CDS

Greek debt negotiations continue. They do seem less afraid of triggering a Credit Event (and some even think it could be a good thing - as we have argued for some time). Estimates are that only EUR100bn of Greek bonds are actually in hands that will follow the IIF recommendations but it is clear that the negotiations are getting tricky (actually they have always been tricky, it’s just that until recently no one was actually negotiating).  The IMF seems insistent that they won’t provide new money without a high participation rate in an exchange with worse terms than many thought.  There are questions about whether the ECB should participate or not and this is in direct opposition to the IMF's need for very high participation and while losses could be hidden by off-market trades to the EFSF, there will be lots more political bickering if that were the case. More importantly, we think, is the Portuguese debt problem, which is much smaller than that of Greece, but should be attracting more attention as we note Portuguese debt hitting new lows (especially post LTRO) unlike the rest of Europe's exuberance.

We noted last night that heavy and large average trade size was going through after the cash market close in S&P futures and it seemed overnight we needed one more push to flush out some more chasers before today's less than euphoric macro prints (aside from CFNAI's market-centric index) stalled the Fed-induced excitement. Financials had their worst day of the year (worst performing sector 2 days in a row), down just under 1% as did the Tech and Energy sectors as Utilities were best once again. Volumes were up with ES at its 50-day average and NYSE volume second highest of the year as ES (the e-mini S&P 500 futures contract) slid 20 points or so from opening highs up near 1330. Equity and credit markets tracked on another closely all day (as did broad risk drivers) with a last-30-minutes ramp (once again on high average trade size) just for good measure taking ES back to Tuesday after-hours swing highs. The late swing up looked like a recovery from being modestly oversold relative to risk assets as TSYs, FX, and commodities all trod water as stocks pulled up 5-6 S&P pts into the close. TSYs all rallied on the day with 2s-10s all at week low yields and 30Y starting to catch up to the excitement at the end of the day (though 2s10s30s remains notably 'low' relative to ES currently). Gold and Silver continued to outperform (up around 3.5% on the week) and Copper held onto its gains while Oil dropped back below $100 after getting above $101 early in the day. The correlation of EURUSD and risk has re-emerged recently and post-Europe's close today, USD strengthened though EUR remained just above 1.31 as we closed.

Confused by the Greece situation? Dizzied by the PSI haircuts, retractive CACs, Troika promises, ECB participations, local vs non-local law implications, CDS triggers, and ultimately contagion concerns? Fear no more (just like Jamie Dimon apparently) as Barclays presents the definitive Greek End-Game Scenario decision tree.

As the world awaits resolution out of Greece and the debt exchange offer which even if passed today would have to cram 6 months of actual work into 54 days, the global bond vigilantes are not sticking around, and continue to attack the next weakest link - Portugal, whose 10 Year bonds just passed 15% in yield, and were trading well below 50 cents of par with CDS hitting a new record of 1350 bps. Naturally this has brought out the ECB's crack bond buying team (only at a central bank does a "trader" need only know how to buy, selling skills are optional) which tried to put the genie back in the bottle but now it is too late. After all, vigilantes are just wondering what form the Portuguese restructuring will take place considering that unlike Greece the bulk of its bonds have strong protections. So if one does use Greece as a benchmark how long does Portugal have? As the third chart shows, the last time 10 year GGBs passed 15% was back in August. So Portugal has 6 months. Give or take.

Year-to-date, Gold is up an impressive 9.4%, significantly outpacing the S&P 500 at +5.6% and the disappointing 2% loss (in price) for the 30Y bond.

Treasuries sold back off initial knee-jerk rally low yields into the close but the EUR kept going (holding above 1.3100) as Gold and Silver were the big winners on the day (+2.9% and 3.4% on the week now). Stocks and credit roared higher after an initial stumble post FOMC. Financials lagged among all the S&P sectors (and Utilities outperformed post FOMC statement +0.75% vs financials -0.25%). Right up until the close, credit and equity markets were on a tear but very soon after cash closed, futures limped back and HY credit snapped lower (quite dramatically) which makes some sense given just how ridiculously rich it had become to fair-value.

As European bank deleveraging continues, Middle East tensions rise, and oil prices (Brent and Crude alike) oscillate from headline to headline, we thought it intriguing that the entities with net notional outstandings in CDS markets at or near their largest in history are China (and Chinese banks), LatAm Oil companies, Abu Dhabi, and Israel. Quite a crop of potential risk bombs that at least credit traders appear to demand protection on more than others.

