Eurozone

• Markets await US Non-Farm Payrolls data, released 1330GMT
• UniCredit experiences another disrupted trading session, trades down 11%, then returns to almost unchanged
• Iran causes further unease with plans to engage in wargame exercises in the Strait of Hormuz

• So very encouraging - IMF's Lagarde: euro likely to survive 2012 (Reuters)
• Drop Greek bond plan, urges ECB council member (FT)
• Soros says EU break-up would be catastrophic (Reuters)
• Japanese Banks Get 'Stress Tests' (WSJ)
• Hungary Pledges Compromise on IMF Loan (Bloomberg)
• Confidence in London property falls (FT)
• Fed nears an adoption of an inflation target as Bernanke pushes transparency (Bloomberg)
• Seoul and Tokyo seek to ease Iran oil ties (FT)

Troika inspectors will leave angry again. But this time, the Prime Minister put the nuclear option on the table....

For anyone who still hasn't grasped the magnitude of the central planning intervention over the past four years, the following two charts should explain it all rather effectively. As the bottom chart shows, currently the central banks of the top three developed world entities: the Eurozone, the US and Japan have balance sheets that amount to roughly $8 trillion. This is more than double the combined total notional in 2007. More importantly, these banks assets (and by implication liabilities, as virtually none of them have any notable capital or equity) combined represent a whopping 25% of their host GDP, which just so happen are virtually all the countries that form the Developed world (with the exception of the UK). Which allows us to conclude several things. First, the rapid expansion in balance sheets was conducted primarily to monetize various assets, in the process lifting stock markets, but just as importantly, to find a natural buyer of sovereign paper (in the case of the Fed) and/or guarantee and backstop the existence of banks which could then in turn purchase sovereign debt on their own balance sheet (monetization once removed coupled with outright sterilized asset purchases as is the case of the ECB). And in this day and age of failed economic experiments when a dollar of debt buys just less than a dollar of GDP (there is a reason why the 100% debt/GDP barrier is so informative), it also means that central banks now implicitly account for up to 25% of developed world GDP!

In spite of some short-term fixes, there remains no real resolution to the sovereign debt issues in many European countries. We're certainly not spending less money in the US, and now we're bailing out Europe via currency swaps with the European Central Bank. Shouldn't gold be rising? Yes, but nothing happens in a vacuum. There are some simple explanations as to why gold remains in a funk.

1. The MF Global bankruptcy, the seventh-largest in US history, forced a high degree of liquidation of commodities futures contracts, including gold. Many institutional investors had to sell whether they wanted to or not. This is similar to why big declines in the stock market can force funds and other large investors to sell some gold to raise cash for margin calls or meet redemption requests.
2. The dollar has been rising. Money fleeing the Eurozone has to go somewhere, and some of it is heading into US bonds, which means first converting the foreign currency into dollars.
3. It's tax-loss selling season, something that's also impacting gold stocks. Funds and individual investors are selling underwater positions for tax purposes. Funds also sell their big winners to lock in gains for the year and dress up quarterly reports.

These forces have all acted to depress the gold price.

One of the ironclad assumptions in CDS trading was that recovery assumptions, especially on sovereign bonds, would be 40% of par come hell or high water. This key variable, which drives various other downstream implied data points, was never really touched as most i) had never really experienced a freefall sovereign default and ii) 40% recovery on sovereign bonds seemed more than fair. Obviously with Greek bonds already trading in the 20s this assumption was substantially challenged, although the methodology for all intents and purposes remained at 40%. No more - according to CMA, the default recovery on Greece is now 20%. So how long before both this number is adjusted, before recovery assumptions for all sovereigns are adjusted lower, and before all existing risk model have to be scrapped and redone with this new assumption which would impact how trillions in cash is allocated across the board. Of course, none of this will happen - after all what happens in Greece stays in Greece. In fact since America can decouple from the outside world, it now also appears that Greece can decouple from within the Eurozone, even though it has to be in the eurozone for there to be a Eurozone. We may go as suggesting that the word of the year 2012 will be "decoupling", even though as everyone knows, decoupling does not exist: thank you 60 years of globalization, $100 trillion in cross-held debt, and a $1 quadrillion interlinked derivatives framework.

