Carry Trade

We have discussed forecasts for the second (and certainly not last ) February 29 3 Year LTRO in the past, with expectations for its size ranging from €1 trillion all the way up to a mindboggling €10 trillion. Today, Goldman has conducted a poll focusing on investors and banks, to gauge the sentiment for what has over the past 2 months been taken as the latest Deus Ex, which is really nothing than yet another bout of quantitative easing, only one in which the central bank pretend to be sterilizing 3 year loans by accepting any and virtually all collateral that banks can scrape off the bottom of their balance sheets (as a reminder, back in the financial crisis, Zero Hedge discovered that the Fed was accepting stocks of bankrupt companies as collateral - certainly the ECB is doing the same now). And once the banks get the cash instead of lending it out, or using it for carry trades, they simply use it to plug equity undercapitalization due to massive asset shortfalls on their balance sheets which are mark-to-unicorn^TM, yet which generate zero cash flow, even as banks have to pay out cash on their liabilities. In essence, the banks convert worthless crap into perfectly normal cash with the ECB as an intermediary: and that is all the LTRO is. Luckily, as we pointed out, even the idiot market is starting to grasp the circular scam nature of this arrangement, and the fact that it is nothing short of Discount Window usage, and because of that, the stigma associated with being seen as needing this last ditch liquidity injection is starting to grind on the banks. It is only a matter of time before hedge funds create portfolios in which they go long banks which openly refuse to use LTRO cash, and short all the other ones (read every single Italian and Spanish bank out there, and most French ones too) because at the end of the day one can only fool insolvency for so long. But once again we are getting ahead of the market by about 3-6 weeks. In the meantime, and looking forward to the next LTRO, whose cash will be used exclusively to build up "firewalls" ahead of the Greek default, here is what Goldman's clients expect to happen...

According to the WSJ, the “ECB is willing to forego profits on their Greek bonds”. That statement strikes me as one of the scariest things that a central banker could say (and there is some tough competition for that one). Forego profits? Here is the chart of a typical Greek bond over the past 2 years. The ECB started buying Greek bonds in May 2010, and stopped sometime in 2011. How do they possibly have “profits” to give up? They have “profits” because they live in an accrual accounting world. They buy bonds, don’t mark them, and accrue the interest. The accrued interest counts as “profit”. That is the carry trade. That is what everyone is so excited about for the banks. Banks can buy bonds, not mark them, and book the interest accrual (and payments) as profit. The problem with accrual accounting is when a sale is forced. Whatever the reason for the sale (in this case, a restructuring/default by Greece), the accrual accounting game is over and you have real profit or loss. The “profit” is the total proceeds received for the sale, versus total purchase price, plus any coupon payments received, minus costs of carrying the position. Some entity is taking the real world loss.

Since the start of the year, global markets have been apparently buoyed by the understanding that Draghi's shift of the ECB to lender-of-last-and-first-resort via the LTRO has removed a significant tail on the risk spectrum with regard to Euro-banks and slowed the potential for contagious transmission of any further sovereign stress. In fact the rally started earlier on the backs of improved perceptions of US growth (decoupling), better tone in global PMIs, and potential for easing in China and the EMs but it does seem that for now the ECB's liquidity spigot rules markets as even in the face of Greek uncertainty, as George Magnus of UBS notes, 'financial markets are most likely to defer to the ECB's monetary policy largesse' as a solution. Both Magnus and his firm's banking team, however, are unequivocal in their view that the next LTRO will unlikely be the last (how many temporary exceptions are still in place around the world?) and as we noted earlier this morning, banks' managements may indeed not be so quick to gorge on the pipe of freshly collateralized loans this time (as markets will eventually reprice a bank that holds huge size carry trades at an inappropriate risk-weighting) leaving the stigma of LTRO borrowing (for carry trades, substitution for private-sector funding, or buying liquidity insurance) as a mark of differentiable concern as opposed to a rising tide lifts all boats as valuations reach extremes relative to 'broken' business models, falling deposits, and declining earnings power.

They expect a EUR300bn take up of the next LTRO, somewhat larger than the previous EUR200bn add-on - but not hugely so - as the banks face a far different picture (in terms of carry profitability) and yet-to-be-proven transmission to real-economy credit-creation that will make any efforts at a fiscal compact harder and harder to implement as its self-defeating austerity leave debtor countries out in the cold. The critical point is that unless the market believes there will be an endless number of future LTROs, covering the very forward-looking private funding markets for banks, then macro- and event-risk will reappear and volatility will flare.

