Commercial Paper

"In the last three plus years, central banks have had little choice but to do the unsustainable in order to sustain the unsustainable until others do the sustainable to restore sustainability!" is how PIMCO's El-Erian introduces the game-theoretic catastrophe that is potentially occurring around us. In a lecture to the St.Louis Fed, the moustachioed maestro of monetary munificence states "let me say right here that the analysis will suggest that central banks can no longer – indeed, should no longer – carry the bulk of the policy burden" and "it is a recognition of the declining effectiveness of central banks’ tools in countering deleveraging forces amid impediments to growth that dominate the outlook. It is also about the growing risk of collateral damage and unintended circumstances." It appears that we have reached the legitimate point of – and the need for – much greater debate on whether the benefits of such unusual central bank activism sufficiently justify the costs and risks. This is not an issue of central banks’ desire to do good in a world facing an “unusually uncertain” outlook. Rather, it relates to questions about diminishing returns and the eroding potency of the current policy stances. The question is will investors remain "numb and sedated…. by the money sloshing around the system?" or will "the welfare of millions in the United States, if not billions of people around the world, will have suffered greatly if central banks end up in the unpleasant position of having to clean up after a parade of advanced nations that headed straight into a global recession and a disorderly debt deflation." Of course, it is a rhetorical question.

Much has been made, and rightly so, of the echoing crisis that is evolving in Spanish bank and sovereign credit (and equity) markets in the last few weeks. The impact of the LTRO on the optics of Spain's problems hid the fact that things remain rather ugly under the surface still and with the fading of that cashflow and reach-around demand from the Spanish banking system, the smaller base of sovereign bond investors has shied away. Stephane Deo, of UBS, notes that while the Spanish budget is a positive step (with its labor market reforms), Spain's economy remains weak and will face a severe recession this year followed by still significant contraction next year. However, he fears the measures announced may not be enough to calm investor angst as he doubts the size of fiscal receipts numbers and the ability to half the deficits of local authorities. Furthermore, the measures will have a large impact on corporate earnings - implicitly exaggerating the dismal unemployment numbers (which is increasingly polarizing young against old) with expectations that the aggregate unemployment rate could well top 26% and youth well over 50%. This will only drag further on the housing market, which while it has suffered notably already, is expected to drop another 25% before bottoming and credit is contracting rapidly (compared to a modest rise overall in Europe). Spanish banks remain opaque in general from the perspective of the size and quality of collateral and provisioning and Deo believes they are still deep in the midst of the provisioning cycle and tough macro conditions will force restructuring and deleveraging. Spain scores 5 out of 5 on our crisis-prone indicator and markets, absent intervention, are starting to reflect that aggressively.

In the not quite 100 years since the founding of your institution, America has exchanged central banking for a kind of central planning and the gold standard for what I will call the Ph.D. standard. I regret the changes and will propose reforms, or, I suppose, re-reforms, as my program is very much in accord with that of the founders of this institution. Have you ever read the Federal Reserve Act? The authorizing legislation projected a body “to provide for the establishment of the Federal Reserve banks, to furnish an elastic currency, to afford means of rediscounting commercial paper and to establish a more effective supervision of banking in the United States, and for other purposes.” By now can we identify the operative phrase? Of course: “for other purposes.” As you prepare to mark the Fed’s centenary, may I urge you to reflect on just how far you have wandered from the intentions of the founders? The institution they envisioned would operate passively, through the discount window. It would not create credit but rather liquefy the existing stock of credit by turning good-quality commercial bills into cash— temporarily. This it would do according to the demands of the seasons and the cycle. The Fed would respond to the community, not try to anticipate or lead it. It would not override the price mechanism— as today’s Fed seems to do at every available opportunity—but yield to it.

We have discussed the money-on-the-sidelines fallacy a few times recently in the context of the circular money-flows (clear misunderstanding of the idea of a buyer and a seller) as well as mutual fund cash levels, retail sentiment, demographic shifts, and insider transactions. There is mounting evidence, as Morgan Stanley's Michael Wilson notes, that 'make no mistake...institutional investors are all-in' as the rolling beta of mutual funds relative to the S&P 500 tops 1.10x at multi-year highs, institutional investors are most exposed to high beta sectors since MS data began, and long/shorts funds are near their most levered long since MS records began. Combine this with the massive surge in Insider Selling transactions in the last few weeks (apropos Charles Biderman's comments on the rally's support by Insider buying til now) and perhaps bearish retail sentiment will lead this market down as we hope that finally 'money-on-the-sidelines' fades from the parlance of all but the most aged and incompetent of market prognosticators.

