France

Yesterday following the S&P announcement of the Greek 'selective default', we had one simple question to the ECB:

Today we get the answer.

Could Sweden or Finland be the scene of the next European financial crisis? It is actually far likelier than most people realize. While the world has been laser-focused on the woes of the heavily-indebted PIIGS nations for the last couple of years, property markets in Northern and Western European countries have been bubbling up to dizzying new heights in a repeat performance of the very property bubbles that caused the global financial crisis in the first place. Nordic and Western European countries such as Norway and Switzerland have attracted strong investment inflows due to their perceived economic safe-haven statuses, serving to further inflate these countries’ preexisting property bubbles that had expanded from the mid-1990s until 2008. With their overheated economies and ballooning property bubbles, today’s safe-haven European countries may very well be tomorrow’s Greeces and Italys.

Banking privacy is dead. Completely, totally dead. Murdered, really. The US government is the assailant, and FATCA is the murder weapon. We’ve talked about this a few times before– FATCA is the heinously insidiously piece of legislation that the Honorable Barrack Hussein Obama passed into law in 2010 as part of the “Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act”. There were no hiring incentives, and there was no restoration of employment. But any vestiges of banking privacy were destroyed. In brief, FATCA has two key concepts. First, it requires an additional (and completely unnecessary) layer of reporting from all US taxpayers who have ‘foreign financial accounts’ at ‘foreign financial institutions.’ Though as we have discussed before, both of these critical terms are ridiculously and flagrantly ambiguous, putting the onus entirely on the taxpayer. The second key issue is that FATCA puts a burden on ALL foreign financial institutions worldwide to enter into an information-sharing agreement with the IRS; this essentially obliges every bank on the planet to submit reports and customers’ private data to the IRS.  Such provisions are absolutely, 100% impossible. And it’s becoming clear that FATCA was passed with no intention of being enforceable. It’s inconceivable that every institution on the planet could enter into an agreement. And it’s inconceivable that every institution on the planet could possibly know whether every other institution has entered into the agreement. The only thing FATCA has accomplished is scaring the living daylights out of non-US banks. So much so that foreign banks have approached their governments to ask for help.

Will Germany go “all in” on the Euro experiment? I doubt it. In fact I’ve found the “smoking gun” the little known act that Germany has recently implemented that proves the country has a Plan B that involves leaving the Euro with minimal damage.

With the second version of the ECB's enhanced LTRO (back-door QE) starting tomorrow, there has been a great deal of speculation on what the take-up will be, what banks will do with the funds they receive, and more importantly how will this effect global asset markets. SocGen provides a comprehensive top-down analysis of the drivers of LTRO demand, the likely uses of those funds, and estimates how much of this will be used to finance the carry trade (placebo or no placebo). Italian (25%) and Spanish (20%) banks are unsurprisingly at the forefront in their take-up of ECB liquidity (likely undertaking the M.A.D. reach-around carry trade ) and have been since long before the first LTRO. On the other side, German banks have dramatically reduced their collective share of ECB liquidity from 30% to only 6%. SocGen skews their detailed forecast to EUR300-400bn, disappointing relative to the near EUR500bn consensus - and so likely modestly bad news for risk assets. Furthermore, they expect around EUR116bn of this to be used for carry trade 'revenue' production which will however lead to only a 0.6% improvement in sectoral equity levels (though some banks will benefit more than others), as they discuss the misunderstanding of LTRO-to-ECB-deposit facility rotation. We, however, remind readers that collateralized (and self-subordinating) debt is not a substitute for capital and if the ECB adamantly defines this as the last enhanced LTRO (until the next one of course) then European banks face an uphill battle without that crutch - whether or not they even have collateral to post. Its further important to note that LTRO 2 cannot be wholly disentangled from the March 1-2 EU Summit event risk and we fear expectations, priced into markets, are a little excessive. We suspect this will not be a Goldilocks 'just right' moment.

