fixed

George Soros has been a busy man the last few days. Appearing at the INET Conference a number of times and penning detailed articles for the FT (and here at Project Syndicate) describing the terrible situation in which Europe finds itself - and furthermore offering a potential solution. Critically, he opines, the European crisis is complex since it is a vicious circle of competing crises: sovereign debt, balance of payments, banking, competitiveness, and structurally defective non-optimal currency union. The fact is 'we are very far from equilibrium...of the Maastricht criteria' with his very clear insight that the massive gap, or cognitive dissonance, between the 'official authorities' hope and the outside world who see how abnormal the situation is, is troublesome at best. Analogizing the periphery countries as third-world countries that are heavily indebted in a foreign currency (that they cannot print), his initial conclusion ends with the blunt statement that "the euro has really broken down" and the ensuing discussion of just what this means from both an economic and socially devastating perspective: the destruction of the common market and the European Union and how this will end in acrimonious recriminations with worse conflicts between European states than before.

Of the twenty-five largest banks in the world there is only one that does not need to raise additional capital to de-lever to a 20x leverage and a 5% of Tangible Capital Ratio and that is Citigroup which has a current leverage of just 13 times and I also point out that Wells Fargo with a 14 times leverage needs a minor amount of capital to accomplish these goals. At the far other end of this scale is Deutsche Bank which is levered 62 times and would need a massive amount of new capital and tremendous shrinkage to accomplish these goals. The assets of DB are also equivalent to the entire GDP of Germany so that the bank could devour the country if Deutsche Bank were to hit the wall. Then the most leverage can be found at Credit Agricole at 66 times which would also swamp France, given its size, if asset values continue to decline or if Spain or Italy need to be bailed out and the contagion worsens.

In the end having a system without rules is not the same as having a system without consequences. It may be hard to figure out the consequences in such a poorly articulated system, but in time the system will tell you.

That is what EMU is finding out and what the rest of the world is discovering as the flaws in the global financial system become more apparent. But we are much better at finding flaws that at finding solutions.  

• ECB Seen Favoring Bond Buying Over Bank Loans (Bloomberg)
• Italians Rally Against Monti’s Pension-Overhaul Limbo (Bloomberg)
• Spain Cracks Down on Fraud as Rajoy Says Aid Impossible (Bloomberg)
• Europe’s Capital Flight Betrays Currency’s Fragility (Bloomberg)
• China’s Less-Than-Forecast 8.1% Growth May Signal Easing (Bloomberg)
• China Banks Moving to Lower Mortgage Interest Rates (China Daily)
• Fed Officials Differ on Need to Keep Rates Low to 2014 (Bloomberg)
• North Korea Confirms Rocket Failure (Reuters)
• Yuan Lending Set to Cross New Border in Pilot Plan (China Daily)

Earlier today JPMorgan announced results that were better than expected, with revenue of $27.4 billion on expectations of $24.1 billion, and EPS of $1.31 or $5.0 billion, on expectations of $1.17. As previously noted, the bank increased its dividend to $0.30/share, and has authorized a $15 billion new repurchase, which however will likely not be a sizable factor, as JPM has already said with the stock price at the current level buybacks are not accretive. As for the EPS beat, as usual the one-time items swamped everything else, of which the primary one, reduction in loan loss reserves which is the traditional way for the bank to pump up the bottom line, accounting for $1.8 billion or $0.28/share. We are curious how Jamie Dimon will justify this accelerating release even as the firm's Nonperforming loans increased for the first time in years from $10 billion to $10.6 billion: just the TBTF put or something else? Other amusing "one-time" items were the $1.1 billion ($0.17/share) from the WaMu bankruptcy settlement as well as a $0.9 billion loss ($0.14/share) loss from DVA this time hurting the bank as JPM's CDS tightened in Q1. Also curious was a substantial $2.5 billion expense for additional litigation reserves, which is certainly not a one-time item now that every bank is suing JPM and is merely a catch up for Dimon to where he should have been reserved. That, or something else - just what is JPM seeing that others are not (hint: ask Bank of America). This number will continue rising. So net of the real one-time items, EPS was less than a $1.00.

