Sovereigns

"Liquidity trap" was a term coined by John Maynard Keynes in the aftermath of the Great Depression. He argued that when yields are low enough, expanding money supply won't stimulate growth because bonds and cash are already near-equivalents when bonds pay (almost) no interest. Some, like Citi's credit strategy team, would say that it is a pretty apt description of the state of play these days. To their minds (and ours), there is very little doubt that central banks have played an absolutely crucial role in propping up asset prices in recent years, Why have markets responded so resolutely when growth hasn't? The answer, we think, is that in their attempts to free markets from the liquidity trap, central banks are ensnaring markets in what we'll call a "liquidity lure". That lure is three pronged... but tail risks are bound to re-appear and from this position, there is no painless escape.

The fact that the major credit indices have had to resort to 'imaginary credit' in order to generate an actionable market is perhaps the final nail in the coffin of the single-name CDS market in this cycle. An artificially low spread environment, forced their by massive technical flows thanks to central-bankers' financial repression has removed a natural buyer- and seller- from the market - reducing liquidity; and combined with Dodd-Frank and more regulation (higher capital reqs), dealers are also forced to delever risk books (reducing liquidity). But, there is one glaring reason why the single-name CDS market is dying; extremely high correlation. As Barclays notes, in a market where investors’ ears are, more than ever, finely tuned to the statements of politicians and central banks and the tail outcomes for the market, it makes sense for correlation to be high – at this stage, there should be little distinction between individual names – trading the level of systemic risk premia is the focus. And sure enough, index (systemic) volumes is rising as single-name (idiosyncratic risk) trading volumes and exposures are fading fast. So what brings it back?

The exuberant OMT-driven froth of the European equity markets appears to be fading. All major stock indices across the region ended the week red - with Spain worst down 3.3% and Italy down 2.2% (though as CNBC would say - off their lows). This looks like catching-down to European sovereign's less sanguine view of the world as Italy and Spain sovereign bond spreads end almost perfectly unchanged (having been up 15bps and 25bps respectively mid-week). Corporate and financial credit spreads outperformed equities on the week - ending unchanged also - with most of the move occurring today. Interestingly, the LTRO stigma is rising once again - as non-LTRO-encumbered bank credit spreads hit a 14-month low this week and the spread to LTRO-banks widens. Europe's VIX ended the week unchanged at 21.9% - thanks to a significant spike into today's close.

Just two weeks after Egan-Jones started the party, S&P has downgraded Spain to BBB- (with a negative outlook). As we discussed here when Egan Jones pushed all-in with Spain to CC, of course, Moody's (Baa3 Neg) will likely follow shortly with Fitch (BBB Neg) deciding to avoid the office-raid and keep its French parents happy. The main reasons - and concern going forward, via Bloomberg:

• *S&P MAY CUT SPAIN IF POLITICAL, EUROZONE SUPPORT WANED
• *S&P MAY CUT SPAIN IF NET GOVT DEBT RISES ABOVE 100%/GDP '12-'14
• Doubts over some eurozone governments' commitment to mutualizing the costs of Spain's bank recapitalization are, in our view, a destabilizing factor for the country's credit outlook.
• In our view, the shortage of credit is an even greater problem than its cost.

Between the IMF's European growth expectations and deleveraging needs, it seems reality is sinking in a little in Europe. All equity indices are closing red today with Spain and Italy worst and banks underperforming. The most interesting feature we noticed is that once again - now the seventh day in a row - European sovereign spreads have deteriorated notably from the US day-session open to the European close. Spain and Italy 10Y bond spreads are 15 and 8bps wider (only) on the week but notably Spanish and Italian equities are down 3.2% and 2.8% respectively this week. EURUSD is practically unch at the EU close - up 60 pips from overnight weakness.

