Monetization

If you think the EU Crisis is over, think again. True we’ve got until March 20^th for the Greek deal to be reached, but things have already gotten to the point that Germany has essentially issued its ultimatum. Either Greece hands over fiscal sovereignty, or it defaults in a BIG way.

Stop us when this sounds familiar: 'While we expect central banks globally to continue to provide liquidity, it is the ECB’s position that has changed the most dramatically. The relative expansion of the ECB’s balance sheet is EUR bearish in our view....the liquidity being generated by the ECB is to a large extent absorbed by the bank refinancing process, hence the large deposits at the ECB. Although there is clear evidence that some of the funds have been used in the peripheral bonds markets, helping to stabilise sovereign yield spreads, lending into the real economy remains constrained. We believe that the relative performance of money multipliers will be a significant driving force for currency markets in the coming year. We see the ECB liquidity as a negative for the EUR" At this point the preceding should remind our readers, almost verbatim, of this Zero Hedge post from January 31, "Reverting back to our trusty key correlation of 2012, namely the comparison of the Fed and ECB balance sheet, it would mean that absent a proportional Fed response, the fair value of the EURUSD would collapse to a shocking 1.12 as the ECB's balance sheet following this LTRO would grow from €2.7 trillion to €3.7 trillion." And the reason why the latter extract should remind readers of the former is because it is the basis for the just released conclusion by Morgan Stanley cutting its EURUSD price target from 1.20 to 1.15.

If you thought that the siren-call from the sell-side for more QE, more credit, and more monetization was merely lowest-common-denominator thinking on how to fix the Keynesian end-game, think again. As Morgan Stanley shows, it is much more about self-preservation (bonuses) as the extreme correlation of banker's relative pay to Debt/GDP clearly shows the reliance on the perpetuation of the credit super-cycle if 'lifestyles' are to be maintained. As MS notes, the rise of relative pay in the finance sector was highly correlated with the expansion in economy-wide leverage. A similar rise had occurred in the credit boom that culminated in the Great Depression. The deleveraging phase that followed that bust went hand-in-hand with declining relative compensation in finance, as the clearest beneficiaries of the credit super-cycle, credit providers (and implicitly their employees) clearly face the biggest structural problems in a deleveraging phase.

One of the major factors in the Central Banks of the world having stepped up the pace of flushing the world with increasing amounts of freshly digitized cash is writ large in the contraction in credit availability to the real economy (even to shipbuilders). Anecdotal examples of this constrained credit are everywhere but much more clearly and unequivocally in tightening lending standards in all of the major economies. As Bank of America's credit team points out, bank lending standards to corporates have tightened globally in Q4 2011 and the picture is ubiquitously consistent across the US, Europe, and Emerging Markets. Whether it is deleveraging, derisking, or simple defending of their balance sheets, banks' credit availability is becoming more constrained. While the Fed's QE and Twist monetization and then most recently the ECB's LTRO has led (aside from self-reinforcing short-dated reach-arounds in BTPs and circular guarantees supposedly reducing tail risk) to nothing but massive increases in bank reserves (as opposed to flowing through to the real economy), we suspect it was designed to halt the significantly tighter corporate lending environment (most significantly in European and Emerging Markets). The critical corollary is that, as BAML confirms, the single best non-market based indicator of future defaults is tightening lending standards and given the velocity of shifts in Europe and EM (and very recent swing in the US), investors reaching for high-yield may be ill-timed at best and disastrous credit cycle timing at worst (bearing in mind the upgrade/downgrade ratio is also shifting dramatically). Liquidity band-aids are not a solution for insolvency cardiac arrests as the dual vicious cycles of bank and sovereign stress remain front-and-center in Europe (with EM a close second) and the hope for real economic growth via credit creation kick-started by an LTRO is the pipe-dream the market is surviving on currently.