A Monetary Cliff or a Fiscal Cliff: these are the two poisons that Barton Biggs sees rushing straight toward America, with little hope of an uneventful collision. While we have not been shy of our opinions on Barton Biggs' flip-flopping positions, his note on the US "as a nation of totally self-centered special interest groups that terrorize our politicians" struck a chord and deserves praise in its clarity. Noting that Europe seems stuck again, he points to the US market being data and Europe-dependent for the next month and believes the correction is little less than half way over (in terms of size not time). In Biggs opinion "although the Monetary Cliff is more long-term dangerous, the proximity of the Fiscal Cliff, if not dealt with, will trigger the dreaded double-dip recession we are all terrified of and bring on another financial crisis."

"In the last three plus years, central banks have had little choice but to do the unsustainable in order to sustain the unsustainable until others do the sustainable to restore sustainability!" is how PIMCO's El-Erian introduces the game-theoretic catastrophe that is potentially occurring around us. In a lecture to the St.Louis Fed, the moustachioed maestro of monetary munificence states "let me say right here that the analysis will suggest that central banks can no longer – indeed, should no longer – carry the bulk of the policy burden" and "it is a recognition of the declining effectiveness of central banks’ tools in countering deleveraging forces amid impediments to growth that dominate the outlook. It is also about the growing risk of collateral damage and unintended circumstances." It appears that we have reached the legitimate point of – and the need for – much greater debate on whether the benefits of such unusual central bank activism sufficiently justify the costs and risks. This is not an issue of central banks’ desire to do good in a world facing an “unusually uncertain” outlook. Rather, it relates to questions about diminishing returns and the eroding potency of the current policy stances. The question is will investors remain "numb and sedated…. by the money sloshing around the system?" or will "the welfare of millions in the United States, if not billions of people around the world, will have suffered greatly if central banks end up in the unpleasant position of having to clean up after a parade of advanced nations that headed straight into a global recession and a disorderly debt deflation." Of course, it is a rhetorical question.

We all know that central banks and governments have been actively intervening in markets since the 2007 subprime mortgage meltdown destabilized the leveraged-debt-dependent global economy. We also know that unprecedented intervention is now the de facto institutionalized policy of central banks and governments. In some cases, the financial authorities have explicitly stated their intention to “stabilize markets” (translation: reinflate credit-driven speculative bubbles) by whatever means are necessary, while in others the interventions are performed by proxies so the policy remains implicit.  All through the waning months of 2007 and the first two quarters of 2008, the market gyrated as the Federal Reserve and other central banks issued reassurances that the subprime mortgage meltdown was “contained” and posed no threat to the global economy. The equity market turned to its standard-issue reassurance: “Don’t fight the Fed,” a maxim that elevated the Federal Reserve’s power to goose markets to godlike status. But alas, the global financial meltdown of late 2008 showed that hubris should not be confused with godlike power. Despite the “impossibility” of the market disobeying the Fed’s commands (“Away with thee, oh tides, for we are the Federal Reserve!”) and the “sure-fire” cycle of stocks always rising in an election year, global markets imploded as the usual bag of central bank and Sovereign State tricks failed in spectacular fashion.

The second bond auction of the week prices uneventfully, with the Treasury selling $21 billion of 10 Years at a yield of 2.043%, better than the 2.045% When Issued, and better than last month's 2.08%. Yet keep in mind that inbetween the March auction and today, the 10 year hit nearly 2.40%, so don't let the apparently stability give the impression that there is no volatility under the surface. Unlike the yield, the Bid To Cover dropped from last month's 3.24 to 3.08, which while week for recent auctions was just below the TTM average of 3.12. What is of note is that Dealers had to once again take down more than half the auction, or 50.5%, with the last time there was more than a 50% takedown being back in November 2011. Of the balance 11% went to Direct, and the remainder or 38.5% to Indirects. Overall, a quiet auction and now we just have tomorrow's $13 billion 30 Years to look forward to as total US debt approaches the $15.7 trillion milestone next on its way to the $16.3 trillion debt ceiling breach in 6 months. In the meantime enjoy fixed coupon bonds: for in one month, the FRN cometh.

In a few weeks the Treasury will most likely launch Floating Rate Notes. Will that be the signal to get out of Dodge? If history is any precedent, and especially the 1951 Accord... you bet.

