Chicago Fed's Charlie Evans called the drop in rates at the longer-end of the Treasury yield curve "extraordinary," falling just short of screaming "sell, sell, sell bonds" and threw wrench in the Fed's policy path by noting "raising rates at the wrong time would be catastrophic." So it is noteworthy that damage control appears to have been engaged this morning by no lesser Fed mouthpiece than Wall Street Journal's Jon Hilsenrath [9]. Reminding the public of Bill Dudley's fears, when he argued the Fed had the wrong reaction to lower long rates in the 2000s, a mistake that might have contributed to the housing boom that ended disastrously; when instead the Fed should push rates higher sooner or more aggressively than planned.
Via The Wall Street Journal's Jon Hilsenrath, [9]
If, on the other hand, lower long-term rates are a reflection of investors pouring money into U.S. dollar assets, flows that could spark a U.S. asset price boom, it might prompt the Fed to push rates higher sooner or more aggressively than planned.
The latter interpretation is less conventional, but it is one that New York Fed President William Dudley made at length in a speech in December. He argued the Fed had the wrong reaction to lower long rates in the 2000s, a mistake that might have contributed to the housing boom that ended disastrously.
Here is a key passage:
During the 2004-07 period, the (Fed) tightened monetary policy nearly continuously, raising the federal funds rate from 1 percent to 5.25 percent in 17 steps. However, during this period, 10-year Treasury note yields did not rise much, credit spreads generally narrowed and U.S. equity price indices moved higher. Moreover, the availability of mortgage credit eased, rather than tightened. As a result, financial market conditions did not tighten. As a result, financial conditions remained quite loose, despite the large increase in the federal funds rate. With the benefit of hindsight, it seems that either monetary policy should have been tightened more aggressively or macroprudential measures should have been implemented in order to tighten credit conditions in the overheated housing sector.
Mr. Dudley’s conclusion was that the pace of the Fed’s short-term interest rate moves this time around ought to be dictated in part by whether the rest of the financial system is moving with or against the Fed’s intentions when it decides it ought to start restraining credit creation:
When lift-off occurs, the pace of monetary policy normalization will depend, in part, on how financial market conditions react to the initial and subsequent tightening moves. If the reaction is relatively large—think of the response of financial market conditions during the so-called “taper tantrum” during the spring and summer of 2013—then this would likely prompt a slower and more cautious approach. In contrast, if the reaction were relatively small or even in the wrong direction, with financial market conditions easing—think of the response of long-term bond yields and the equity market as the asset purchase program was gradually phased out over the past year—then this would imply a more aggressive approach.
...a stronger dollar and rising – albeit volatile – stock prices suggest the U.S. is attracting foreign capital which could charge up U.S. financial conditions and prompt an early or more aggressive Fed move.
The Fed’s next policy meeting is three weeks away. It is clear officials will spend a considerable time debating the correct response to a perplexing lurch down in long-term rates.
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Strawman? Or Hint?
It seems Dudley's view that stocks rising and bond yields falling post-QE3 is "wrong" and requires a more aggressive stance is extremely noteworthy.
