Sovereigns

You should be recieving about 46% interest to compensate for the risk of using a Cyprus bank! Use this calculator to determine how much interest your EU (that's right, it ain't just Cyrpus) bank should be paying you. Guaranteed your getting ripped off! Wake up, and smell the confiscation coffee.

When the ECB first announced the LTRO in late 2011 (and executed in early 2012) we explained how the ECB's encumbrance via this 'aid' is in fact a major negative for the rest of the capital structure. We were proved correct and even as Draghi lied and stated there was no stigma, the market priced the LTRO-encumbered banks notably weaker. Of course, the banks with the greatest need for support were the ones who grabbed the ECB's punchbowl that time and it seems as fears re-awaken in Europe, risk-appetite towards these ECB-dependent banks (relative to non-LTRO banks) is waning rapidly. The so-called LTRO Stigma (the spread between LTRO and non-LTRO bank credit) is back at 5-month wides as investors rotate away from any and every bank outside of the core. This weakness rubbed off everywhere in Europe as Italian and Spanish bonds saw their worst day since the Italian elections as European stocks slumped and Europe's VIX is now 4.5vols higher than Monday's open.

After one of the most fabulous verbal faux pas in recent history was committed yesterday, in which the truth briefly escaped the lips of the new Eurogroup head who still has to learn from his masterful "when it becomes serious you have to lie" predecessor and ever since both he and all of uber-incompetent Europe have been desperate to put the genie back into the bottle to no avail, everyone has been caught in a great debate: to template, or not to template?  Below is a summary of Wall Street's thinking on this key for so many European (and soon global) depositors.

Another session in which the market continues to be "cautiously optimistic" about Europe, but is confused about Cyprus which keeps sending the wrong signals: in the aftermath of the Diesel-Boom fiasco, the announcement that the preciously announced reopening of banks was also subsequently "retracted" and pushed back to at least Thursday, did little to soothe fears that anyone in Europe has any idea what they are doing. Additional confusion comes from the fact that the Chairman of the Bank of Cyprus moments ago submitted his resignation: recall that this is the bank that is supposed to survive, unlike its unluckier Laiki competitor which was made into a sacrificial lamb. This confusion has so far prevented the arrival of the traditional post-Europe open ramp, as the EURUSD is locked in a range below its 200 DMA and it is unclear what if anything can push it higher, despite the Yen increasingly becoming the funding currency of choice.

As we recently discussed, many euroskeptics are pushing Cypriot lawmakers to default, devalue, and decouple from the Euro - understanding that the short-term pain of such a move will lead to much more sustainable gains afterwards. But BofAML raises the question of what damage (and required response) would occur in the remainder of the European Union should Cyprus leave (or be pushed ). Unlike some EU leaders suggestions, BofAML suggests the contagion and growth impacts could last a decade; but it is the policy reaction of the ECB that is most crucial to understand and how it may rapidly lead to a German decision on debt mutualization (or not) that should be most concerning.

There are three key highlights in yet another take on Cyprus, this time from JPMorgan's Robert Henriques: the first, and most obvious, is that "more extreme scenarios of burden-sharing will not necessarily reinforce investor confidence" - that much is clear; the second, as we pointed out over the weekend, is that what happened in Cyprus is a "the death knell for an EU Common Deposit Guarantee scheme, which was to be an integral part of the Banking Union proposals" - so much for the key part of European monetary and fiscal integration. But the third, and most important, is that "we would expect future crises to be exacerbated by more extreme deposit flight. This would likely mean the ECB would have to increase its presence as liquidity provider of last resort, which, under normal circumstances, would lead to increased asset encumbrance and lower recoveries for senior debt." The problem for Europe, as diligent readers know too well already, is that asset encumbrance is already at record high levels, meaning the ability to find "free" assets used to create new loans will be next to impossible.

I was a little early, but just as I promised, those European bank runs are coming as expected. Wait until I release my newest EU crash analysis, Lehman x 3, nearly guaranteed!!!

