Nominal GDP

European cash equities are in the red across the board at the midway point, as the bourses fail to reverse the trend of the past few sessions. With data points very light today, participants continue to focus on the macroeconomic themes as speculation regarding a Greek exit maintains focus. A medium-term maturity Spanish bond auction slightly eased fears, selling to the top of the indicative range, however the appearance of solid demand was countered somewhat by limited supply and sharply higher yields across all three lines. Following the auction results, EUR/USD saw some modest support and the Bund exhibited slight weakness, but this was short-lived as the macroeconomic concerns took over once more. Unexpectedly, the 3-month Euribor rate fixing came in with its first increase since December last year, prompting some selling pressure on the Euribor strip. This move was retraced as it was rumoured that one bank had not submitted a rate due to the Ascension Day market holiday across certain European markets, prompting the incline.

In 2006, Michael Pettis (one of the best known on-the-ground academic-and-practitioner experts on China) started making a number of predictions based on what he thought was the necessary and logical development of China’s growth model. Some of these predictions seemed fairly outlandish, especially to China analysts – Chinese and foreign – who had very little knowledge of economic history or other developing countries, but many of them so far have turned out quite well. As more and more analysts are beginning to understand the constraints of the Chinese growth model he thought it might be useful to list some of these predictions to get a sense of what might be still to come. Hold on to your hard-landing hats.

Relative to their positively exuberant +2.7% GDP growth expectation, Goldman opines on the below consensus print for today's Real GDP growth. The composition of growth was seen as weak, with a larger add from inventories and less momentum in domestic final sales than they had expected. There is a silver-lining though as they suggest the weakness in national defense spending that explained part of the miss will possibly reverse next quarter (or not we hesitate to add). BofA adds that the strength in consumer spending and contribution from motor vehicle output look unlikely to repeat in future quarters. Auto production added more than a percentage point to growth. At least half of that is due to the recovery from Japan supply chains and is not sustainable. Outside of autos, GDP growth would have been just 1.1% - thank goodness for all that channel-stuffing.

PIMCO's Bill Gross spent a longer-than-soundbite period discussing QE3, the chance of a US double-dip, and Europe's ongoing dysfunction with Trish Regan on Bloomberg Television this afternoon. Given more than his typically limited-to-ten-second thoughts some other media outlets appear to prefer, the old-new-normal-bond-king believes the Fed will resist another round of quantitative easing in the short-term but "if unemployment begins to rise for two-to-three months then QE3 is back on". Noting that investors should focus on nominal GDP growth tomorrow, he goes on to dismiss the idea that the US can decouple from a troubled Europe pointing the political dysfunction between the Germans and the rest as greater than the polarity between Democrats and Republicans here at home. Preferring to play a slightly levered long bet on low rates holding for a longer-period, he like MBS (as we have discussed in the past) but does not see the 10Y yield dropping precipitously from here though he does echo our thoughts entirely in his view of the 'flow' being more critical than the 'stock' when it comes to the Fed's balance sheet and hence the June end-of-Twist may be a volatile period for all asset classes.

If central planners decide to circumvent the already manipulated bond market and enforce much lower interest rates by implementing forced loans, there would be a big uproar for some time in the market. However, the negative wealth effect on the private sector would be more foreseeable and stretched out over a longer period of time. This definitely would decrease uncertainty. In my opinion, this measure would actually help to break through the downward spiral and avoid the much more devastating course towards a restructuring event with its negative side effects.

Appropos Bernanke's razor's-edge tight-rope-walk fence-sitting as the not-too-cold-not-too-hot economy reduces the Fed's ability to do anything, Jeff Gundlach of Double Line provided a succinct explanation of the the 'uncomfortable position' the place-of-confusion Fed finds itself in. Simplifying the dilemma to: the Fed cannot raise rates as the dramatic implications for the huge debt load (and implictly the interest expense saving the budget deficit) of the US Government are untenable while at the same time inflation (in the things we need - not just want) is rising notably. However the new bond-king notes rather sarcastically, that the Fed can show that there is only modest inflation thanks to housing and wage growth (and herelies 'the biflation'). The old-school-Fed's efforts at pre-emptive strikes against inflation is simply not going to happen, he states, citing an "intentional attempt to suppress national income - an attempt to stop nominal GDP growing too much - simply won't be tolerated until inflation moves into the 4-5% category".

