Brazil

"All this points to weaknesses in domestic and international policy arrangements - arrangements that have so far been unable to constrain sufficiently the build-up and unwinding of hugely damaging financial booms and busts across countries.Hence a world in which debt levels are too high, productivity growth too weak and financial risks too threatening. This is also a world in which interest rates have been extraordinarily low for exceptionally long and in which financial markets have worryingly come to depend on central banks' every word and deed, in turn complicating the needed policy normalisation. It is unrealistic and dangerous to expect that monetary policy can cure all the global economy's ills."

So far, it’s a different type of crisis – market tumult in the face of global QE, in the face of ultra-low interest rates and the perception of a concerted global central bank liquidity backstop. It’s the kind of crisis that’s so far been able to achieve a decent head of steam without causing much angst. And it’s difficult to interpret this bullishly. If Brazil goes into a tailspin, it will likely pull down Latin American neighbors, along with vulnerable Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey and others. And then a full-fledged “risk off” de-risking/de-leveraging would have far-reaching ramifications, perhaps even dislocation and a collapse of the currency peg in China. China does have a number of major trading partners in trouble. Hard for me to believe the sophisticated players aren’t planning on slashing risk.

Fostering dependence on irresponsible banks and a still very vulnerable banking sector will make the entire western financial and economic system even more vulnerable.

While the massive, $19.2 billion outflow in the week of the August 24 flash crash was understandable, as the market's record complacency was shaken by days of violent selling, as was the snap rebound inflow of $5.8 billion the following week resulting from oversold conditions, the fact that EPFR reported that in the week ended September 9 equity outflows once again surged, rising to a total of $19.4 billion - greater than two weeks prior, and the largest of 2015 - will cast doubt that the recent market correction is a one and done event, especially if the selling becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Perhaps after intervening every single day in the past week (remember that FT piece saying the PBOC would no longer directly buy stocks... good times) in either the stock or the FX (both on and offshore) market, China needed a day off; perhaps even the algos got tired of constantly spoofing the E-mini and inciting momentum ignition, but for whatever reason the overnight session has been oddly uneventful, with no ES halts so far, few USDJPY surges (then again those come just before the US open), and even less violent CNY or CNH moves, leading to virtually unchanged markets in Japan (small red) and China (small green). And while the initial tone in Europe has been modestly "risk off", it is nothing in comparison to the massive gyrations that have become a stape in the past few weeks.

This level of global inter-connected financial risk is hazardous in Mexico, where it’s peppered by high bank concentration risk. No one wants another major financial crisis. Yet, that’s where we are headed absent major reconstructions of the banking framework and the central bank policies that exude extreme power over global economies and markets, in the US, Mexico, and throughout the world. Mexico’s problems could again ripple through Latin America where eroding confidence, volatility, and US dollar strength are already hurting economies and markets. The difference is that now, in contrast to the 1980s and 1990s debt crises, loan and bond amounts have not just been extended by private banks, but subsidized by the Fed and the ECB.  The risk platform is elevated. The fall, for both Mexico and its trading partners like the US, likely much harder.

News That Matters

Market participants, be they lenders or borrowers, know that “easy money” has an expiry date. If The FOMC raises rates, "we foresee negative effects on world GDP in the medium term, not only for emerging markets but also for industrialized economies." In other words, though emerging markets – through their dependence on capital inflows – will be at risk when America’s monetary policy eventually returns to “normal,” the same will be true for advanced economies.

Exactly one month ago, in the aftermath of the Chinese devaluation announcement, we made a simple prediction. "Biggest immediate loser from China's devaluation: Brazil" Today, following the overdue, long anticipated, and yet "shocking" downgrade of Brazil by the S&P to junk, this prediction is coming true.

• Compare: S&P 500 Futures Advance After U.S. Stocks Ignored Global Rally (BBG)
• And contrast: Global Stock Rally Grinds to a Halt (BBG)
• And be very confused: Global Stocks Lower on U.S. Interest Rate Uncertainty (WSJ)
• Hilsenrath: Fed Wavers on September Rate Rise (WSJ)
• Time for more QE: Abe Adviser Says Next Month Good Opportunity for BOJ Easing (BBG)
• Brazil downgraded to junk rating by S&P, deepening woes (Reuters)
• Kiwi dollar tumbles after New Zealand cuts interest rates (Reuters)

It has become virtually impossible to differentiate between actual central bank intervention, hopes of central bank intervention, and how the two interplay on what was once the "market" but is now merely the place where money printers duke it out every day in some pretense of price discovery set by those who literally print money.

Brazil, whose economy officially slid into recession in Q2 - a quarter during which Brazilians suffered through the worst inflation-growth outcome (i.e. stagflation) in over a decade - and whose efforts to plug a yawning budget gap are complicated by political infighting and a growing public outcry against embattled President Dilma Rousseff, has been cut to junk by S&P.

"We believe a global recession scenario has become the most likely global macroeconomic scenario for the next two years or so. Helicopter money drops would be the best instrument to tackle a downturn in all DMs. We expect to see QE #N, where N could become a large integer, as part of the monetary policy response in the US and the UK, and QEE2 in Japan."