Credit Suisse

We shared our thoughts on the implication for more possible QE, sterilized or not, earlier, as did the market: why is risk higher, and with it the threat of inflation, if the Fed is doing perfectly innocuous sterilized easing? Maybe because it does not matter if the Fed intervenes sterilized or unsterilized, as long as the Fed intervenes, period? Now we present the knee jerk reaction of several Wall Street experts, all of whom are about as confused about this development, which is neither here nor there in terms of actually achieving any of the Fed's goals, as we are.

Oil is battling hard with Greece to top the tail-risk-du-jour in financial markets recently. As Credit Suisse notes, the US economy so far seems to have shrugged it off as 'gasoline-sensitive' economic data for Feb have ignored the price rise for now. The extreme (warm) weather may be shielding the economy from the effect of these higher energy costs, as are consumers habituation with relatively high prices, and while CS remains more sanguine than us on energy's negative impulse they set forth some useful implications (rules-of-thumb) for what oil means for gas prices, headline inflation, real disposable income, and GDP growth pointing to $150 Brent as a critical threshold for the economy (or equivalently $4.50 retail gasoline prices). Of course, Fed policy precedents and implications are necessarily situational as the hope for this being a 'temporary' situation but the circular reaction to the consequences of any growth drag will merely exacerbate the situation. Was Bernanke's recent less unconditional dovishness an implicit effort to 'tighten' expectations and manage the war-premium out of oil prices?

China had a massive surge in its demand for commodities over the past decade, fueled by its housing boom and infrastructure investment boom. From 2000 to 2010, China’s imports (in value terms) of iron ore surged by 42.5 times, thermal coal 248 times and copper 16.2 times. During the same period, its production (in quantity terms) for aluminum jumped by 441.8%, cement 219.5% and steel 396.0%. It is the biggest consumer in virtually all commodity categories in the world. In Credit Suisse's view, China was the key factor behind the global commodity supercycle. After a period of economic slowdown, all eyes are on China, hoping that the middle kingdom can return to its might in commodity demand. CS cuts through all the cyclical factors and asks whether China's mighty demand for commodities will return in the medium term - their answer is 'No'. As the economy shifts its growth engines away from infrastructure, construction and exports toward consumption, especially service consumption, the propensity of demand for commodities is bound to decline. Getting a massage simply does not use as much steel as building an airport.

Not many websites, analysts or authors have both the balls/temerity & the analytical honesty to take Goldman on. Well, I say.... Let's dance! This isn't a collection of soundbites from the MSM. This is truly meaty, hard hitting analysis for the big boys and girls. If you're easily offended or need the 6 second preview I suggest you move on.

Average US gas prices are over 13% higher since late December 2011, back at June 2011 levels, and do not look set to drop any time soon. The anecdotal impact of this rise in a significant segment of the real US consumer's spending habits is unmistakable, as we discussed earlier, but it is more important to note where we have come from when considering the macro impact. Q4 macro data was 'juiced' by the significant drop in the price of energy as the 4-5pt drop in Energy-and-Utilities spend enabled 'visible' consumption to rise during that time (obviously helped by government handouts also). Just as occurred in the latter part of 2008, as the consumer was forced to spend more on Energy, so the visible consumption dropped notably and given the significance of the current data 'drop' in energy spending, when the current gas prices filter into this data, we would expect, as Credit Suisse points out, consumption on more discretionary spending will drop significantly, especially with the gridlock in Washington. Perhaps this is just the 'crash' that Bernanke needs to run-the-presses again as conditionality will increasingly force investors to reject the buy-and-keep-buying trend as they recognize that QE3 can't start until things get worse, and buying in anticipation of QE3 means it will never happen?

Analysts are questioning the "double-down effect" the ECB's LTRO exercises are creating in eurozone sovereign spreads. Citi notes a spike in the purchase of government securities since the initial take-up in December.

Here's concrete proof of a mass European bank run. If you missed it, don't worry - there'll be plenty more from where these came from...

As expected by virtually everyone:

• NO PAYOUT ON GREECE $3.25 BILLION DEFAULT SWAPS, ISDA SAYS

Keep in mind, as criminal as this appears, and as damaging to the CDS market, the real trigger will be what ISDA does determines following the end of the PSI process. If there is no credit event then either, especially when the CACs are triggered as expected - an event which will certifiably be a trigger event under Section 4.7, then ISDA is truly hell bent on blowing up the CDS market as a hedging vehicle in its entirety.

It was a busy two months for the Sack-man, and Credit Suisse is the big winner

And I thought securitization ment they where going to keep the loan docs in a safe place in some bank vault some where...