 Best Buy’s CEO Brian Dunn did a courageous and proper thing for shareholders by resigning.  He was not the right person to lead Best Buy into battle against online-only competitors that use Best Buy’s spacious and beautiful stores as the showroom for their products.  To make things even worse, smart cell phones make comparison shopping so much easier nowadays, and structurally, Best Buy cannot have lower prices than its online competitors.  Its stores also lack the breadth of selection of Amazon and they are at a permanent, competitive cost disadvantage.&nbs

The topic of the student loan bubble (and even its popping) has been digested to death on Zero Hedge. One topic that has been avoided however, is that of the student equity bubble, for the simple reason that until now the concept did not exist. That may change soon: as the Economist reports, some California students have a modest proposal to the symbiotic University-Banker net worth extraction mechanism - shove your debt. Instead, they will pay for their unaffordable education (except when funded with copious amounts of unserviceable and non-dischargable debt) with equity.

UK and EU markets played catch up at the open this morning following Friday’s miss in the US non-farm payroll report. This coupled with on-going concerns over Spain has resulted in further aggressive widening in the 10yr government bond yield spreads in Europe with the Spanish 10yr yield edging ever closer to the 6% level. As a result the USD has strengthened in the FX market in a moderate flight to quality with EUR/USD trading back firmly below the 1.3100 and cable falling toward the 1.5800 mark. There was some unconfirmed market talk this morning about an imminent press conference from the SNB which raised a few eyebrows given the recent move in EUR/CHF below the well publicised floor at 1.2000, however, further colour suggested an announcement would be linked to the naming of Jordan as the full-time head of the central bank when they hold their regular weekly meeting this Wednesday. Elsewhere it’s worth noting that the BoJ refrained from any additional monetary easing overnight voting unanimously to keep rates on hold as widely expected. Meanwhile, over in China the latest trade balance data recorded a USD 5.35bln surplus in March as import growth eased back from a 13-month peak.

Since most people live in the real World, this concept of cyclical versus structural falls on deaf ears. However, it’s actually a very important concept for you to understand and it could even save you a few bucks in your portfolio. Cyclical simply means the regular ebbs and flows of a market. Think of your daily commute to work (if you have a job) – some days are longer, some are shorter but in general they are quite predictable. Structural refers to the underlying foundation and how it supports the system. For example, what happens if suddenly in the middle of the night the bridge everyone uses collapses. Suddenly your commute has become a lot more complicated and will remain complicated for a long time. In the real World, 6 million people had their bridge collapse and lost their jobs. Yet, in Mr. Bernanke’s World this cyclical inconvenience could easily be fixed simply by cutting interest rates to 0%, spending billions on “shovel ready” projects, and cutting taxes. Sadly, a funny thing didn’t happen - the usual boomerang (or cyclical) rebound in new jobs has not occurred, and for some strange reason the collapsed bridge hasn’t been replaced either. The high levels of employment reached during the 2004-2007 period were achieved on the backs of the housing and debt bubbles. During that time, economic growth was boosted by 400% as a result of people taking equity out of their homes (mortgage equity withdrawal). Considering no one has any equity left in their homes to withdraw, economic growth and the jobs that come with it are going to have to find another adrenalin shot. If you know the next big thing – feel free to share it, the World needs it.

5 days ago saw the 150th year anniversary of an event so historic that a very select few even noticed: the birth of US fiat. Bloomberg was one of the few who commemorated the birth of modern US currency: "On April 2, 1862, the first greenback left the U.S. Treasury, marking the start of a new era in the American monetary system.... The greenbacks were originally intended to be a temporary emergency-financing measure. Almost bankrupt, the Treasury needed money to pay suppliers and troops. The plan was to print a limited supply of United States notes to meet the crisis and then have people convert the currency into Treasury bonds. But United States notes grew in popularity and continued to circulate." The rest, as they say is history. In the intervening 150 years, the greenback saw major transformations: from being issued by the Treasury and backed by gold, it is now printed, mostly in electronic form, by an entity that in its own words, is "set up similarly to private corporations, but operated in the public interest." Of course, when said public interest is not the primary driver of operation, the entity, also known as the Federal Reserve is accountable to precisely nobody. Oh, and the fiat money, which is now just a balance sheet liability of a private corporation, and thus just a plug to the Fed's deficit monetization efforts, is no longer backed by anything besides the "full faith and credit" of a country that is forced to fund more than half of its spending through debt issuance than tax revenues.