default

Put another way, those Greek bondholders who DIDN’T go for the Second Bailout, just got their money back at 100 cents on the Dollar (compared to those who DID go for the Second Bailout and lost 70% of their money). This has shown the ECB and EU bureaucrats to be complete and total liars. It also shows the entire bailout/ austerity measures process to be garbage. 

From around two minutes into this CNBC clip, Marc Faber brings the conversation back into sharp focus. Noting that "whenever everybody focuses on just one thing - Greece and Europe in this case - there are other things that are far more important - such as a meaningful slowdown in India and China - going on that are being ignored". But remaining on the topic of Europe, Faber consistently opines that the next event risk will be the Greek exit - even though Faber suspects strongly that Germany will cave to Eurobonds eventually - as he comments that the longer the delay of a restructuring/default/exit/euro-bonds takes the higher the probability of a gigantic systemic failure. This subject brings up (at around 3:30) an interesting perspective that the European market would be oddly relieved (not plunging 50%) if Greek exited the Euro as there would be some clarity (though Faber adds that bank and insurance stocks would likely be crushed). At five minutes in though, Faber ramps up the rhetoric noting that while stock indices are not performing terribly, there are many economically sensitive (and luxury) stocks that are down very significantly - which suggests to him that the huge asset price run of the last decades in come to an end prompting the question of the day from CNBC's Cramer-stand-in "You're not looking for a recession in the US are you?" Faber, in his calm, thoughtful way responds, "I think we will have a global recession late this year, early next year", to which a stunned Wapner asks for odds (surely 30%, 50%?) of this recession - "100% certainty" comes the reply to leave Wapner throwing in the towel on any positive spin as Faber suggests the only 'investment' in this case is 'Cash USD' and investors must own some gold.

It seems the clarion call for central bank intervention to save us all is growing louder as following Citigroup's imploring letter earlier in the week, SocGen has done its homework on the impact of a Greek exit from the Euro and finds Euro Stoxx could drop by 50% under a contagion scenario. They believe the reason why the eurozone market is holding up relatively well - despite the rising risk of a Greek exit - is that contagion has not really spread yet, which is then 'discounted' away based on expectations of a central bank put to save the world. In the case of a disorderly break-up (the only kind there can be realistically in our view), they expect eurozone profits to decline for two years, a rise in bond yields (raising cost of funds), a rising equity risk premium, and the implicit drop in P/E multiples. A Greek exit alone (with no contagion) would likely knock 10% off Euro Stoxx but the significant rise in correlations across the euro-zone suggests the idiosyncratic becomes systemic very rapidly.

Note the following sequence of events, bolded numbers, and dates:

• Bank Of Spain Formally Nationalizes Bankia, Says Insolvent Bank Is "Solvent", Adds There Is No Cause For Concern, Zero Hedge, May 9
• Spain is taking over Bankia by converting its 4.5 billion euros of preferred shares in the group’s parent company into ordinary shares, BusinessWeek, May 21
• Spain said on Wednesday its rescue of problem lender Bankia would cost at least 9 billion euros ($11 billion), as the government tries to clean up a banking system that threatens  to drag the country deeper into the euro zone crisis, Reuters, May 23   
• Bankia SA will have to ask the Spanish government for more than 15 billion euros as part of its effort to restore its financial health, state-owned news agency EFE reported Thursday, citing financial sources, Dow Jones, May 24

Hopefully we aren't the only ones to notice how the bailout cost has oddly doubled almost on a daily basis.

This is the REAL DEAL for Europe. Anyone who has some kind of counter-argument to these points either doesn’t understand the political environment we’ve entered (even Central Banks are fed up with bowing to political pressure from politicians) or is simply hoping that by ignoring these realities they (the realities) will go away.

The word 'encumbrance' has received a lot of headlines in the last few months - and rightfully so - after we pointed out the impact that LTROs had in subordinating senior creditors of European banks. As Morgan Stanley points out, this is a considerable problem for bondholders as 'in a wind-down scenario, senior unsecured holders have recourse to fewer assets and hence face a higher loss given default (LGD)'. In understanding just how bad things are for European banks, it is important to focus on 'how much loss-absorbing capital there is beneath you in the bank’s liability stack, as this is the capital that will take losses before senior creditors in the event of a bail-in' which means looking at deposits as well as secured encumbrance. What is very apparent from the pictorial representations of banks’ liability structures is that rather than encumbrance from covered bonds/LTRO etc. the bigger issue for encumbrance of senior unsecured investors is the potential threat from depositor 'runs'. The hope of another LTRO is limited by collateral as policy-makers are well aware that, in a world where failing banks are to be resolved through resolution frameworks and senior creditors are to take losses to shield taxpayers’ funds, banks may not have enough ‘bail-in-able’ debt, given their growing reliance on secured funding sources. With deposits increasingly impaired - and/or the potential for contagious bank runs if we see Grexit, Europe's problem is 'all about the bank runs' now and we were told yesterday how far off that is - though the crisis 'event' may bring deposit guarantees (and the implicit exchange of sovereignty for monetary support) sooner.