With an economy of just $3.2Tn versus the United States $14.3Tn Germany is trying to prop up a Eurozone that is more than one trillion dollars bigger than America. They just do not have the resources for the task they are undertaking and I predict serious consequences, eventually, from their efforts. Germany is “best of class” and will be the last to go but they cannot evade the European recession in the end and I think it is only a matter of time and unfortunate decisions before the austerity demands made on so many will wind their way back home to those who made the demands. They used a timeline that was much too short for the job at hand and payment will eventually be forced upon them. They obviously get the joke where Eurobonds and other ploys of this nature average the economies of Europe and the standards of living over some period of time so that Germany, in the end, will suffer most as they have the furthest to fall. They have approached the G-20, China, the emerging market countries and all polite responses to the side; the results have been about zip. The Germans are running out of both time and money and Franz is squirming in the beer hall.

• Germany Crisis Role in Focus After G-20 Rebuff (Bloomberg)
• G20 to Europe: Show us the money (Reuters)
• Draghi’s Unlimited Loans Are No Panacea (Bloomberg)
• Geithner says Europe has lowered risks of "catastrophe" (Reuters)
• Gone in 22 Seconds (WSJ)
• Gillard beats Rudd to stay Australian PM (FT)
• Brazil Will Continue Reducing Interest Rates, Tombini Says (Bloomberg)
• China to Have ‘Soft Landing’ Soon: Zoellick (Bloomberg)
• China To Be Largest Economy Before 2030: World Bank (Reuters)
• Obama pressed to open emergency oil stocks (FT)

As the banks in Europe report out earnings; or the lack thereof in most cases, it becomes clear that the LTRO is helping with liquidity but not with solvency past some very short term point. This is always the case of course but it is beginning to hit home. The balance sheets for many European banks have now swelled on the liability side with more and more debt piling up courtesy of the ECB while their assets decrease due to the Basel III mandates so that the financials of these banks begin to deteriorate. It is not just the losses from their Greek debt holdings that are coming into play but also their potential future losses from sovereign debt write downs markedly for Portugal soon I think but also perhaps for Spain and Italy in the near term as the recession in Europe brings new problems to the fore which will further reduce the value of sovereign and bank credits in Europe.

• U.S. Postal Service to Cut 35,000 Jobs as Plants Are Shut (BBG) -Expect one whopper of a seasonal adjustment to compensate
• European Banks May Tap ECB for $629 Billion Cash (Bloomberg) - EURUSD surging as all ECB easing now priced in; Fed is next
• Madrid presses EU to ease deficit targets (FT)
• Greek Parliament Approves Debt Write-Down (WSJ)
• Mentor of Central Bankers Fischer Rues Complacency as Economy Accelerates (Bloomberg)
• Draghi Takes Tough Line on Austerity (WSJ)
• European Banks Hit by Losses (WSJ)
• Moody's: won't take ratings action on Japan on Friday (Reuters)
• Athens told to change spending and taxes (FT)

Having spent much of the day attempting to explain the difference between nominal and real wealth creation and that asset price movements are different to the economy, we turn back to Michael Cembalest of JP Morgan to set the story straight on one of the most frequently cited reasons for the rally: "It's the economy, stupid".  It is hard to disagree that there are positive signs, but as the JPM CIO opines, let's be realistic: US growth is projected to be ~2.5% for 2012. Some argue that profits are the driver, and they are doing well, but their apparent strength is masked by a sad truth that gets little exposure. Looking at where those profits come from shows that if labor compensation grew at trends comparable to prior recoveries, a big chunk of current-cycle profits would disappear (quicker than a rehypothecated 2Y BTP under Corzine's watch). Cembalest summarizes that while this doesn't mean these profits are entirely illusory; it does mean that they come with related costs: such as weak household income and bloated government budget deficits - which have a cost as well (don't they?).

Belgium's total exposure to its bank bailouts: 41% of GDP. But finally there is some resistance.

