Carry Trade

Not many websites, analysts or authors have both the balls/temerity & the analytical honesty to take Goldman on. Well, I say.... Let's dance! This isn't a collection of soundbites from the MSM. This is truly meaty, hard hitting analysis for the big boys and girls. If you're easily offended or need the 6 second preview I suggest you move on.

For those who are in a hurry today, the bottom line is that Japan is in serious trouble right now and is a top candidate to be the next black swan. Here are the elements of difficulty that concern me the most, each one serving to reduce Japan's economic and financial stability:

• The total shutdown of all 54 nuclear plants, leading to an energy insufficiency
• Japan's trade deficit in negative territory for the first time in decades, driven largely by energy imports
• A budget deficit that is now 56% larger than revenues (!!)
• Total debt standing at a whopping 235% of GDP
• A recession shrinking Japan's economy at an annual rate of 2.3%
• Renewed efforts underway to debase the yen

As I wrote a shortly after the earthquake in March 2011, Japan is facing an economic meltdown. If it is not careful, it may well face a currency meltdown, too. These things take time to play out, but now almost exactly a year after the devastating earthquake of 2011, the difficulties for Japan are mounting -- as expected.

Okay, we don’t know if that is a good translation of Dead Bank Walking into Portuguese, but we didn’t think zombie banks was sufficient. As Portugal's sovereign spreads have risen by 200bps in the last 3 weeks and now trade at a wholly unsustainable 1200bps over Bunds, we thought it worth looking at how large (and under-capitalized) the Portuguese banking system was. Perhaps more critically just how zombified they were with regards to their Central Bank liquidity needs - the picture is not encouraging. As tensions continue to mount internally, it seems the LTRO's lull should be used to wipe out the weak banks or recap the less-than-dismal banks as that is the only real firewall. With the Greek PSI/restructuring dangling in the dust, it seems increasingly likely (as the IIF just noted) that Portugal is next and imminent given market pricing, despite the 'uniqueness' of their Hellenic neighbors.

That red color on your screen this morning is not a failure in the green pixel channel but an indication of three main things. First, European composite PMIs came in at 49.3, down from 50.4 in January, and below the preliminary print 49.7 released on February 22. The main reason was the slide in the Eurozone Service PMI which printed at 48.8 on expected 49.4. This included a deterioration not only in the peripheral countries but in the core stalwarts France and Germany too. Elsewhere, China reduced its growth target to 7.5% this year, the lowest goal since 2004. The government will also aim for inflation of about 4 percent this year, unchanged from its goal in 2011. China also announced that it will target a deficit of 800bn CNY for 2012, a rather surprising change from its previous stance. Rounding out the dour note is a Moody's announcement that Ireland is likely to need a second bailout when its current aid program ends, rating agency Moody’s warned today, and that it too may need a PSI just like Greece. Then again, scratch may and replace with will. From the Irish Times: "In its weekly credit outlook report, Moody’s also warned a No vote in the upcoming fiscal treaty referendum would bar Ireland from receiving further funds from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The agency predicted the Government would have to rely on the ESM for additional funding after the existing bailout program expires in 2014. "We expect Ireland to face challenges regaining market access in 2013 and it will likely need to rely on the ESM, at least partially, when the current support  programme expires,” it said." As a reminder, if Ireland proceeds with a referendum on the Fiscal compact, and the referendum fails, it will have no ESM support, and thus no second bailout potential. Finally, the ECB deposit facility usage soared to an all time record of €821 billion overnight, confirming that the LTRO 2, contrary to some wrong analysis, is not being used for Carry trades at all.

Analysts are questioning the "double-down effect" the ECB's LTRO exercises are creating in eurozone sovereign spreads. Citi notes a spike in the purchase of government securities since the initial take-up in December.

Rosie: "Somehow a long gold, short euro barbell looks really good here. Bernanke, after all, now seems reluctant to embark on QE3 barring a renewed economic turndown while the ECB is moving further away from the role of a traditional central bank to take on the role of quasi fiscal policymaking, The German central bank, after all, is responsible for 25% of any losses that would ever be incurred by the massive Draghi balance sheet expansion. Why would anyone want to be long a currency representing a region with a 10.7% unemployment rate, rising inflation rates and free money? Mind you — the same can be said for the US (where U-6 jobless rate is even higher), which is why the best currency may be physical gold."

