Russell 2000

Back in April 2012, in "How The Fed's Visible Hand Is Forcing Corporate Cash Mismanagement" we first explained how despite its best intentions (to boost the Russell 2000 to new all time highs, a goal it achieved), the Fed's now constant intervention in capital markets has achieved one thing when it comes to the real economy: an unprecedented capital mismanagemenet, where as a result of ZIRP, corporate executives will always opt for short-term, low IRR, myopic cash allocation decisions such as dividend, buyback and, sometimes, M&A, seeking to satisfy shareholders and ignoring real long-term growth opportunities such as R&D spending, efficiency improvements, capital reinvestment, retention and hiring of employees, and generally all those things that determine success for anyone whose investment horizon is longer than the nearest lockup gate. Today, one calendar year later, none other than Bill Gross, in his first investment letter of 2013, admits we were correct: "Zero-bound interest rates, QE maneuvering, and “essentially costless” check writing destroy financial business models and stunt investment decisions which offer increasingly lower ROIs and ROEs. Purchases of “paper” shares as opposed to investments in tangible productive investment assets become the likely preferred corporate choice." It is this that should be the focus of economists, and not what the level of the S&P is, as it is no longer indicative of any underlying market fundamentals, but merely how large, in nominal terms, the global balance sheet is. And as long as the impact of peak central-planning on "business models" is ignored, there can be no hope of economic stabilization, let alone improvement. All this and much more, especially his admissions that yes, it is flow, and not stock, that dominates the Fed market impact (think great white shark - must always be moving), if not calculus, in Bill Gross' latest letter.

Presented with little comment as the Russell 2000 reaches up to its all-time (nominal) record highs...

Ironically, the very success of stock market manipulation only thins the market of legitimate participants and thus increases the probability that risk that has been suppressed for years will erupt uncontrollably. That the stock market is manipulated is no longer in question. One explicit goal in the Fed's zero-interest rate policy (ZIRP) is to drive capital into risk assets such as stocks. That is a first-order, transparent policy of manipulation, i.e. a centrally managed policy aimed at managing markets to meet a key central-planning goal: creating an illusion of prosperity via an elevated stock market and the resultant "wealth effect" for the 10% who own enough stocks to matter. Indirect manipulation is hidden from public view lest the rigging of the market taint the perception that a rising market is "proof" that Federal Reserve and Administration policies are "succeeding." Indirect manipulation is achieved via Federal Reserve quantitative easing operations, unlimited liquidity and lines of credit to fund bank speculations and masked buying of market futures. This multilevel manipulation creates a Boolean either/or for any Bear market: either it is a planned "panic" that profits the banks or a systemic failure of the orchestrated campaign of market manipulation.

The crowds are slowly starting to fill up Times Square, and despite the imminent countdown to New Year’s, Washington still has not conjured up a resolution to avoid the fiscal cliff.  Over the prior two months we have leveraged game theory, Venn diagrams, option “greeks,” and basic investor psychology as tools to decipher the ultimate path of the crisis and subsequent market reaction.  Alas, regardless of all the analysis we and countless others have supplied; the short, intermediate, and long term prospects for stocks rest exclusively on headlines.  More poignantly, the fate of the U.S. economy, global equities, and net incomes for hundreds of millions now depend upon the decision making of a group so small, its numbers can be counted with one hand.

There were some readers who took offense at our "bloodbath" recap of yesterday's market action (modestly different from that provided by MarketWatch). And, all else equal, a modest 28 step drop in the E-Mini/SPX would hardly be earthshattering. However, all else was not equal, and based on peripheral facts, the reason for our qualifier is that as of last week virtually nobody was prepared for a move as violent and sharp as the one experienced in the last minutes of trading yesterday. In such a context a "mere" 1.5% drop in the futures market has a far more pronounced impact on participants than a 10% or even 5% drop would have had, had traders been positioned appropriately. They weren't. So what was the context? Let's find out.