Did the first (of many) European LTRO buy just one month of marginal improvement? According to a compilation of analyst views by Bloomberg, who looked at today's mixed Spanish auction results when the country sold €4.56 billion of three-, four- and five-year government bonds, the easy money may have been made. Because while average yields fell for all three lines at the auctions, maintaining the trend at Spanish debt sales so far this year, it was the internals that showed weakness and could indicate that the marginal benefit from the first LTRO is now ending, even as the real task - the longer-dated bonds 10 years and great - still have to see much if any carry trade benefit at auction. Lastly, anyone hoping for a full carry flush from the European banks has to give up all hope: ECB announced its deposit facility usage rose to €486.4 billion, up €14 billion overnight. And with that we now know what the LTRO half-life is.

Just a matter of when?

Back in January 2010, when in complete disgust of the farce that the market has become, and where fundamentals were completely trumped by central bank intervention, we said, that "Zero Hedge long ago gave up discussing corporate fundamentals due to our long-held tenet that currently the only relevant pieces of financial information are contained in the Fed's H.4.1, H.3 statements." This capitulation in light of the advent of the Central Planner of Last Resort juggernaut was predicated by our belief that ever since 2008, the only thing that would keep the world from keeling over and succumbing to the $20+ trillion in excess debt (excess to a global debt/GDP ratio of 180%, not like even that is sustainable!) would be relentless central bank dilution of monetary intermediaries, read, legacy currencies, all to the benefit of hard currencies such as gold. Needless to say gold back then was just over $1000. Slowly but surely, following several additional central bank intervention attempts, the world is once again starting to realize that everything else is noise, and the only thing that matters is what the Fed, the ECB, the BOE, the SNB, the PBOC and the BOJ will do. Which brings us to today's George Glynos, head of research at Tradition, who basically comes to the same conclusion that we reached 2 years ago, and which the market is slowly understand is the only way out today (not the relentless bid under financial names). The note's title? "If 2011 was the year of the eurozone crisis, 2012 will be the year of the central banks." George is spot on. And it is this why we are virtually certain that by the end of the year, gold will once again be if not the best performing assets, then certainly well north of $2000 as the 2009-2011 playbook is refreshed. Cutting to the chase, here are Glynos' conclusions.

You've just crossed over...

Somehow the fact that the PIIGS can issue Bills (sub 1-year debt) in an environment in which both the ECB and the Fed have made any debt investment under 3 years risk free is taken as a positive sign. But in a continent starved for even the most optically irrelevant good news, this may be all it gets, which it did last night after Italy auctioned off €8 billion 182 bills at a 1.97% rate, the lowest since May. A far more relevant question is where peripheral debt with a maturity greater than 3 years, and thus with implicit risk, would price. But for now at least some of the banks appear to be dipping their toe into a very short-term carry trade, with ECB deposits declining from €484.1 billion to €464.8 billion overnight. Whether or not this is on the back of the assumption that a Greek default is contained remains to be seen: it would be truly laughable if Europe believes things are ok and thus underutilizes the next LTRO in one month only to find itself with a several trillion euro shortfall 3 weeks later. Yet this, being Europe, is the most likely outcome. Offsetting Bill issuance optimism is the ongoing uncertainty over the outcome of the Greek PSI talks, which for now at least have stalled with the cash coupon being the straw man sticking point. The truth is that if hedge funds want a default to proceed with international litigation arbitrage, that most lucrative of hedge fund strategies, they will get a default. Everything else is irrelevant. Below is Bloomberg's summary of how the newsflow is affecting markets.

Over the past month, much has been said about the recent 3 year LTRO, and its function in stabilizing the European bond market. Certainly it has succeeded in causing an unprecedented steepening in European sovereign 2s10s curves across the periphery (well, except for Greece, and recently, Portugal) as by implication the ECB has made it clear that debt with a sub-3 year maturity is virtually risk free, inasmuch at least as the ECB is a credible central bank (and if it is perceived as no longer being one, there will be far bigger issues), along the lines of what the Fed's promise to keep ZIRP through the end of 2013, and today's likely extension announcement through 2014. Yet does filling a much needed for European stability fixed income "black hole" equate to a catalyst for Risk On? Hardly, because as in a new note today Brockhouse Cooper analysts Pierre Lapointe and Alex Bellefleur explains, the LTRO is "not a catalyst for a risk-on rally as the central bank is substituting itself for funding sources that have “dried up.” Sure enough - all the ECB is doing is preserving existing leverage (especially in light of ongoing bank deleveraging), not providing incremental debt, something which could only be done in the context of unsterilized bond monetization ala QE in the US. So just over a month in, what does the LTRO really mean for Europe (especially as we approach the next 3 Year LTRO issuance on February 29)? Here is Brockhouse's explanation.