2012 is proving to be the 'Year of the Central Bank'. It is an exciting celebration of all the wonderful maneuvers central banks can employ to keep the system from falling apart. Western central banks have gone into complete overdrive since last November, convening, colluding and printing their way out of the mess that is the Eurozone. The scale and frequency of their maneuvering seems to increase with every passing week, and speaks to the desperate fragility that continues to define much of the financial system today.... All of this pervasive intervention most likely explains more than 90 percent of the market's positive performance this past January. Had the G6 NOT convened on swaps, had the ECB NOT launched the LTRO programs, and had Bernanke NOT expressed a continuation of zero interest rates, one wonders where the equity indices would trade today. One also wonders if the European banking system would have made it through December. Thank goodness for "coordinated action". It does work in the short-term.... But what about the long-term? What are the unintended consequences of repeatedly juicing the system? What are the repercussions of all this money printing? We can think of a few.

Too bad not every hedge fund can be long Apple (even if as Goldman points out, they sure are trying - "One out of five hedge funds has AAPL among its ten largest long positions" - a truly stunning observation and one which means that if Apple, which is priced to absolute perfection, has even one hiccup, we would see an absolutely epic bloodbath in the market). Because if 2011 was a horrible year for hedge funds which closed the year well below, or -10%, their respective benchmark - the S&P (unch for the year), the last thing hedge fund LPs can afford is another year in which they pay 2 and 20 to generate a return lower than the S&P. Yet to their horror, this is precisely what is happening. According to Goldman's latest Hedge Fund Tracker, "The typical hedge fund generated a 2012 YTD return of 3% through February 10th compared with 7% gains for both the S&P 500 and the average large-cap core mutual fund." Yes, there are outliers, but far and wide this means that even more redemptions are about to hit the hedge funds space, where jittery investors will no longer show any restraint before sending in that redemption letter. It gets worse: "The 60-fund Dow Jones Credit Suisse Blue Chip Hedge Fund IndexSM has returned 3% YTD, in line with our sample average.... The distribution of YTD performance indicates that 50% of hedge funds have  generated returns between -2% and +2%." And the absolute kicker: "Only 10% have returned more than 7%, outperforming the S&P 500." Another way of saying that is that 90% of hedge funds are generating negative alpha! If that is not the signed, sealed and delivered notice of death of the hedge fund industry courtesy of not ubiquitous central planning, we don't know what is.

While the record corporate profit bonanza (if now declining) is still the fallback argument for any bearish allegation that the only reason why the market is up 20% in 3 months is due to $2 trillion in liquidity dumped into markets by central banks, this may be about to end quite abruptly, especially if Europe is a harbinger of things to come. As the following chart from Credit Suisse shows, the number of large companies (>500bn market cap) that lose money on an LTM basis (so not just in the quarter, and thus with a much longer lasting effect) has risen in Q4 for the first time since Q3 2009. And while in nominal terms the change is still relatively modest, the actual change in "losing companies" is a doubling from under 5% to 10%, as for the first time in years the percentage of European money losing companies matches that of the US.

In the ongoing 'game of chicken' in Europe (playing out between the core and the periphery as the main two players) it appears we are once again at a point of inflection in the Nash Equilibrium that exists only in the minds of the Eurogroup leaders. As Credit Suisse notes, the continued existence of the Euro will hugely depend on the incentive structure of its members to defend it (and implicitly this means costs and retaliations - downsides - must be appreciated and allocated). These incentives evolve through time (and interventions can have unintended consequences) and brinksmanship and threats (Greece's referendum comments for instance) can improve outcomes in the short-term. Most importantly, it seems the market is among the best mediators to 'fix' each player's action and outcome but each intervention reduces that effect, 'time becomes money' as costs are increasing through procrastination. This leaves the asymmetric interests of the players (remember how exposed the core is to the periphery?) likely to increase break-up risks with Credit Suisse seeing the logical and intended consequence 'an increase in stress' - with either a 'catastrophic' break-up (or member exit) or a long, painful and volatile continuation of the crisis that can only be slowly improved by some type of inter-European enforceable contract. The more intervention, the lower the immediate impact of inaction and the higher the pent-up volatility in the system before threats are taken seriously (or consequences admitted).

We have discussed, at length, the symbiotic (or perhaps parasitic) relationship between the banking system in Europe and the governments (read Central Banks). The LTRO has done nothing but bring them into a closer and more mutually-reinforcing chaotic relationship as we suspect many of the Italian and Spanish banks have gone all-in on the ultimate event risk trade in their government's debt. It should come as no surprise to anyone that the bulk of the Greek bailout money will flow directly to the European banking system and Credit Suisse has recently updated the bank exposure (by country) to peripheral sovereign debt that shows just how massively dependent each peripheral nation's banking system is on its own government for capital and more importantly, how the core (France and Germany) remains massively exposed (in terms of Tier 1 Capital) to the PIIGS. Retroactive (negative) salary cuts may well not be the worst of what is to come as the bankers deleveraging returns to bite them in a phoenix-like resurrection of sovereign risk on now even-more sovereign-bloated (and levered) balance sheets.