As seems obvious from the market's reaction over the last week, European problems are not solved by short-term liquidity band-aids. In fact, as Goldman notes this week, the same economic and political risks remain even if some funding relief has been put in place. With sovereigns and financials leading one another to new lows since the LTRO, the negative feedback loops remain in full force. Given the difficulties on the road ahead – and significant ongoing differences across governments on how to resolve them – the risk of political miscalculation or errors is unfortunately still very clear. In the limit, those instabilities could still put the union on a path towards a break-up. Economic weakness in the meantime will intensify the challenges for the weaker sovereigns.

Looks like Europe plans (and we use the term very loosely) on pushing its fate literally to the wire. Yesterday we explained why for Greece March is D(eadline)-Day, and as Greece itself stated, absent bailout cash coming in, it is game over: for Greece, for the Eurozone, and for Europe as the serial chain of defaults and exits begins. Which is why we read with great surprise minutes ago that according to the European Commission, the entire Greek bailout package has been delayed by three months because of delays in payouts of the 2011 tranche! Naturally this is supposed to have the optics of punishing Greece for doing absolutely nothing to fix its fiscal situation but all it will do is send the market (the European one that is - America is still stuck in some idiotic limbo where it fools itself that it can exist in isolation from the world's biggest economy) even more into Risk Off mode, as the world will be forced to wait until the 11th hour and 59th minute to find out if the Euro and Eurozone will survive for a few more months. In the meantime, Mario Monti is off to Brussels to satisfy an unscheduled craving for Belgian beer and chocolate, or something.

Less than a week after a fully failed 3 Year Hungarian bond auction (in which all bids were rejected by the government) sent Hungarian yields surging on December 29, things have gone from bad to worse culminating with today's 1 Year Bill auction which sold just HUF 35 billion ($140 million) in 1 year bills at a staggering 9.96%, a surge of over 2% compared to the yield for the same maturity debt sold just on December 22. To say that this is unsustainable is an understatement. Alas, with the IMF and EU out of the bailout picture following Hungary's refusal to yield to demands to make its central bank a puppet of the state, ironically categorized by Europe as concerns of central bank "independence" it is likely that Hungary will see far more pain in the coming days as the ECB is certainly not going to be buying Hungarian debt - after all it has its hands full already with those other collapsing Eurozone countries. And punctuating the new year comfort are Hungarian CDS levels which just soared to new records over 750 bps. It is only a matter of time before ISDA decrees that any and every Hungarian default event will be fully voluntary thereby collapsing this latest default protection house of cards.

• ECB Cash Averts ‘Funding Crisis’ for Italy, Spain (Bloomberg)
• Bailout talks in Greece ‘crucial’, Premier says (WSJ)
• Spain sees €50bn of new bank provisions (FT)
• Fed says expand Fannie, Freddie role to aid housing (Reuters)
• France’s Borrowing Costs Rise at Bond Sale (Bloomberg)
• Europe worries linger after French auction (Reuters)
• PBOC Suspends Bill Sale as Money Rates Rise Before Holiday (Bloomberg)
• Turkey warns against Shi'ite-Sunni Cold War (Reuters)
• New capital rules for banks ‘delayed to 2H’(China Daily)

When it comes to the markets one can easily ignore the fact that the world is one big ponzi and things, as we know them, are coming to an end as long as the can can be kicked down the street at least one more time. In other words, without a hard deadline, there is nothing that can force change upon a system already in motion, no matter how self-destructive. Unfortunately, the clock in Europe is ticking as a deadline approaches, and somewhat poetically, the place where it all started is where it may end. In March Greece faces a redemption cliff: if by then the €130 billion promised to it by the Troika as per the July 21 second bailout, is not delivered, it is game over - first for Greece which will default, then for the ECB, which will be forced to write down holdings of Greek bonds, in effect wiping out its equity and credibility, and lastly, for the Euro, which will see a core member leaving (in)voluntarily.