Fed chairman Ben Bernanke is covered in a long profile by Roger Lowenstein in the Atlantic. The sympathetic account takes the reader blow-by-blow through the criticism that he has received from virtually all quarters during his tenure as Fed chair. What Lowenstein hones in on are the reviews and criticisms of Bernanke’s performance in “resurrecting the economy” — the interest rate policy, his interpretation of the dual mandate, quantitative easing, Operation Twist, etc. But for a piece that clocks in at 8,287 words, Lowenstein pays scant attention to the emergency actions taken to save the financial system itself.

• Euro zone formally approves 2nd Greek bailout: statement (Reuters)
• In a First, Europeans Act to Suspend Aid to Hungary Unless It Cuts Deficit (NYT)
• UK Chancellor Looks at 100-Year Gilt (FT) - What? No Consols?
• Hilsenrath: Fed's Outlook a Tad Sunnier - (WSJ)
• Banks Shored Up By Stress Test Success (FT)
• U.S. dangles secret data for Russia missile shield approval (Reuters)
• Wen Warns of Second China Cultural Revolution Without Reform (Bloomberg)
• Wen Says Yuan May Be Near Equilibrium as Gains Stall (Bloomberg)
• Merkel Says Europe Is ‘Good Way’ Up Mountain, Not Over It (Bloomberg)

UBS' economics research group do not believe that Greece is saved but hope that it is at best ring-fenced. In an excellent Q&A follow up, Stephane Deo and his team address the role of the EFSF, the IMF package and its austerity measures, the ECB's participation, and finally the likelihood of the PSI being successful and its fallout. As Greek 2Y yields break 200% (obviously price is the critical part but these yields are stupendous) and bridge loan discussions appear for the March 20th maturity, perhaps UBS view of the IMF 'walking away' is more credible if they manage to ring-fence a recap of the banking sector. We would be surprised if contagion was contained and, as we have seen before, that risk leaks out somewhere and unintended consequences (or unknown unknowns) tend to pop up just when we least expect them. Perhaps the FT's note this morning (which incidentally confirms the everything that Zero Hedge warned about almost a month earlier) that deadlines are slipping rapidly is the bright yellow canary in the Piraeus coal-mine as 'time is running out' for a solution here very quickly (as seemingly is the desire).

Here we present a history of the Fed in charts. As you’ll surely glean from the below — the Fed has degenerated from a by and large passive institution (dealing only in high-quality self-liquidating commercial paper and gold) to an active pursuant of junk, an enabler of wars, a ‘benevolent’ combatant of the depressions of its own creation, a central planner of employment & prices and of course a forgiving friend to inconvenient market follies.

In his latest letter, Bill Gross, obviously for his own reasons, essentially channels Zero Hedge, and repeats everything we have been saying over the past 3 years. We'll take that as a compliment. Next thing you know he will convert the TRF into a gold-only physical fund in anticipation of the wrong-end of the "fat tail" hitting reality head on at full speed, and sending the entire house of centrally planned cards crashing down. "How many ways can you say “it’s different this time?” There’s “abnormal,” “subnormal,” “paranormal” and of course “new normal.” Mohamed El-Erian’s awakening phrase of several years past has virtually been adopted into the lexicon these days, but now it has an almost antiquated vapor to it that reflected calmer seas in 2011 as opposed to the possibility of a perfect storm in 2012. The New Normal as PIMCO and other economists would describe it was a world of muted western growth, high unemployment and relatively orderly delevering. Now we appear to be morphing into a world with much fatter tails, bordering on bimodal. It’s as if the Earth now has two moons instead of one and both are growing in size like a cancerous tumor that may threaten the financial tides, oceans and economic life as we have known it for the past half century. Welcome to 2012...For 2012, in the face of a delevering zero-bound interest rate world, investors must lower return expectations. 2–5% for stocks, bonds and commodities are expected long term returns for global financial markets that have been pushed to the zero bound, a world where substantial real price appreciation is getting close to mathematically improbable. Adjust your expectations, prepare for bimodal outcomes. It is different this time and will continue to be for a number of years. The New Normal is “Sub,” “Ab,” “Para” and then some. The financial markets and global economies are at great risk."

In what is becoming a multi part series on how various products price in recession tonight it is time to check out the commercial paper markets. Below are two charts (1) showing the last two recessions and how commercial paper rates performed and (2) commercial paper rates since Q2 2009. Both charts utilize non financial AA rated 30 and 90 day terms. The results were similar for financial paper as well. Commercial paper seems to be an excellent market timer of economic recession. Notice the last two periods where rates began falling precipitously and the timing of economic contraction.

