Jamie Dimon

Someone has to take the other side of the JPM debate. I'll try.

As Nassim Taleb described in The Black Swan these kinds of trades — betting large amounts for small frequent profits — is extremely fragile because eventually (and probably sooner in the real world than in a model) losses will happen (and of course if you are betting big, losses will be big). If you are running your business on the basis of leverage, this is especially dangerous, because facing a margin call or a downgrade you may be left in a fire sale to raise collateral. This fragile business model is in fact descended from the Martingale roulette betting system. Martingale is the perfect example of the failure of theory, because in theory, Martingale is a system of guaranteed profit, which I think is probably what makes these kinds of practices so attractive to the arbitrageurs of Wall Street (and of course Wall Street often selects for this by recruiting and promoting the most wild-eyed and risk-hungry). Martingale works by betting, and then doubling your bet until you win. This — in theory, and given enough capital — delivers a profit of your initial stake every time. Historically, the problem has been that bettors run out of capital eventually, simply because they don’t have an infinite stock (of course, thanks to Ben Bernanke, that is no longer a problem). The key feature of this system— and the attribute which many institutions have copied — is that it delivers frequent small-to-moderate profits, and occasional huge losses (when the bettor runs out of money).

Either Dimon misled the public about the gravity of the festering trades during his company’s first-quarter earnings call last month. Or he didn’t know what was happening inside the bowels of his own company. History tells us the latter is the norm for Wall Street bosses, though it’s hard to say which is worse.

We have presented our opinion on the JPM prop trading desk repeatedly, in fact starting about a month ago. Last night, Senator Carl "Shitty Deal" Levin also decided to join the fray, which is to be expected: the man needs air time. And now, in a surprising twist, competing banks, all of whom have more than enough skeletons in their own prop desk trading closet, are starting to speak up against the bank that should not be named. Enter Deutsche Bank's Jim Reid and his take on the Fail Whale.

Having listened to the conference call (I was roaring with laughter), Jamie Dimon sounded very defensive especially about one detail: that the CIO’s activities were solely in risk management, and that its bets were designed to hedge risk. Now, we all know very well that banks have been capable of turning “risk management” into a hugely risky business — that was the whole problem with the mid-00s securitisation bubble, which made a sport out of packaging up bad debt and spreading it around balance sheets via shadow banking intermediation, thus turning a small localised risk (of mortgage default) into a huge systemic risk (of a default cascade). But wait a minute? If you’re hedging risk then the bets you make will be cancelled against your existing balance sheet. In other words, if your hedges turn out to be worthless then your initial portfolio should have gained, and if your initial portfolio falls, then your hedges will activate, limiting your losses. That is how hedging risk works. If the loss on your hedges is not being cancelled-out by gains in your initial portfolio then by definition you are not hedging risk. You are speculating.

Jamie Dimon seems to have handed his head to Chairman Vocker and the advocates of regulation with this error.  

Earlier today JPMorgan announced results that were better than expected, with revenue of $27.4 billion on expectations of $24.1 billion, and EPS of $1.31 or $5.0 billion, on expectations of $1.17. As previously noted, the bank increased its dividend to $0.30/share, and has authorized a $15 billion new repurchase, which however will likely not be a sizable factor, as JPM has already said with the stock price at the current level buybacks are not accretive. As for the EPS beat, as usual the one-time items swamped everything else, of which the primary one, reduction in loan loss reserves which is the traditional way for the bank to pump up the bottom line, accounting for $1.8 billion or $0.28/share. We are curious how Jamie Dimon will justify this accelerating release even as the firm's Nonperforming loans increased for the first time in years from $10 billion to $10.6 billion: just the TBTF put or something else? Other amusing "one-time" items were the $1.1 billion ($0.17/share) from the WaMu bankruptcy settlement as well as a $0.9 billion loss ($0.14/share) loss from DVA this time hurting the bank as JPM's CDS tightened in Q1. Also curious was a substantial $2.5 billion expense for additional litigation reserves, which is certainly not a one-time item now that every bank is suing JPM and is merely a catch up for Dimon to where he should have been reserved. That, or something else - just what is JPM seeing that others are not (hint: ask Bank of America). This number will continue rising. So net of the real one-time items, EPS was less than a $1.00.

The real problem with CDS trading by large banks such as JPM is not the speculative positions but instead the vast conflict of interest between the lending side of the house and the trading side

Back in 2006, contrary to conventional wisdom, many financial professionals were well aware of the subprime bubble, and that the trajectory of home prices was unsustainable. However, because there was no way to know just when it would pop, few if any dared to bet against the herd (those who did, and did so early despite all odds, made greater than 100-1 returns). Fast forward to today, when the most comparable to subprime, cheap credit-induced bubble, is that of student loans (for extended literature on why the non-dischargeable student loan bubble will "create a generation of wage slavery" read this and much of the easily accessible literature on the topic elsewhere) which have now surpassed $1 trillion in notional. Yet oddly enough, just like in the case of the subprime bubble, so in the ongoing expansion of the credit bubble manifested in this case by student loans, we have an early warning that the party is almost over, coming from the most unexpected of sources: JPMorgan.