American investor (and longtime CM.com member) Erik Townsend has spent the past several years living internationally, with an eye to which countries may be good alternatives if economic crisis and/or Peak Oil start to materially impact life in the US.  His main observation as an expat? Through its misguided policies, the US has been exporting inflation to the rest of the world, raising prices all over the globe (as an example, he cites a $57 chicken pot pie from the menu at a 'working class' restaurant in Australia).  This inflation is affecting the rest of the world harshly, but is not yet being felt in the US due to our ability to export it as the issuer of the world's reserve currency. Our immunity will not last forever though, and when it ends, a massive upwards spike in prices is going to hit US markets.

When explaining the practical effect of Wednesday's second and certainly not last LTRO, we said that "when it comes to explaining why Europe's banks are not only not deleveraging but increasing leverage while paying an incremental 75 bps on up to €700 billion in deposits soon to be handed over to the ECB, one needs all the favorable spin one can muster." We also estimated that net of rollovers and other tangents, the true net liquidity add would be €311 billion and "the final number by which the ECB's deposit account will increase will be about €210 billion less than the overhead number" of €529.5 billion. Sure enough, as of this morning, which takes into account the full settlement and allocation of the second LTRO cash installment, the ECB's deposit facility has soared by precisely as expected, rising by €302 billion overnight to an all time record of €777 billion, or just over $1 trillion. In other words, Europe has now successfully managed to fool everyone that it is executing the carry trade, when it is doing nothing like that at all, and it continues to park record amounts of cash with the ECB on which not only is it not earning a carry spread, but it is losing 75 basis points as it is paid a meager 0.25% for a deposit that cost it 1.00%. Said otherwise, instead of building a cash position and retaining earnings to fund €3 trillion in debt rollovers over the next three years (by the time the LTRO matures incidentally - good luck paying down that additional €1 trillion, which makes it a total of €4 trillion in maturing debt), roughly 800 European banks will bleed by €6 billion in the next year just to store their cash with the ECB. So much for promises of the carry trade. And we certainly commiserate with all those who bought European bonds on the assumption that they were frontrunning banks who are buying up BTPs, Bonos and what not. They were only frontrunning themselves.

The results for the second European 3 year discount window operation, pardon LTRO are in, and the winner is...

• ECB ALLOTS EU 529.5BLN IN 1,092 DAY REFINANCING TENDER
• ECB SAYS 800 BANKS ASKED FOR THREE-YEAR LOANS

Since the expected range was €200 billion - €1 trillion, and just above the median €500 billion, this is clearly within expectations, however notably less than what the Goldman investor survey expected at €680 billion. What is certainly scary is that the number of banks demanding a hand out was a whopping 800, well above the 523 from the first LTRO: clearly many banks are capital deprived.

There is broad disagreement among European banks on whether they should (and whether they will) choose to access the LTRO. We have discussed the top-down perspective and the very granular bank-by-bank perspective, and we end with a more bottoms-up perspective on the bank's own views of the LTRO. As SocGen notes, the investment banks (and certain Swedish banks) are very skeptical (and rightly so given the 'LTRO Stigma') while the Italian and Spanish are open to taking whatever they can, whenever they can (is that really a good sign?). Bank management must weigh the transparency they will face at the end of the quarter when sovereign bond holdings are exposed and just as SocGen points out, banks with considerably higher exposure (implicitly through the carry trade) may well face much more negative market action (even if Basel III doesn't handicap that risk). As with LTRO 1, the ECB will only reveal aggregate data, leaving the individual banks themselves to reveal their own take-up - we suspect the investment banks will make a point of highlighting that they did not take the funds, while the Portuguese, Italian, and Spanish banks will promote the benefits of their government-reach-around self-immolating ECB life-line.

So far there are no dramatic consequences of the Greek default.  The ECB did say they couldn’t accept it as collateral, but national central banks (including Greece’s somehow solvent NCB) can, so no real change.  We will likely get a Credit Event prior to March 20th once CAC’s are used to get the deal fully done.  Will the market respond much to that?  Probably not, though there is a higher risk of unforeseen consequences from that, than there was from the S&P downgrade. It just strikes us that Europe wasted a year or more, and has created a less stable system than it had before. Tomorrow’s LTRO is definitely interesting.  It seems like every outcome is now bullish – big take up is bullish because of the “carry” trade.  Low take up is bullish because “banks are okay”. Any weak bank looking to borrow from the LTRO to buy sovereign debt would be insane to buy bonds longer than 3 years and take the roll risk, but on the other hand, the weakest and most insolvent, got there by doing insane things in the first place.