Markets have become far less volatile than last year, but many investors remain focused on the Credit Markets for signs and cues as to the next move.  With so many people looking to moves in credit markets and trying to determine how successful an auction has been, we thought it would make sense to go through some examples of how credit trades.  At one extreme you have a real market like for the E-mini S&P futures.  That trades from Sunday at 6pm EST until Friday at 4:15 EST.  It is virtually continuous and at any given time you can see the bids and offers of the entire market.  Then you have credit trading, which has almost nothing in common with ES futures and their incredible liquidity and transparency.

Even as the Euro-Dollar 3 Month basis swap has contracted to a nearly 6 month low at -75 bps, on residual hopes that the LTRO will do anything to fix Europe (it won't - just compare it to the €442 billion 1 year LTRO from June 2009 which worked until it didn't for the simple reason that Europe does does not have a liquidity problem), Europe has once again reemerged as a source of risk off (not least of all because the fulcrum security benefiting from the LTRO - the Italian 2 year BTP is for the first time in weeks wider by 17 bps). Why? The same reason as always: Greece, with a touch of Portugal. As BBG observes the positive sentiment in Asia earlier was retraced in the European session, with commodities, FX, equities lower, especially after ECB demurred from accepting losses on its Greek bond holdings. What that means is that as we patiently explained over the weekend, the imminent Greek default (just listen to Soros over in Davos spewing fire and brimstone on Europe for allowing the situation to get to a place where a Greek default is inevitable) will create so many subordinated junior tranches of Greek debt it will make one's head spin. But while the fate of Greece is all but sealed, and a CDS triggered virtually factored in (note: a Greek CDS trigger, in isolation, won't have much of an impact as repeated here before - in fact it will return some normalcy to the market as CDS will be a hedging vehicle once again over ISDA's corrupt trampled corpse), it is what happens to Portugal and its bonds that has the market gasping for air. Because as Zero Hedge pointed out first, a Greek default will be impossible to be enacted in Portugal in its currently envisioned format, as stupid as it may be. In fact, due to the pervasive and broad negative pledges in most medium-term Portuguese bonds, any priming Troika bailout is impossible without providing matching collateral for everyone else under UK indenture bonds!

I warned on Greece 2 years ago, and it seems to have come to fruition. This is who's next....

Remember when Europe was fixed, if only for a few weeks? Those were the times, too bad they are now officially over. EURUSD is back under 1.30 in thin volume because even as we "shockingly" find that, no, Greece did not have the "upper hand" since Greek bondholder negotiations just broke down (and that over the matter of a cash coupon delta between 3.5% and 4.0%, which implicitly means that from a bondholder IRR perspective, when taking a 15 cent EFSF Bill into consideration, the hedge fund community fully expects the country to be in default even post reorg in at about two years). But it is that "other" European country which was recently junked by S&P (causing the 10 year to soar to new records), that is now the focus point of (re)bailout concerns. Reuters reports: "The euro nudges down some 20 pips to $1.2995 in thin, illiquid trade with Tokyo dealers citing renwed fears Portugal may need a second bailout. Undermining the glow of Lisbon's achievements in reforming the country's labour market is the rapidly rising market concern that it is the next potential candidate to default in the euro zone after Greece -- a point that is fast becoming clear as Athens approaches the end of its debt restructuring talks." And here is the paradox: if Greece succeeds in persuading the ad hoc creditors to accept a 3.5% coupon, which it won't absent cramdown and CDS trigger, Portugal will immediately if not sooner proceed with the same steps. There is however, a problem. Unlike Greece, where the bulk, or over 90%, of the bonds are under Local Law, and thus have no bondholder protections (a fact about to be used by Greece to test the legal skills of asset managers who can retain the smartest lawyers in the world and generate par recoveries on their bonds in due course), in a generic Portuguese Euro Medium Term note Programme prospectus we find the following...