Last week Mario Monti, like a good (ex) Goldmanite, did his best to buy what Goldman is selling, namely telling anyone gullible enough to believe that the "European crisis is almost over." Funny then that we learn that just as this was happening, Ben Bernanke held a secret meeting with the entire banker caretel, in which discussed was not American jobs (seasonally adjusted or otherwise), nor $5 gas, but... helping European with its debt crisis. But, but... Mario said. In the meantime, European spreads are back to late 2011 levels.

Anyone who hasn’t sensed a mood change in this country since the 2008 financial meltdown is either ignorant or in denial. Millions of Americans fall into one of these categories, but many people realize something has changed – and not for the better. The sense of pure financial panic that existed during September and October of 2008 had not been seen since the dark days of 1929. Our leaders used the initial terror and fear to ram through TARP and stimulus packages that rewarded the perpetrators of the financial collapse rather than helping the middle class who lost 8 million jobs, destroyed by Wall Street criminality. The stock market plunged by 57% from its 2007 high by March 2009. What has happened since September 2008 has set the stage for the next downward leg in this Crisis. The rich and powerful have pulled out all the stops and saved themselves at the expense of the many. Despite overwhelming proof of unabashed mortgage fraud, rating agency bribery, document forgery on a grand scale and insider trading based on non-public information, the brazen audacity of Wall Street oligarchs is reminiscent of the late stages of the Roman Empire.   

The last 90 minutes of the day dragged ES (the S&P 500 e-mini futures contract) back up to the safety of its VWAP on what seems to be some comments by Jamie Dimon on the Fed looking for much larger job creation (prompting QE3 moves) or another housing bottom-call? After what had been an ugly day in which stocks sold off (aggressively after the European close) back to the post-Bernanke reality that is the less sanguine credit markets, the USD weakened, commodities and stocks popped (led by financials), and Treasuries sold off (belly underperforming). It seems that no matter who comes on TV nowadays and says anything, the algos market will rally. By the close, Financials were the only sector in the green (as GS and JPM surged but not so much BAC or MS) but Materials, Energy, and Industrials were the worst. VIX managed to get above 17 before reversing back to unchanged and the term-structure steepened back a little. Gold (which dropped the most in 2 weeks today after Goldman's long call) remains the only metals/oil commodity higher on the week - though only marginally - as plunges in Oil and Silver bounced quite positively into the close. Stocks underperformed credit on the day in general but the low volume limp up into the close saw them even out and we note that as ES hit its VWAP - heavier negative delta volume came through somewhat suggesting this was an effort to ease institutional exit - as both NYSE and ES volume was above average. 30Y Treasuries are back to higher in yield for the week but this afternoon's selloff lifted yields 4-5bps off their earlier lows. Broad risk assets led the equity market down but quite coincidentally, the S&P ended the day almost perfectly in CONTEXT with risk assets and credit/vol (after a significant dislocation the last few days).

Earlier we presented the view by one of the TBAC's co-chairmen, Goldman Sachs, former employer of such NY Fed presidents as Bull Dudley. Now we present the only other view that matters - that of Fed boss (recall the JPM dividend announcement and how Jamie Dimon pushed Ben B around like a windsock) JP Morgan, and specifically chief economist Michael Feroli who is a little less sanguine than the market about interpreting Bernanke's promise to always support stocks, using the traditional stock vs flow obfuscations which is about as irrelevant as they come. To wit " How one views the word "continued" in this context depends in part on whether it is the stock (or total announced amount) of asset purchases that matter for financial conditions, or whether it is the monthly or weekly flow of those purchases.... according to the stock effect view the end of Twist purchases in June does not amount to a tightening, but rather is a continuation of the current accommodative stance of monetary policy. Thus, "continued accommodative policies" for a stock effect adherent would not necessarily imply an extension of asset purchases beyond June." That said, all of this is semantics. Recall that the US has $1.4 trillion in debt issuance each and every year. Unless the Fed steps in to buy at least a material portion, this debt will never be parked, rendering all other plot lines, narratives and justifications for QE moot.

Dallas Fed Confirms that Big, Insolvent Banks Are Killing Our Economy ... and Democracy

And so Steve Jobs legacy is now gone as Apple goes Jamie Dimon. At least Apple was not part of the stress test. And as announced yesterday, we for one, can't wait to find out if it was JPM that advised Apple, to pull a JPM. Finally, we hope that AAPL's cash creation rate remains the same, as $45 billion in 3 years may put quite a large dent on the company's onshore cash, which according to reports is one-third of total.