If there is one lesson to be learned from the Japanese experience with deleveraging over the past few decades it’s that deleveraging cycles have there own special rhythm of reflationary and deflationary interludes.  Pretty simple thinking as balance sheet deleveraging by definition cannot be a short term process given the prior decades required to build up the leverage accumulated in any economic/financial system.  If deleveraging were a short term process, it would play out as a massive short term depression.  And clearly any central bank would act to disallow such an outcome, exactly has been the case not only in Japan over the last few decades, but now also in the US and the Eurozone.  We just need to remember that this is a dance.  There is an ebb and flow to the greater (generational) deleveraging cycle.  Just as leveraging up was not a linear process, neither will the process of deleveraging be linear.  Why bring this larger picture cycle rhythm up right now?  The recent price volatility we’ve seen in assets that can be characterized as offering purchasing power protection within the context of a global central banking community debasing currencies as their preferred method of reflation for now, specifically recent the price volatility of gold.

Since the start of December, the tight correlation between EURUSD and risk assets has deteriorated. Most notably from the middle of December, as LTRO pronouncements began, the positive correlation has flipped to negative and EURUSD became considerably less relevant while AUD (and other carry currencies) dominated as correlated drivers. Citi's Steven Englander notes this divergence and sees two reasons for it: the LTRO has contributed by theoretically underpinning eurozone (EZ) bank funding, reducing one source of EZ risk, but leaving in place broader concerns on sovereign debt (risk transfer from private to public balance sheets once again); and the growing confidence in the US that growth will be mediocre but not disastrous. However, even though growth expectations have bounced back to some degree, taking the S&P with it, expectations of future Fed policy have not adjusted upwards at all. Our fear, in agreement with Englander, is that asset markets may be much more sensitive to economic outcomes than is commonly expected and with growth expectations having angled up, the risk rally may be very sensitive to disappointment. The deterioration of European sovereign and corporate credit along with the EUR, combined with US credits underperforming equities in the last few days suggests cracks in the risk divergence are quickly starting to appear.

• Iowa result leads to GOP confusion (FT)
• Romney ekes out Iowa caucus victory (FT)
• MF Global sold assets to Goldman before collapse (Reuters)
• China’s Wen Jiacao sees ‘relatively difficult’ first quarter (Bloomberg)
• German Scandal Adds to Pressure on Merkel (WSJ)
• US mortgage demand fell at year-end, purchases sag (Reuters)
• Bank worries hit Europe stocks, euro down (Reuters)
• Martin Wolf: The 2012 recovery: handle with care (FT)
• SNB Chief’s Wife Defends Dollar Trades (Bloomberg)
• China Home Prices Slide Amid Reserve-Ratio Speculation (Bloomberg)

All eyes were on Germany this morning, where up to €5 billion in new 10 Year Bunds would hit the market, with many dreading a repeat of November's failed auction. As it turns out, the auction was a success in relative terms, with the government getting bids of €5.14 billion or more than the desired maximum - something it could not do two months ago. At the end of the day, Germany sold €4.06 billion and the resulting bid/cover ratio of 1.3 was well higher than the failed auction of November which came at  1.1, when a large amount of paper was retained and bids were not enough to cover the amount of paper on offer. Wednesday's auction is still below the average of 1.54 seen at 10-year sales in 2011 and a 19 percent retention rate is also above the 2011 average. In other words, as we suggested, the November failure has nothing to do with the Buba pushing the ECB into auction and everything to do with prevailing rates: the average yield dropped to 1.93 percent from 1.98 percent but the dwindling returns on offer due to the sharp rally in safe-haven assets as the euro zone debt crisis has intensified have led to lower than average demand at recent German auctions. And while the auction was better than expected it was still quite weak, which explains why the EURUSD is trading at overnight lows, back at around 1.2980. Not helping things is Hungary, which had a failed bond auction last week, and whose IMF rescue package is now in tatters. As a result the CDS on the country just hit an all time record 688 bps and moving much wider, while the forint dropped to record lows. As everyone knows if Hungary falls, which is now operating in a bailoutless vacuum, Austria will tumble promptly next. Next, leading to a blow out in Spanish-Bund spreads is a report in Spanish Expansion which said that Spain may request EU, IMF loans to help banks. In other words - this morning's news shows a potential risk reflaring in the European core, periphery and deep periphery which was immune until now. And finally, a UniCredit €7.5 billion new stock issue pricing at a whopping 43% discount to market price shows that fair value of actual demand for European banks is about half of where the artificially propped up price is (recall Europe still has a short selling ban)