Two things of note in today's Rosie piece. On one hand he breaks out the 10 good and bad things that investors are factoring, and while focusing on the positive, and completely ignoring the negative, are pushing the market to its best start since 1997. As Rosie says: "The equity market has gotten off to its best start in a good 15 years and being led by the deep cyclicals (materials, homebuilders, semiconductors) and financials — last year's woeful laggards (the 50 worst performing stocks in 2011 are up over 10% so far this year; the 50 best are up a mere 2%). Bonds are off to their worst start since 2003 with the 10-year note yield back up to 2%. The S&P 500 is now up 20% from the early October low and just 3.5% away from the April 2011 recovery high (in fact, in euro terms, it has rallied 30% and at its best level since 2007)." Is there anything more to this than precisely the same short-covering spree we saw both in 2010 and 2011? Not really: "This still smacks of a classic short-covering rally as opposed to a broad asset- allocation shift, but there is no doubt that there is plenty of cash on the sidelines and if it gets put to use, this rally could be extended. This by no means suggests a shift in my fundamental views, and keep in mind that we went into 2011 with a similar level of euphoria and hope in place and the uptrend lasted through April before the trap door opened. Remember too that the acute problems in the housing and mortgage market began in early 2007 and yet the equity market did not really appreciate or understand the severity of the situation until we were into October of that year and even then the consensus was one of a 'soft landing'." Finally, Rosie steps back from the noise and focuses on the forest, asking the rhetorical question: "Isn't this still a "modern day depression?" - his answer, and ours - "sure it is."

As we wait for more IIF announcements about the Greek Private Sector Involvement (PSI), Greek CDS remains bid above 60 points up front.  For a contract that is about to be "worthless", this seems to have a lot of value. Why would Greek CDS still be so well bid? Whether it is stubbornness, stupidity, or more simply a reality check on the IIF's negotiating power (just how many bonds do they speak for?) and the future unsustainability of Greek debt anyway, it seems that an impressive immediate exchange of all Greek debt with at least a 50% notional reduction, 30 year maturity, and low coupon is pretty well priced in (away from actual Greek bonds that is). Anything less is likely to disappoint the market as the realization that nothing is fixed sinks in, and that this may not even take near term "hard default" off the table (this PSI is a default no matter how it is spun even if it isn't a Credit Event).

When we predicted on Thursday that the most recent record number of EUR shorts would take the EURUSD over 1.30 on Friday following a spurious rumor that the IIF and Greece had reached a deal, it turns out we were one work day off. As it happens, the EURUSD has just taken out 1.3000 following an FT Deutschland report that Greece and the IIF have reached a broad agreement. It would be funny if only it wasn't so predictable. The source- unidentified government officials. Either way, it appears this will be the on again, off again rumor that drives risk today, since there are no fundamental economic news. Per Bloomberg, banks and EU, IMF, ECB still trying to agree on coupons, so it actually is not a deal but hey, who cares. Coupon for the new, long-term debt after the voluntary haircut should be somewhere above 4%. Troika still pushing for a 4% ceiling. Deal may be concluded in next few hours. Top level talks were interrupted Saturday, continued Sunday by “experts”. Troika experts want to calculate today if Greece can still meet the goal of cutting total debt to 120% of GDP by 2020. And so on. Of course, since just one hold out hoping for "legal arbitrage" and par recoveries, will force the retroactive implementation of CACs, which in turn will trigger CDS, which in turn will force a subordination of debt claims, all of this is moot.

The CDS index market remains one of the most liquid sources of hedges and positioning available (despite occasional waxing and waning in volumes) and is often used by us as indications of relative flows and sophisticated investor risk appetite. However, as Kamakura Corporation has so diligently quantified, the broad CDS market (specifically including single-names) remains massively concentrated. This concentration, evidenced by the Honolulu-based credit guru's findings that three institutions: JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Citibank National Association, have market shares in excess of 19% each has shown little to no reduction (i.e. the market remains as closed as ever) and they warn that this dramatically increases the probability of collusion and monopoly pricing power. We have long argued that the CDS market is valuable (and outright bans are non-sensical and will end badly) as it offers a more liquid (than bonds) market to express a view or more simply hedge efficiently. However, we do feel strongly that CDS (indices especially) should be exchange traded (more straightforward than ever given standardization, electronic trading increases, and clearing) and perhaps Kamakura's work here will be enough to force regulators and the DoJ to finally turn over the rock (as they did in Libor and Muni markets) and do what should have been done in late 2008 when the banks had little to no chips to bargain with on keeping their high margin CDS trading desks in house (though the exchanges would also obviously have to step up to the plate unlike in 2008).

Lots of questions, and answers, from UBS in this Q&A on the Greek default/restructuring, much of it already covered previously, but the only one that matters is this: "Would the restructuring make the Greek situation sustainable? No. Sorry, but no is the answer. Even with full repudiation of the Greek debt, the situation would not be sustainable. In that event, the deficit would move to the primary balance, 5-6% last year. Not sustainable. And the current account deficit would be in the high single digits. Not sustainable either." So you're telling me there's a chance?