On December 20, 2012, there was an Event in the eMini futures at 20:18:40 ET. The data exhibits many hallmarks of a HFT (High Frequency Trader) market maker absorbing sell orders up to their limit, and then turning around and dumping those contracts as fast as possible. Exactly what happened in the Flash Crash on May 6, 2010 (this documentary on youtube has a great explanation). Only in this case, the original seller appears to be much more aggressive than Waddell & Reed's algorithm. The drop came in 2 seconds, and halted trading for 10 seconds. The flash crash halted eMini trading for just 5 seconds. A mere 10,000 contracts (or $700mm notional) was enough to do all that damage - enjoy.

Since the beginning of December, the Russell 2000's most-shorted index has outperformed the Russell 2000 by a magnicently squeezed 500bps! How much longer can it last? No idea but once again the worst becomes first in this topsy-turvy market.

With humans long gone from the trading arena and algorithms left solely in charge of the casino formerly known as "the stock market", in which price discovery is purely as a function of highly levered synthetic instruments such as ES and SPY or, worse, the EURUSD and not fundamentals, numerous valuation dislocations are bound to occur. Such as company equity value trading well below net cash (excluding total debt), or in other words, negative enterprise value, meaning one can buy the cash at a discount of par and assign zero value to all other corporate assets.  In other far more rare cases, some companies may trade with negative EV even if they have positive LTM free cash flow (EBITDA-CapEx). Usually these arbs are rather well hidden, and certainly not within the roster of the far more popular S&P500 companies. We did a quick CapIQ search of all Russell 2000 companies (avoiding microcaps) for whom Net Cash > Market Cap. There were a total of 10 companies among the universe of 2000 that fit these criteria. We then further subdivided the category into companies with negative (far less valuable) cash flow, and positive cash flow. There were just 4 companies in the last category. They are highlighted in the table below.

The problem with this market is that it can't seem to sell off enough to produce a sustainable rally. There are not enough bears or bulls.

Why ever sell? Such is our markets where investors have been conditioned that they will not experience the pain of deep (any?) losses for any length of time.

After all in this singular issue world of ours, the only thing holding the market back is the fiscal cliff and Washington's inability to deal with it.

By blaming this week's sell off on the coming fiscal cliff is another belief by market participants that Washington can fix our economy and our markets.

The slow data (and holiday) week will likely keep eyes focused on the 'fiscal cliff' supplying a stiff headwind to stocks as it only reminds investors of the peril which looms directly in front of them. One suggestion I could offer both sides of this debate to avoid any further damage is just to be quiet.  Stop making stump speeches.  We all know your views.  We all know how stridently you will defend them, but your incessant reminders that you have dug in your heels does no good regardless of the negotiating tactic.  Instead, hold a joint press conference and admit there are ideological differences, but announce that both parties will do their best to hammer out a deal palatable enough for everyone. Alas, this is wishful thinking.  As a result, anytime they open of their mouths, most notably Mr. Obama’s, the words they spew will cause damage to share prices. Unfortunately, the President’s drawing a line in the sand on Friday has guaranteed that a countless number of E-Mini bandits will short the futures in front of his speaking which will erode the conviction among managers trying to put money to work. Ironically, it may take an equity market in free fall that ultimately forces compromise.

With all the hope slooshing around the world, it is likely no surprise that some risk-reward connections have 'broken' or become misaligned. In an effort to simplify the view of asset class risk and return, we present Morgan Stanley's Yield vs Volatility chart. It seems relatively plain to see that the Russell 2000 (and European stocks SX5E) are dramatically over-priced (under-'yielded') relative to their risk, while Asian and European High Yield credit (and to a lesser extent Asian and European Investment Grade Credit) are trading notably cheap relative to their volatility. So for all those performance chasing asset-allocators who remain fundamental bulls, buying European High Yield credit seems the best bang for your buck - instead of piling into more Russell 2000 beta...interestingly the S&P 500 appears 'fair' compared to risky sovereigns, global stocks, and global credits from a risk-reward perspective.

Even though The Powers That Be pushed the market higher at the close, I was pretty pleased with how the day went. My portfolio was profitable for most of the day - - although a lovely five-figure profit dwindled to a two-figure profit (!) by day's end - - but the point is that my portfolio hugely outperformed the market (on an inverse basis since, as you've probably guessed, I was so short I could jump off a nickel). I remain positioned for a fall.