As Zero Hedge demonstrated last week, comprising the list of international banks rescued by the Fed's Commercial Paper Funding Facility were at least 35 foreign financial corporations. Among these, Barclays was near the very top in terms of capital funded from US taxpayers to preserve the bank's solvency. Which is why we were not at all surprised to read that Barclays' chief rates strategist Joseph Abate had a very sour view of the Fed's release of CPFF details "ironically, the same legislation that forced to [sic] the Fed to disgorge details about these 21,000 transactions makes it much harder for the Fed to recreate these facilities by limiting its ability to use the "exigent circumstances" clause of the Federal Reserve Act." Actually, what we find ironic is that Joseph Abate, formerly a major shareholder of Lehman Brothers, and subsequently assimilated by the British Bank, would be a defender of ongoing Fed secrecy: we have the sinking suspicion that Abate's share losses in his Lehman stake were sizable (as in wiped out), and had he had some transparency into what the true state of affairs of his then bank was, he may have had a chance to actually recoup or mitigate some of his catastrophic losses... But such is life for the sufferer of Stockholm Syndrome, whereby each and every one of us has been kidnapped and held hostage by the banking system. The only question is how friendly (and compensated) we decide to be with our captors.

The crunch in funding continues. As we wrote yesterday, there is $673 billion in Commercial Paper maturing over the next month and a half. The problem is that the rolling of all this paper will come at increasingly higher costs. Today the market for US 7 Day CP hit level of 0.61%. As the chart below indicates, the current CP rate is not only the highest in 2010, but higher than CP costs during the March 2009 market lows. More worrying is that despite the recent unprecedented volatility in daily rate swings, the trend is one of an accelerated increase. At this rate of increase, the Fed may soon need to put the CPFF program back in play.The most worrying is the implication 7 Day CP rates have for the FF rate: while 7 Day CP historically has tracked the Fed Funds tick for tick, over the past few months we have once again seen a major divergence between the two. In this closest proxy to short-term funding, the market is now notifying Bernanke that the Fed Funds rate is now about 36 bps off and increasing.

As an increasing number of analysts evaluate the impact of Europe's rolling defaults and failed auctions on Europe's liquidity and particularly its shadow liquidity system, best seen in rising European Commercial Paper rates, is it about time to take a look at our own back yard. According to the Federal Reserve there is $673 billion in Commercial Paper maturing in the next 6 weeks alone, of which the bulk, Non-ABL Tier 1 CP amounts to $328 billion, ABL CP totals $292 billion, and Non-ABL Tier 2 CP totals $34 billion. What is concerning is that just like in Europe, rates here in the US for the various tranches of Commercial Paper have started rising. And as this is arguably one of the biggest components of the US shadow liquidity system, it bears close watching, especially if spreads continue leaking wider as they have recently. One thing to keep in mind: the Fed' CPFF emergency facility has now been retired, and any hitch in the CP market will necessitate another brand new involvement in broad liquidity provisioning by the Fed. Then again, just as in the Central Bank liquidity swap case, which was reactivated on a moment's notice, we don't see any problem with the Fed announcing the CPFF program going live with no notice.

More troubles for both Spain and the Commercial Paper market. Spanish top bank BBVA is said to have be unable to renew a $1 billion commercial paper line, according to the WSJ, which touches on the topic we discussed yesterday first about complications developing in the top-tier ECP market. BBVA still has substantial european-based funding and deposits, and another $9 billion in CP, which will likely also soon be pulled. This will certainly put further pressure on CP spreads, as the European liquidity crisis is alive and well. The news has impacted both the EURUSD and the price of European financial firms, which have sagged since this news has come out.

The chart below demonstrates that while concerns about Libor are gaining steam, a far more dangerous situation has developed in the Euro Commercial Paper (top tier) market, where rates have surged far more in the past week than even compared to Euro Libor or Euribor. As those who were alive in the days after Lehman will recall, the freezing up of the Commercial Paper market was one of the primary reasons for the Fed's creation of the Commercial Paper emergency liquidity funding facility (CPFF). If the CP market once again dies, or, as it is better known in polite circles, "locks up" it will once again set off the avalanche of locked up credit markets initially for financial and other IG companies, and shortly thereafter spread to all other segments of the market. Should the CP rates continue rising without moderation, look for European credit markets to break soon enough.