In a brief though detailed clip, Stratfor's VP Peter Zeihan discusses the risk of contagion from Greece and the 'creative' - if not self-centered - suggestions for a solution to these problems. Earlier in the week we described Deutsche's suggestion of a dual currency - the GEURO - and that is where Zeihan focuses, noting that "The Greek economy is as deliciously non-competitive as the German economy is hyper-competitive" - this mismatch is the core of the crisis. The GEURO (trading as gEUROQQ on the pink sheets) plan doesn't address this mismatch but extends it just a little longer while bailout funds will continue to funneled through Athens to the country's lenders (read European banks) but private capital would be unlikely to flow and without outside capital, they would be unlikely to stimulate the growth they need to regain any kind of solid footing. Greek debt levels to GDP would rise (not fall) under the plan as EUR debts would remain but GEURO incomes (devalued) would be the source of GDP - making a long-term recovery even less likely. The only winners - simple: foreign banks who have exposure to Greece. The Stratfor VP goes on to note that the vast bulk of Greek debt is held by the ECB, IMF, and the Greeks (Greek banks) adding that private losses would not be catastrophic in the event of another Greek default - though we point out that it is the contagion effects (as we have so critically established in the past) that makes the Greek imbroglio so important to watch.

Bank Regulatory Capital has been in the news a lot recently - between the $1+ trillion Basel 3 shortfall, the Spanish banks with seemingly their own set of capital issues, or JPM's snafu.  There has been a lot of discussion about Too Big To Fail (“TBTF”) in the U.S. with regulators demanding more and banks fighting it.  After JPM's surprise loss this month, the debate over the proper regulatory framework and capital requirements will reach a fever pitch.  That is great, but maybe it is also time to step back and think about what capital is supposed to do, and with that as a guideline, think of rules that make sense. Specifically, regulatory capital, or capital adequacy, or just plain capital needs to address the worst of eventual loss and potential mark to market loss. Hedges are once again front and center.  The only "perfect" hedge is selling an asset. This "hedge" is also a trade.  The risk profile looks very different than having sold the loan and the capital should reflect that.

In plain terms, by mid-June, Greece could very well be controlled by an anti-austerity, anti-bailout party that wants to completely do away with the second Greek bailout (which means a potential disorderly default). This actually is the best possible outcome for Greece as the alternative is outright anarchy. Remember, Greece has gone through two Governments since its Crisis began: one was the long-standing President, the other was an EU-appointed bureaucrat.

For the drillers, but....

Gold’s London AM fix this morning was USD 1,558.50, EUR 1,239.27, and GBP 993.62 per ounce. Yesterday's AM fix this morning was USD 1,555.00, EUR 1,229.44, and GBP 989.56 per ounce.
Gold fell $5.60 or 0.36% in New York yesterday and closed at $1,561.20/oz. Gold has been trading sideways in Asia and was slightly lower in Europe prior to buying which saw gold rise to about the close in New York yesterday. 

All you need to read.

If Greece leaves, Spain or Italy will definitely either default or threaten to leave (they've seen that bailouts in exchange for austerity don't work).

The evidence was clear that there was a long and unblemished record of good faith timely monthly payments by Defendants... And a bona fide default never occurred...

Building on yesterday's discussion of the lack of an integrated banking system and credible lender of last resort in Europe, UBS appears to have gone thermonuclear this morning. Their lengthy article 'What If Greece Goes?' outlines the contagion risk from an 'orderly' exit as markets, international trading companies, and bank depositors will all anticipate the consequences likely resulting in economic disorder. Their remains a great deal of complacency about the ability of firewalls to prevent this - but as they note - should bank runs begin, even a pan-European deposit guarantee scheme will not stop rational depositors extending bank runs instead of gambling on the probability of policy-maker actions. Laying out Greece's options (renegotiate austerity or default), UBS summarizes the situation more profoundly: "Integrate Or Die" as without a Euro confederation (in their eyes), continental Europe will cry 'havoc' once again.