Just as we will not tire of pointing out the unintended consequence of the Fed's central-planning efforts, so it is time, courtesy of the IMF's latest missive, to point out the vicious circle that the ECB has created and encouraged in Europe. The unintended consequence of the ECB's intervention - as both perpetual backstop and lender of last resort - has created an ever-increasing fragmentation between the core and the periphery (exactly the supposed 'issue' Draghi is attempting to fix with his OMT). The toxic-debt-loop as capital leaves the periphery for the core, pressuring peripheral bond yields/spreads, and forcing private sector borrowing to be replaced by public-sector not only clouds the true picture for real-money investors or depositors (risk-based pricing has been destroyed) but encourages front-running fast-money flows which do nothing but provide short-term cover for banks/sovereigns to delay the inevitable (and potential market-clearing) deleveraging/restructuring that is required. Because the fundamental issue is one of solvency - not liquidity - the ECB's continued artifice of plugging liquidity shortfalls does nothing but lessen the confidence in the system and reduce any faith in price levels as without addressing the real insolvency, trust will never return.

While yesterday it was the sovereigns who suffered the wrath of the IMF's wholesale growth outlook downgrade (unbeknownst to Christine Lagarde), today it is the turn of the financial sector (which is increasingly being blurred with the former in a world in which central banks are used to both backstop bank liabilities and fund endless public deficits, unafraid of the consequences in a closed loop fiat world in which defection is, so far, impossible) to be greeted by a cold dose of reality emanating from the IMF's "Global Financial Stability Report" especially as pertains to Europe's insolvent banking system. The most notable finding of said report is the admission that the IMF was only kidding when it said six months ago, in April of this year, that the worst case outlook now has European banks deleveraging to the tune of $3.8 trillion through the end of 2013, or over the next 14 months: now this number is 18% higher, or a gargantuan $4.5 trillion (12% of bank assets). This is how much debt Eurobanks will need to shed in a "weak policies" case in which Europe continues to delay implementing fiscal reform, aka austerity, as per Figure 2.14. Even the baseline (and this being the IMF it means it has zero chance of happening) scenario is not much better, at a revised $2.8 (7.3%) trillion in deleveraging. The reason for the increase is due to "lower expected earnings, higher losses linked to worsened economic conditions, and greater funding pressures on banks."

"The recovery continues but it has weakened" is how the IMF sums up their 250-page compendium of rather sullen reading for most hope-and-dreamers. The esteemed establishment led by the tall, dark, and handsome know-nothing Lagarde (as evidenced by her stroppiness after being asked a question she didn't like in the Eurogroup PR) has cut global growth expectations for advanced economics from 2.0% to only 1.5%. Quite sadly, they see two forces pulling growth down in advanced economies: fiscal consolidation and a still-weak financial system; and only one main force pulling growth up is accommodative monetary policy. Central banks continue not only to maintain very low policy rates, but also to experiment with programs aimed at decreasing rates in particular markets, at helping particular categories of borrowers, or at helping financial intermediation in general. A general feeling of uncertainty weighs on global sentiment. Of note: the IMF finds that "Risks for a Serious Global Slowdown Are Alarmingly High...The probability of global growth falling below 2 percent in 2013––which would be consistent with recession in advanced economies and a serious slowdown in emerging market and developing economies––has risen to about 17 percent, up from about 4 percent in April 2012 and 10 percent (for the one-year-ahead forecast) during the very uncertain setting of the September 2011 WEO. For 2013, the GPM estimates suggest that recession probabilities are about 15 percent in the United States, above 25 percent in Japan, and above 80 percent in the euro area." And yet probably the most defining line of the entire report (that we have found so far) is the following: "Central bank capital is, in many ways, an arbitrary number." And there you have it, straight from the IMF.

Friday's ramp-fest in European stocks - which did not appear to be correspondingly followed by European sovereign debt - was largely retraced today. Extended by the bullish bias from the US NFP data (and closed before the US data BLShit sunk in), it seems that not just the catch down drove stocks in Europe (and Europe's VIX) but anxiety ahead of the expected wall of noise from European leaders ahead of their meetings (which we have already suffered today). European government bonds leaked lower (yields/spreads higher) and Swiss 2Y rates dropped to their lowest in a month (though still well above the mid-crisis safety panic levels of a few months ago). European credit also slid - tending to follow equities this time.