Over the past month, much has been said about the recent 3 year LTRO, and its function in stabilizing the European bond market. Certainly it has succeeded in causing an unprecedented steepening in European sovereign 2s10s curves across the periphery (well, except for Greece, and recently, Portugal) as by implication the ECB has made it clear that debt with a sub-3 year maturity is virtually risk free, inasmuch at least as the ECB is a credible central bank (and if it is perceived as no longer being one, there will be far bigger issues), along the lines of what the Fed's promise to keep ZIRP through the end of 2013, and today's likely extension announcement through 2014. Yet does filling a much needed for European stability fixed income "black hole" equate to a catalyst for Risk On? Hardly, because as in a new note today Brockhouse Cooper analysts Pierre Lapointe and Alex Bellefleur explains, the LTRO is "not a catalyst for a risk-on rally as the central bank is substituting itself for funding sources that have “dried up.” Sure enough - all the ECB is doing is preserving existing leverage (especially in light of ongoing bank deleveraging), not providing incremental debt, something which could only be done in the context of unsterilized bond monetization ala QE in the US. So just over a month in, what does the LTRO really mean for Europe (especially as we approach the next 3 Year LTRO issuance on February 29)? Here is Brockhouse's explanation.

After generating $37.9 billion in cash, short and long-term equivalents in 2011, and a record $16 billion in Q4 alone (of which $11.8 billion in Long-Term Marketable Securities: Treasurys? Pretty soon Apple will be a bigger monetization force than the Fed), the company's total cash and equivalents horde is now just shy of $100 billion, or $97.6 billion. And with cash growing at 20% in the quarter, extrapolating into the future, means that the company will hit $1 trillion in cash by Q1 2015. Looked at otherwise, if Apple were a country, and its cash was equivalent to GDP, it would rank as the world's 58th largest economy, above such countries as Slovakia, Iraq, Luxembourg, and Syria. At least now we know where all that money that is not going to pay mortgages, is going. Next question: how long until uncle Sam demands windfall tax, or until the FoxConn workers learn to read press releases and politely request a pay raise or they all jump?

At some point, the market will force the issue of whether or not the ECB is going to be monetizing everything or not. Germany, having already seen the ultimate outcome of monetization (Weimar) has already made it clear that it will not tolerate this.

GroupThink! GroupThink! GroupThink!

While it is early to determine if the ongoing breakout is finally in anticipation of upcoming episodes of direct and indirect monetization by the Fed, ECB, or any of the many other pathological currency diluters in circulation, it is obvious that precious metals have found a new bid in recent days. Is this then, the beginning of the next surge in gold and silver to record highs? It remains to be seen, but one entity, the Duet Commodities Fund which was one of last year's best performers, has already made up its mind. 'Our central forecast in gold remains constructive as our long term view targets $2,500 in 2012. Our core view is that gold will head higher to the $2,500 range driven by consequential USD weakness once the EU crisis dissipates and the US steps into the limelight. A weaker USD is not undesirable in the world order as everyone (especially China) understands that the US consumer is the driver for global consumer confidence and consequential consumption led demand." Wow - someone in this market can actually think one step ahead of the inevitable ECB LTRO/monetization, and realize that the Fed will in turn have to escalate to that escalation. Gold, er golf clap.

While skimming the latest draft of the "TREATY ON STABILITY, COORDINATION AND GOVERNANCE IN THE ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION" or the EU fiscal draft in short, which is supposed to give Europe reason to rejoice as it says something about the ESM potentially being levered more than €500 billion (not absent additional funding of course, and we have seen how good the EFSF is in procuring capital), we have found the only two clauses worth noting. Which unfortunately show just what a farce this whole process truly is.

Truthfully the only reason to be long stocks right now is in anticipation of more QE from the Fed at its January 25 FOMC meeting. However, the likelihood of more QE being announced at that time is slim to none. For starters, interest rates are already at record lows, so the Fed cannot use that excuse. Secondly the latest economic data out of the US, while heavily massaged, is showing some signs of improvement, which negates the need for more QE. And finally, Bernanke and the Fed are far too politically toxic for the Fed to begin another massive round of QE (the last one of $600 billion accomplished nothing) just for the sake of it.