Oh, the ignominy of thinking that China's widening of the Yuan trading band was anything other than uber-bullish and indicative of as soft a landing as can be imagined as the mainstream herd promptly, in a desperate attempt to seek affirmation from other members of the herd as always happens (see Jeremy Grantham for more), said this would be a move that guaranteed no hard landing. Albert Edwards takes the 'massive over-confidence in the ability of the Chinese authorities to achieve a soft landing' to task and furthermore indicates that between a rapidly diminishing current account surplus, a real effective exchange rate that is arguably (thank you IMF) not undervalued anymore, and the velocity with which nominal GDP has slowed recently (akin to 2007), the very fact that they widened the trading band suggests it is now a lot easier for them to achieve significant devaluation of their currency (to escape the hard landing) both technically and politically. Since widening the band, the PBOC has already devalued two days-in-a-row. Ironically, the bilateral imbalance with the US is reaching new records (seasonally adjusted) and will peak (seasonally unadjusted) just in time for some temperamental headlines right before the US election.

In the not quite 100 years since the founding of your institution, America has exchanged central banking for a kind of central planning and the gold standard for what I will call the Ph.D. standard. I regret the changes and will propose reforms, or, I suppose, re-reforms, as my program is very much in accord with that of the founders of this institution. Have you ever read the Federal Reserve Act? The authorizing legislation projected a body “to provide for the establishment of the Federal Reserve banks, to furnish an elastic currency, to afford means of rediscounting commercial paper and to establish a more effective supervision of banking in the United States, and for other purposes.” By now can we identify the operative phrase? Of course: “for other purposes.” As you prepare to mark the Fed’s centenary, may I urge you to reflect on just how far you have wandered from the intentions of the founders? The institution they envisioned would operate passively, through the discount window. It would not create credit but rather liquefy the existing stock of credit by turning good-quality commercial bills into cash— temporarily. This it would do according to the demands of the seasons and the cycle. The Fed would respond to the community, not try to anticipate or lead it. It would not override the price mechanism— as today’s Fed seems to do at every available opportunity—but yield to it.

First it was Bob Janjuah throwing in the towel in the face of central planning, now we get the same sense from Bill Gross who in his latest letter once again laments the forced transfer of risk from the private to the public sector: "The game as we all have known it appears to be over... moving for the moment from private to public balance sheets, but even there facing investor and political limits. Actually global financial markets are only selectively delevering. What delevering there is, is most visible with household balance sheets in the U.S. and Euroland peripheral sovereigns like Greece." Gross' long-term view is well-known - inflation is coming: "The total amount of debt however is daunting and continued credit expansion will produce accelerating global inflation and slower growth in PIMCO’s most likely outcome." The primary reason for Pimco's pessimism, which is nothing new, is that in a world of deleveraging there will be no packets of leverage within the primary traditional source of cheap credit-money growth: financial firms. So what is a fund manager to do? Why find their own Steve McQueen'ian Great Escape from Financial Repression of course. " it is your duty to try to escape today’s repression. Your living conditions are OK for now – the food and in this case the returns are good – but they aren’t enough to get you what you need to cover liabilities. You need to think of an escape route that gets you back home yet at the same time doesn’t get you killed in the process. You need a Great Escape to deliver in this financial repressive world." In the meantime Gross advises readers to do just what we have been saying for years: buy commodities and real (non-dilutable) assets: "Commodities and real assets become ascendant, certainly in relative terms, as we by necessity delever or lever less." As for the endgame: "Is a systemic implosion still possible in 2012 as opposed to 2008? It is, but we will likely face much more monetary and credit inflation before the balloon pops. Until then, you should budget for “safe carry” to help pay your bills. The bunker portfolio lies further ahead."

It is a fact that when it comes to the oddly resilient Japanese hyperlevered economic model, the bodies of those screaming for the end of the JGB bubble litter the sides of central planning's tungsten brick road. Yet in the aftermath of last month's stunning surge in the country's trade deficit, this, and much more may soon be finally ending. Because as Caixin's Andy Xie writes "The day of reckoning for the yen is not distant. Japanese companies are struggling with profitability. It only gets worse from here. When a major company goes bankrupt, this may change the prevailing psychology. A weak yen consensus will emerge then." As for the bubble pop, it will be a sudden pop, not the 30 year deflationary whimper Mrs. Watanabe has gotten so used to: "Yen devaluation is likely to unfold quickly. A financial bubble doesn't burst slowly. When it occurs, it just pops. The odds are that yen devaluation will occur over days. Only a large and sudden devaluation can keep the JGB yield low. Otherwise, the devaluation expectation will trigger a sharp rise in the JGB yield. The resulting worries over the government's solvency could lead to a collapse of the JGB market." It gets worse: "Of course, the government will collapse with the JGB market." And once Japan falls, the rest of the world follows, says Xie, which is why he is now actively encouraging China, and all other Japanese trade partners of the world's rapidly declining 3rd largest economy to take precautions for when this day comes... soon.