Can't get enough of Cyprus? Then here is yet another post-post-mortem from Goldman's Jernej Omahen, once more trying to put some very silvery lining on this particular mushroom cloud, and providing some useful facts in the process. "As part of its rescue package, Cyprus introduced a one-off tax on deposits. This “tax” can be viewed as both (1) a depositor bail-in, and/or (2) a wealth tax. Cyprus aims to capture €5.8 bn of tax revenue in this way, which compares to the total bailout package of €10 bn. In absolute terms, the amounts are low; regardless, the market focus on potential read-across will be high, in our view. The tax on depositors is setting a precedent, which is likely to have an impact beyond the immediate term, in our view. Resilience of, in particular, retail deposits was an important element of stability during crisis peaks (e.g., Spain). Post the Cyprus precedent, however, it is reasonable to expect that the deposit volatility in stressed sovereigns could rise, for two reasons: firstly, perceived risk of deposit bail-in will have increased; secondly (independent of failing bank issues), perceiving savings as a potential tax-base – for wealth taxes – is new."

The usually optimistic bunch of salubrious sell-side strategists are mixed in their perspective of the latest debacle to roll ashore from Europe. Most, if not quite all, expect short-term 'nervousness' and a few hardy Pollyannas remain though looking at the other end of the rainbow - once again because, drum roll please, "central banks will respond." Adding to our summary yesterday, Bloomberg adds another 13 sell-side opinions (and Moody's), it the diversity of response is perhaps best glimpsed with one who "does not expect savers to be fearful of a confiscation of their savings and spark a run on banks" for some whimsical reason and another states unequivocally, "No sensible foreign depositor would continue to keep money in a banking system that just took nearly 10% of his deposit without any notice."

"Has Europe bazookaed itself in the foot? Even if we avoid a negative outcome this week, events in Cyprus invite broader questions about the region’s commitment, repeated ad nauseum since June to ‘break the feedback loop between sovereigns and banks’. The IMF warned as recently as Friday that the Euro area lacked an effective deposit guarantee framework (before agreeing to a haircut that adroitly proves its point). The Cypriot package reinforces the fact that existing deposit guarantee schemes are only as strong as the sovereign which backs them; something which is unlikely to go unnoticed in the rest of the region (although we think specific contagion risks are limited near-term). Other EU member states will likely be affected, there are significant numbers of UK depositors in Cypriot banks, some of whom the UK has now promised to protect (with echoes of the Icesave situation), and some potential contagion channels may not be obvious. It is notable that German policy-makers have been insisting on Cyprus’ significant ‘systemic relevance’ over recent days while pushing a package that may test it."

“Financial stability has not been assured”

This is the third day in a row that an attempt to mount an overnight ramp out of the US has fizzled, with first the Nikkei closing down for the second day in a row and snapping a week-long rally, and then the Shanghai Composite following suit with its 5th consecutive drop in a row as the rumblings out of the PBOC on the inflation front get louder and louder, following PBOC governor Zhou's statement that inflation expectations must be stabilized and that great importance must be attached to inflation. Stirring the pot further was SAFE chief Yi Gang who joined the Chinese chorus warning against a currency war, by saying the G20 should avoid competitive currency devaluations. Obviously China is on the edge, and only the US stock market is completely oblivious that the marginal economy may soon force itself to enter outright contraction to offset the G-7 exported hot money keeping China's real estate beyond bubbly. Finally, SocGen released a note last night title "A strong case for easing Korean monetary policy" which confirms that it is only a brief matter of time before the Asian currency war goes thermonuclear. Moving to Europe, it should surprise nobody that the only key data point, Eurozone Industrial Production for January missed badly, printing at -0.4% on expectations of a -0.1% contraction, down from a 0.9% revised print in December as the European recession shows no signs of abating. So while the rest of the world did bad or worse than expected for the third day in a row, it will be up to the POMO and seasonally adjusted retail sales data in the US to offset the ongoing global contraction, and to send the perfectly manipulated Dow Jones to yet another all time high, in direct refutation of logic and every previous market reality ever.

A interesting non-partisan analysis of Draghi (which means dragon) and Grillo (which means cricket) to discuss what is happening in Italy and the euro area more generally.  

The passing away of president Chávez has important implications ranging from the political spectrum to the economical spectrum. These implications will be crucial in assessments of the future of the country. Stratfor's Karen Hooper provides a succinct summary of the short-term (who will be the interim president until new elections take place? When will the elections take place, and what is the most likely result of the election), medium-to-long-term (Uncertainty about future economic management creates an additional downward bias in macroeconomic performance in a 1–2 year horizon), and Citi, despite the uncertainty-removing finality of Chavez' death, maintain an underweight as while neither political unrest nor a near-term default are likely, markets are also not pricing in much risk of either.