'All is not resolved' is how Morgan Stanley's Arnaud Mares begins his latest diatribe on the debacle that is occurring in Europe. While a disorderly default seems to have been avoided (for now), the Greek problem (as we have discussed extensively) remains unsolved as debt sustainability seems questionable at best, economic recovery a remote hope, and the growing political tensions across Europe (and its people) grow wider. Critically, Mares addresses the seeming complacency towards a Greek exit from the euro area noting that it is no small matter and has dramatic consequences (specifically a la Lehman, the unintended consequences could be catastrophic). Greece (or another nation) leaving the Euro invites concerns over the fungibility of bank deposits across weak and strong nations and with doubt over the Euro, the EU could collapse as free-trade broke down. The key is that, just as in the US downgrade case last year, a Euro-exit implies the impossible is possible and the impact of such an event is much, much higher than most seem to realize. While the likelihood of a Greek euro-exit may remain low (for now), the scale of the impact makes this highly material and suggests the EU will do whatever it takes (print?) within their mandates to hold the status quo. For all practical purposes, it would be the end of the euro as a genuine single currency and to preserve the euro if Greece left would require total federalism in the rest of the area.

We have discussed, at length, the symbiotic (or perhaps parasitic) relationship between the banking system in Europe and the governments (read Central Banks). The LTRO has done nothing but bring them into a closer and more mutually-reinforcing chaotic relationship as we suspect many of the Italian and Spanish banks have gone all-in on the ultimate event risk trade in their government's debt. It should come as no surprise to anyone that the bulk of the Greek bailout money will flow directly to the European banking system and Credit Suisse has recently updated the bank exposure (by country) to peripheral sovereign debt that shows just how massively dependent each peripheral nation's banking system is on its own government for capital and more importantly, how the core (France and Germany) remains massively exposed (in terms of Tier 1 Capital) to the PIIGS. Retroactive (negative) salary cuts may well not be the worst of what is to come as the bankers deleveraging returns to bite them in a phoenix-like resurrection of sovereign risk on now even-more sovereign-bloated (and levered) balance sheets.

The softer PMI reports have weighed on risk markets, which as a result saw equities trade lower throughout the session. In addition to that, market participants continued to fret over the latest Greek debt swap proposals, which according to the Greek CAC bill will give bond holders at least 10 days to decide on new bond terms following the public invitation, and the majority required to change bond terms is set at 2/3 of represented bond holders. Looking elsewhere, EUR/USD spot is flat, while GBP/USD is trading sharply lower after the latest BoE minutes revealed that BoE's Posen and Miles voted for GBP 75bln increase in APF. Going forward, the second half of the session sees the release of the latest Housing data from the US, as well as the USD 35bln 5y note auction by the US Treasury.

After months (it seems like years) of trying to avoid a CDS Credit Event, it looks like one is inevitable.  The Greek 5 year CDS is at least 70 bid which may be the highest ever.  The game plan seems to be that Greece will put in retroactive CAC laws.  The PSI will come in below 100%.  Greece will trigger the CAC clauses on the Greek bonds, and we will get 100% participation in all those bonds, and we will get a Credit Event.  The interesting part is that depending on what they manage to do with English law bonds, the only bonds outstanding (not in the hands of the central bank only bonds, and troika loans) will be the new bonds.  If they start CAC’ing each bond, it is possible that there will be no existing bonds outstanding left.  Settlement would be based on the new bond (yes, ISDA has a Sovereign Restructured Deliverable Obligation clause – Section 2.16 of the definitions).  With the amortization schedule in place (and not including any value attributable to the GDP strippable warrants), I get that the new bonds would trade at 30% of par with a yield of just over 13%.  I would be careful paying up for CDS here, because settlement will be against these new bonds, not existing bonds if every old bond is CAC’d.  And given the attitude out of Greece late yesterday, and harsh IMF demands, we may well see that.