Lots of questions, and answers, from UBS in this Q&A on the Greek default/restructuring, much of it already covered previously, but the only one that matters is this: "Would the restructuring make the Greek situation sustainable? No. Sorry, but no is the answer. Even with full repudiation of the Greek debt, the situation would not be sustainable. In that event, the deficit would move to the primary balance, 5-6% last year. Not sustainable. And the current account deficit would be in the high single digits. Not sustainable either." So you're telling me there's a chance?

LTRO version 1.0 continues to capture the market's attention.  It was a reason to rally, then fade, now back to an excuse to rally. Our contention all along has been that LTRO was good for banks.  It dramatically reduced the liquidity risk for banks. It did nothing for the solvency of banks or sovereigns, and we continue to believe it doesn't do anything for the liquidity risk of sovereigns. We think the belief that the carry trade is at work is a fallacy. Banks did NOT take down LTRO to buy new assets and are still in deleveraging mode, so will NOT use the next LTRO offering to take on new money. We will see what happens but Peter Tchir believes that the second tranche of LTRO will be a pale comparison of the first in terms of size which will damage market excitement over how much of the "carry" trade is going on.

Following last week's Easter egg by JPMorgan, the misses by financials continue, with Citi crapping the bed following a big miss in both top and bottom line after reporting $17.2 billion and $0.38 EPS on expectations of $18.5 billion and $0.52 per share. The biggest hit to the top line was the DVA adjustment courtesy of tightening CDS spreads, which while adding to top and bottom line in Q3, took out $1.9 billion in Q4 - of course like everything else it was also priced in. And while we are confident the full earnings presentation will be a labyrinth of loss covering, the first thing to realize is that absent a $1.5 billion in loan loss reserve releases, the bank would have reported negative net income, which was $1.364 billion pretax. Yet there is no way to explain the absolute bloodbath in the Securities and Banking group, which saw revenues implode by 53% from $6.7 billion to $3.2 billion Y/Y, and down 10% Q/Q. Notably, Lending revenues down 84% from $1 billion to $164 million. RIP Carry Trade.

All your questions about the historic European downgrade should be answered after reading the following FAQ. Or so S&P believes. Ironically, it does an admirable job, because the following presentation successfully manages to negate years of endless lies and propaganda by Europe's incompetent and corrupt klepocrarts, and lays out the true terrifying perspective currently splayed out before the eurozone better than most analyses we have seen to date. Namely that the failed experiment is coming to an end. And since the Eurozone's idiotic foundation was laid out by the same breed of central planning academic wizards who thought that Keynesianism was a great idea (and continue to determine the fate of the world out of their small corner office in the Marriner Eccles building), the imminent downfall of Europe will only precipitate the final unraveling of the shaman "economic" religion that has taken the world to the brink of utter financial collapse and, gradually, world war.

Stock futures are up sharply after another week of unprecedented volatility. Although last week was relatively tame, only 13 times in the last 60 years has the S&P 500 had a down 1% day during the week between Christmas and New Year's.  We managed one of those days last week.  We also had a 1% positive day.  Futures are strong and looks like stocks will open above 1272 (where they closed on Jan. 3, 2011). Not only does volatility remain elevated, the stories are about the same. We have some new acronyms to contend with, but ultimately the European Debt Crisis (it is both a bank and sovereign crisis) and the strength of the US economy and China's ability to manage its slowdown are the primary stories. Issues in the Mid-East remain on the fringe but threaten to elevate to something more serious with Iran flexing its muscles more and more. So what to do?  Prepare for more headlines, more risk reversals, and more pain.

While nothing out of Italy or France was on the bond docket today, other countries in Europe will be issuing bonds on a virtually daily basis as the continent prepares to roll an record amount of debt in Q1, and in January as well (full calendar here). As such we saw new Bill issuance from Belgium and from Netherlands. The waffle country sold €1.280 billion in 3 Month T-Bills at a 2.13 Bid To Cover, a plunge compared to the 8.59 previously, albeit with the yield dropping from 0.78% to 0.264% as it falls flatly within the risk-free period defined by the 3 Year LTRO. Belgium also issued €1.155 6 Month T-Bills at a 2.01 Bid To Cover compared to 2.76 previously and a rate plunging from 2.438% to 0.364%. Elsewhere the Netherland also took advantage of the now mixed LTRO euphoria to sell €4.65 billion in Bills, specifically €2.99 billion in March 2012 Bills pricing at 0.00% (compared to negative -0.007% before), and €1.66 billion December 2012 Bills at a yield of 0.05% - obviously the market is still enamored with Netherlands as a safe haven on par with Germany. And speaking of the LTRO, that carry trade concept is now dead with the year end cash parking theory scrapped following the announcement thet banks parked the second highest amount in history at the ECB, or €446 billion, just shy of the €452 billion hit on December 27.