Back in July, when the news of the French foray into the "fairness doctrine" hit, and we learned of Hollande's plan to tax all those making over €1 million at a 75% tax rate, we said that "we are rotating our secular long thesis away from Belgian caterers and into tax offshoring advisors, now that nobody in the 1% will pay any taxes ever again." We should have also added that we are buying all the available long-dated call options in French real estate firms, with the imminent surge in luxury real estate dumping, once the French "1%" decide they want nothing to do with a regime that is hell bent on confiscating 75% of their annual cash flow at first, and slowly moving toward pocketing the balance of their assets (remember what we said in September 2011: that 30% global tax on all financial assets in a New Normal insolvent, and wealth redistributive world, is inevitable, and it is coming). Sure enough, the wholesale dump of luxury properties has now begun. AFP writes: "A flood of top-end properties are hitting the market as businessmen seek to leave France before stiff tax hikes hit, real estate agents and financial advisors say. "It's nearly a general panic. Some 400 to 500 residences worth more than one million euros ($1.3 million) have come onto the Paris market," said managers at Daniel Feau, a real-estate broker that specialises in high-end property." But that would mean that in the New Normal real estate is once again merely a credit-bubble dependent, flippable asset: not a long-term housing investment, but merely one in which the pursuit of the greater fool is all that matters (not news to anyone here, but certainly news to all those who actually believe that 'housing has bottomed').

We have mentioned the little-known Belgian economist's works a couple of times previously (here and here) with regard his exposing the serious flaws in the Bretton Woods monetary system and perfectly predicting it's inevitable demise. Triffin's 'Dilemma' was that when one nation's currency also becomes the world's reserve asset, eventually domestic and international monetary objectives diverge. Have you ever wondered how it's possible that the USA has run a trade deficit for 37 consecutive years? Have you ever considered the consequences on the value of your Dollar denominated assets if it eventually becomes an unacceptable form of payment to our trading partners? Thankfully for those of us trying to navigate the current financial morass, Robert Triffin did. Triffin's endgame is simple. A rapid diversification of reserves out of the dollar by foreign central banks. The blueprint for this alternative has been in plain sight since the late 1990's, and if you watch what central banks do – not what they say – you can benefit.

Hint: It's not the "sovereigns." The chart below (an update of a chart we showed some years ago: not unexpectedly, Dexia no longer made the cut) shows the ratio of the biggest European and American bank assets to domicile nation GDP. The red line is the 50% assets/GDP breakeven. It is safe to say that if a bank's "assets" whether marked to myth, unicorns, or markets (sadly nobody has done the latter in the past 3 years) represents at least half of a domicile nation's GDP, the bank is obviously Too Humongous To Fail, and when it comes to leverage it is its unelected executive committee which calls the real shots for not only the host country, but any monetary union it may be part of. This is how 20 or so corner offices hijacked Europe. The ironic observation is that for all the complaints about the TBTF phenomenon in the US (banks in red), it is Europe where the TBTF spectacle will truly unfurl once the central banks finally lose control, and the giant unwind begins.

European sovereign bond spreads weakened notably today - extending losses from yesterday - ending the day unchanged to slightly wider on the week. There has been a rather notable pattern though emerging in the last week as from the US Open to EU Close, we see bonds consistently sold off. EURUSD pushed up above 1.30 on a decent stop-run amid Draghi's words. It seemed Draghi was a little less dovish than in recent days - no rate cuts, more pain for Portugal, no concessions on Spain. European equities underperformed European credit for the second day in a row - playing catch down as financials underperformed.

Catching up to the apparent 'good news' from the Spanish bank audit debacle and as we noted earlier, the smallest of beats in a singular data item, provided some support for equity prices in Europe today. It appeared as though traders had reduced weight or been modestly short-biased into the news and the lack of events spurred a reversal - which on its own looks good but merely returns us to Thursday's close (or not even for Spain). In other markets, the US ISM data spurred a jump which was immediately faded in both EURUSD, European sovereigns, and European corporate/financial credit markets. Bottom line - European equities round-tripped from Thursday but credit markets are much less sanguine.

The financial crisis of 2008 shook politicians, bankers, regulators, commentators and ordinary citizens out of the complacency created by the 25-year "great moderation". Yet, for all the rhetoric around a new financial order, and all the improvements made, many of the old risks remain (and some are far larger). The following 'story' suggests a scenario based on an 'avoidable history' and while future crises are not avoidable, being a victim of the next one is.

"John Banks was woken by his phone at 3am on Sunday 26th April 2015. John worked for Garland Brothers, a formerly British bank that had relocated its headquarters to Singapore in late 2011 as a result of..."