Gaming out the impact of this week's LTRO2 demand on global risk assets is complicated by the ability of banks to mobilize collateral (how much can they pledge to the ECB and how much of that will be 'optimal' given the implicit subordination of senior unsecured debt holders), the use of those funds (carry trade economics are considerably lower and refinancing needs remain high), and the market's expectations (just how much more back-door QE is priced into European - and for that matter - US asset prices). Goldman Sachs surveyed its clients and found a gaping divide between banks and investors with the latter expecting considerably more than the banks - it seems someone will be disappointed - investors hope for more and banks expect to do less.

With the second version of the ECB's enhanced LTRO (back-door QE) starting tomorrow, there has been a great deal of speculation on what the take-up will be, what banks will do with the funds they receive, and more importantly how will this effect global asset markets. SocGen provides a comprehensive top-down analysis of the drivers of LTRO demand, the likely uses of those funds, and estimates how much of this will be used to finance the carry trade (placebo or no placebo). Italian (25%) and Spanish (20%) banks are unsurprisingly at the forefront in their take-up of ECB liquidity (likely undertaking the M.A.D. reach-around carry trade ) and have been since long before the first LTRO. On the other side, German banks have dramatically reduced their collective share of ECB liquidity from 30% to only 6%. SocGen skews their detailed forecast to EUR300-400bn, disappointing relative to the near EUR500bn consensus - and so likely modestly bad news for risk assets. Furthermore, they expect around EUR116bn of this to be used for carry trade 'revenue' production which will however lead to only a 0.6% improvement in sectoral equity levels (though some banks will benefit more than others), as they discuss the misunderstanding of LTRO-to-ECB-deposit facility rotation. We, however, remind readers that collateralized (and self-subordinating) debt is not a substitute for capital and if the ECB adamantly defines this as the last enhanced LTRO (until the next one of course) then European banks face an uphill battle without that crutch - whether or not they even have collateral to post. Its further important to note that LTRO 2 cannot be wholly disentangled from the March 1-2 EU Summit event risk and we fear expectations, priced into markets, are a little excessive. We suspect this will not be a Goldilocks 'just right' moment.

Overnight sentiment is significantly negative, with stocks, bond yields, risk currencies lower after G-20 over the weekend refused to increase IMF funding. The result is an end to the buoyant market sentiment of recent days which has seen the Dax down 1.2%, bund, UST yields lower, and US futures lower. As many had expected, the G-20 has rebuffed EU leaders' request for more assistance, which in turn has placed the onus on Germany to find a way to resolve its internal conflict vis-a-vis a Greek bailout, ironically as many believe that it is Germany who more than anyone wants Greece out. This happens as the Bundestag votes today on second aid package today; Merkel’s government must decide whether to back plans at this week’s summit to combine EFSF and ESM. In other news, tomorrow the ECB will call for bids for the second 3 Year LTRO tomorrow, with results announced on February 29. And with the ECB's deposit facility at €477 billion, it is rather clear that the banks will park the bulk of new proceeds with the ECB once again, where it will continue to be a negative carry trade, earning 0.25% at a cost of 1.00%. And somehow this is favorable for the European sovereign bond market, which continues to ignore the various layers of subordination it is now working under. We expect the market revulsion to this flaw to be violent when it comes, and will result in a rapid and sudden divergence between the various subordinated tranches of sovereign bonds.

The decoupling/recoupling we discussed earlier in the EURUSD pair seemed the biggest deal in Europe this week as the 2.5% gain is thge most in a month and takes the cross back to near 3-month highs. Not to be outdone, the VSTOXX (Europe's VIX equivalent) dropped notably and now stands at its lowest in 7 months - dramatically outperforming equity and credit markets on its way as selling vol appears the easiest trade ever (until of course your arms and legs are ripped off by a risk flare). Credit markets outperformed this week as equity underperformed - bringing the two asset classes closer into sync after last week's plunge in credit. Sovereign credit markets were mixed but clearly the high-beta compression trend has stalled as Portugal underperformed dramatically followed by Belgium with the rest generally tracking sideways (and Spain outperforming modestly). JPY weaknes balanced the EUR strength to keep the USD (DXY) from getting completely crushed on the week -1.35% (as Oil has rallied over 5%).