It is a pure coincidence that following the previous report of stern condemnation of traditional ECB QE in the form of Large Scale Asset Purchases (LSAP) by the Bundesbank, we should follow it up with the latest analysis by Chris Wood of CLSA's famous Greed and Loathing newsletter, in which the noted skeptic does an about face on his existing short European financial trade and covers such exposure, while observing the much-discussed major shift in ECB liquidity provisioning as the catalyst. And while his trade reco may or may not be right (if we were betting people we would put our money on the latter), what is interesting is the basis for the material change in exposure which to Wood is explained simply by the dramatic shift in the ECB approach toward monetary generosity, courtesy of the arrival of ex-Goldmanite Mario Draghi. The basis is the first noted here massive surge in the European balance sheet (Figure 2) which while not engaging in prima facie monetization, has done so via indirect channels, in the form of an LTRO, which is basically a 1%, 3-year loan, but more importantly, a balance sheet expansion which while having failed to increase the velocity of money in any way (with all of the LTRO and then some now having been redeposited back at the ECB as reporter earlier), has at least fooled the market for the time being that any sub 3 Year debt is "safe". So just how large will the next LTRO be? "Market talk is focusing on an even bigger amount to be borrowed at the next 3-year longer-term refinancing operation (LTRO) due on 29 February. GREED & fear has heard guesstimates of up to €1tn!" That's right - it is possible that in its quanto monetary diarrhea (but at least it's not printing, so the Bundesbank will be delighted), the ECB is about to increase its balance sheet from €2.7 trillion to € €3.7 trillion, or a €1.7 trillion ($2.2 trillion) expansion in 8 months! And gold is where again?

There is a little for everyone in Marc Faber's latest appearance on CNBC. The infamous boomer (and doomer) believes (as we do) that today's downgrades are less significant for stocks (at least until the realization that banks and more importantly insurance companies are about to be cut as well - keep a close eye out on Allianz and Generali (of ASSGEN fame) - it is not incidental that they are abbreviated to A&G, just one letter away from our own AIG) as it is largely priced in but the equity market's rally of the last few weeks (with its lack of breadth and volume) is strongly suggestive of a bear-market rally (as opposed to the decoupling bull market that so many hope for). His view quite simply is that the ECB has undergone a backdoor monetization and without this the EUR would be significantly stronger especially given the huge short-interest (though he sees the trend for EUR is down).  Some highlights include: EUR weakness may help exports but the debt servicing costs of major European firms with huge US denominated debt wil suffer greatly, most European nations should be CCC-rated, nominally European stocks will outperform and holding quality dividend paying companies is preferred, valuation is practically impossible given ZIRP, and finally noting the irony, the worse the global economy gets (and the Chinese economy suffers), the more money printing will occur lifting nominal equity prices while real economies stumble and standards of living drop, so hold gold.

Continuing the schizoid overnight theme, we look at Germany which just sold €3.9 billion in 6 month zero-coupon Bubills at a record low yield of -0.0122% (negative) compared to 0.001% previously. The bid to cover was 1.8 compared to 3.8 before. As per the FT: "German short-term debt has traded at negative yields in the secondary market for some weeks with three-month, six-month and one-year debt all below zero. Bills for six-month debt hit a low of minus 0.3 per cent shortly after Christmas...The German auction marks the start of another busy week of debt sales across Europe. France and Slovakia are also selling bills on Monday, with Austria and the Netherlands selling bonds on Tuesday. Germany will auction five-year bonds on Wednesday, while Thursday sees sales of Spanish bonds and Italian bills. Italy finishes the week with a sale of bonds on Friday." Still the fact that the ECB deposit facility, already at a new record as pointed out previously, is not enough for banks to parks cash is grounds for alarm bells going off: the solvency crisis in Europe is not getting any easier, confirmed by the implosion of UniCredit which is down now another 11% this morning and down nearly 50% since the atrocious rights offering announced last week. On this background Germany continues to be a beacon of stability, yet even here the consensus is that recession has arrived. As Bild writes, according to a bank economist survey, Germany's economy is expected to shrink in Q1, with wage increases remaining below 3%. And as deflation grips the nation, potentially unleashing the possibility for direct ECB monetization, look for core yields to continue sliding lower, at least on the LTRO-covered short end.

European nations need to roll over hundreds of billions if not trillions of Euros’ worth of debt in 2012. And this is at a time when even more solvent members such as France and Germany are staging weak and failed auctions.