Nothing that we haven't said already many times, but always good to hear someone, in this case SocGen's Albert Edwards, observe what is patently obvious - namely that the start of every year now sends a consistently wrong signal that the economy is improving due to seasonal adjustments that no longer are applicable in the New Normal. This coupled with the liquidity boost that takes places just prior to each and every run up completely explains why 2012 is not only deja vu, as it continues to be a carbon copy replica of 2011 (when the market peaked in late April), but is really a treja vu, mimicking the action of 2010. After all it was none other than Reuters who in its puff spin piece tried to caution readers that we have been here before: "This time last year, the U.S. economy was adding jobs at a similar pace of more than 200,000 a month between February and April...Growth was nipped in the bud by the Arab uprising, which sent oil prices soaring. In 2010, prospects had looked even stronger. Between March and May, companies were adding a net 309,000 new jobs each month, and first-quarter growth came in at a 2.7 percent. The rebound proved temporary." And yet here we are, wondering if this time it's different. It isn't. Albert Edwards explains: 'With bond yields breaking out to the upside and the equity bull run continuing, investors are back to their same old hopeful habits. Many are thinking that if we have seen the all-time lows on bond yields investors will be forced into equities. We already can observe leading indicators rolling downwards in exactly the same way as they did in 2011." And here is why Edwards will once again be unpopular with the permabull, momentum chasing crowd: "Expect new lows on bond yields by Q3 and this equity rally to turn to dust – just as it did in 2011."

We have long argued that at its core, modern society, at least on a mathematical basis - the one which ultimately trumps hopium every single time - is fatally flawed due to the existence, and implementation, of the concept of modern "welfare" - an idea spawned by Otto von Bismarck in the 1870s, and since enveloped the globe in various forms of transfer payments which provide the illusion of a social safety net, dangles the carrot of pension, health, and retirement benefits, and in turn converts society into a collage of blank faces, calm as Hindu cows. Alas, the cows will promptly become enraged bulls once they realize that all that has been promised to them in exchange for their docility and complacency has... well... vaporized. It is at that point that the final comprehension would dawn, that instead of a Welfare State, it has been, as Bill Buckler terms it, a Hardship State all along. Below we present the latest views from the captain of The Privateer on what the insoluble dilemma of the welfare state is, and what the key problems that the status quo will face with its attempts at perpetuating this lie.

Ray Dalio released a study he did on deleveraging. The piece was featured prominently here at ZH. I am a fan of Dalio, but his analysis was surprising. His interpretation of the economy is, remarkably, based on a very conventional ideas and is shockingly wrong. For a guy who is known for thinking out of the box and has who has led Bridgewater to become the biggest hedge fund in the world, he has got the deleveraging process all wrong. 

European stock futures have trended higher today in relatively light volumes as the market awaits key interest rate decisions (BoE & ECB) and with the deadline for the Greek debt swap deal looming. The latest talk this morning has been that the participation in the PSI deal has been well received and coupled with speculation of a Chinese RRR cut overnight and stops tripped in the E-mini S&P and Eurostoxx futures earlier this morning, contributed to a large portion of the move higher. As a consequence, the USD index has weakened (-0.5%) which has lifted the EUR/USD pair back firmly though the 1.3200 level to the upside and Brent/WTI crude futures are seen higher ahead of the NYMEX pit open. Looking ahead we await the ECB press conference as well as the latest jobs data from the US due at 1330GMT.

The modern, debt-based economy requires constant economic expansion if only to service all that debt. So what happens when the modern economy goes ex-growth and stops expanding? Iceland already found out. Greece is in the process of discovering. But we will all get a chance to participate in this lesson. Runaway fiscal and monetary stimulus throughout the western economies is in the process of destroying the concept of creditworthiness at the centre of the modern monetary system.  Private investors, we suspect, have little or no conception of the extent to which the state is now the predominant player in the financial markets. Central banks control the money supply and interest rates. Central banking and commercial banking interests have essentially become fused. The ECB's long-term refinancing operations are banking bailouts by the back door. Central banks are now also the swing players in government bond markets which directly influences the price for corporate credit. Central bank monetary stimulus also directly influences equity market direction and confidence. Be careful, be very careful about the sort of government debt you hold. You may well end up being paid in whole- but in such depreciated terms that being "kept whole" will be meaningless in real terms.