Yield Curve

There can be little doubt that the massive, unprecedented surge in inventory accumulation (which counts positively to GDP) will eventually be liquidated. When it does the US enter recession, global dollar liquidity crashes, the value of dollar surges even higher, pulling EM further down and a world recession will be upon us again. In this scenario central banks panic...

But the question remains whether financial condition concern should manifest itself through unemployment and inflation dual mandate forecasts or be a separate consideration all together? To me, the danger in the latter is it turns central bankers into traders and market timers and that is something they are unlikely to have trained for

We know that the corporate credit bubble has been highly disturbed, but the action in mREIT’s these past few days more than suggests that risk perceptions systemically are being affected. That all ties back to funding considerations, as the collapse in REM may be investors selling ahead of liquidity problems that are still building and expanding. In other words, there may be a growing sense (not unlike inflation breakevens) that the corporate pricing problems are going to break out in short order beyond just junk (and beyond what already has).

The Fed’s policy of forward guidance and radical transparency is not working. It turns out that letting the market peer over its shoulder as it makes monetary policy sausage is, in some ways, worse than the opaque process that existed prior to the arrival of Bernanke and Yellen. It pulls back the curtain and shows the human, error prone side of the Fed. Every time the Fed’s dots move, it is an admission of failure and undermines the very confidence it was trying to inspire.

It just keeps getting worse, and worse, and worse...

Historical comparisons, suggest to the FOMC to be extra careful, and don’t underestimate the trust the markets have for the FOMC to act rationally. We all expect the FOMC to act counter-cyclically; a rate rise now would be pro-cyclical, or making the problem worse. Anything FOMC members say after a ‘philosophical’ rate rise would greatly diminish its value. This comparison with Japan suggests that raising rates prematurely is detrimental and avoidable.

How did our financial system weaken to the point where a quarter of a percent increase in rates is more than it can handle?

When it comes to the Fed's upcoming rate hike, only one simple shorthand matters: higher rates means less liquidity, and vice versa. What does that mean for inflation/deflation and bond yields? According to the following simple and understandable analysis by Deutsche Bank, nothing good.

When it comes to crisis, SocGen notes that there is an abundance of case studies; and against the backdrop of the uncertainty shock delivered by China and the subsequent market tumult, market participants have been looking to the history books for clues as to what could happen next. While individual crises create their own risks, SocGen warns, the overriding risk  is that markets are taking less comfort today from the idea that central banks may step in with further QE-style liquidity injections to save the world.

Overnight we got an unexpected call from perpetual optimist JPMorgan (yes, we all miss Tom Lee), which released a report by Mislav Matejka warning that it is not "time to re-enter the US" because "upside is limited at this stage of cycle." To wit: "some of the longer term cycle signals are increasingly worrying, with rising risk that US equities start making sustained losses next year. At best, the upside potential for the US remains limited, in our view." Still, just like BofA, JPM felt the need to hedge: "too early to position for recession." 

"there is a sense that policy is being priced to “fail” rather than succeed... why should equities always rise in value? Why should debt holders be expected to afford their debt burden? There are plenty of alternative viable equilibria with SPX half its value, longevity liabilities in default and debt deflation in abundance. In those equilibria traditional QE ceases to work and the only road back to what we think is the current desired equilibrium is via true helicopter money via fiscal stimulus where there are no independent central banks.

Every Federal Reserve Chair since 1979 has faced a notable challenge in the first 12-20 months of their tenure – something akin to capital markets “Bullies” hazing the new kid at school. Paul Volcker had the 1979-1980 Iranian oil shock/recession, Alan Greenspan the 1987 Stock Market Crash, and Ben Bernanke the 2007 Financial Crisis. Their responses shaped market perceptions about Federal Reserve priorities and set the stage for the remainder of their tenures, from Inflation-Fighting Volcker to Save-the-World Bernanke. Now, it is Chair Yellen’s turn...

Are there any conditions now that are actually better than those of 2008? Or are conditions now less resilient, more fragile and more dependent on unprecedented central bank interventions?

The last three times inflation expectations tumbled this low, the Fed was about to launch QE1, QE2, Operation Twist and QE3.