Primary Market

While many may not recall that the US has been without an official debt ceiling for the past three months, or even that it has a debt target ceiling, the bonus period agreed upon in January to let the nation rake up some $400 billion in addition debt in the past few months, officially runs out tomorrow, May 19, when the debt limit will be restored to its previous level plus the debt that was incurred in the interim, which means around $16.735 trillion in total debt as of yesterday, plus the amount incurred today, excluding the debt not subject to the cap which is about $30 billion. And since no grand bargain is forthcoming in a world in which official governance is now almost universally in the hands of the world's central bankers and out of the hands of the theatrical career politicians, it means that the next deadline in the endless US debt ceiling saga will be the day when the extraordinary measures to extend the debt ceiling run out. Such a deadline will likely be hit in just over three months.

With every modestly positive datapoint being desperately clung to, now that even Goldman's Hatzius has once more thrown in the economic towel after proclaiming an economic renaissance in late 2012 just like he did in late 2010 only to issue a mea culpa a few months later (and just as we predicted - post coming up shortly), the key prerogative is to ignore the elephant in the room. That, of course, is that the JPY 1 quadrillion bond market had to be halted for the second day in a row as the Japanese capital markets are fast becoming a very big and sad joke. The resulting flight to safety from Japanese investors, who sense that their own bond market is on the verge of breaking down completely, has managed to send French and Belgian bonds to record lows, the Spanish 2 Year to sub 2%, the German 6 month bill negative in the primary market, the US 10/30 year constantly bid and so on. The immediate result is that the bond-equity disconnect continues to diverge until one day we may get negative 10 Year rates coupled with an all time high stock market. Gotta love the fake New Normal market, in which the Japanese penny stock market was up another 2.8% to well over 13,000 even as the Shanghai Composite plumbs ever redder territory for 2013 on fears the birdflu contagion will hurt the already struggling economy even more.

Not even the Fed pre-monetizing yesterday of today's 30 Year reopening auction could do much to improve demand for today's $13 billion sale in long-dated paper. Because if yesterday's 10 Year auction was a testament to demand from Direct and Indirect buyers, today's final auction of the week was anything but. Moments ago the Treasury sold $13 billion in 30 year paper, in a 29 year, 11 month reopening, of the infamous 912810QZ4 Cusip, and which priced at a high yield of 3.248%, the highest yield since last March's 3.381%, and more importantly 1.5 bps higher than the When Issued 3.233%. The internals explained why the demand in the primary market was just not there: Indirects got 42%, Dealer take down was 51.2%, which mean Direct bidders were allotted just 4.9% of the total. This was the lowest Direct allocation since September of 2009, and in stark contrast to yesterday's surge in 10 Year Direct bidders. Finally, the Bid to Cover came at 2.43, the lowest since August of 2012.

Even as the gargantuan $1+ trillion student debt load has been the bubbly elephant in the room that few are still willing to talk about, there have been until now zero opportunities for a the proverbial highly convex "ABX" short in the student debt space. This of course is the trade that was put on by those who sensed the subprime bubble is about to pop in early/mid 2007 and made billions as the yield chasers were summarily punished one by one as first New Century blew up, and then everyone else. Yet while one was able to buy synthetic "hedge" exposure with limited downside and unlimited upside (by shorting synthetic index spreads) in subprime, so far the only way to be bearish on student debt has been to short the equity of various private sector lenders - a trade with very limited upside and unlimited downside, and which in the current idiotic New Normal is more likely to leave one insolvent and crushed in a smoldering heap of margin calls following yet another epic short squeeze as GETCO's stop hunting algo run amok. This may be about to change. As WSJ reports, SecondMarket Holdings, the private-market securities trading firm best known for allowing numerous overzealous fans to buy FaceBook at moronic valuations, on Monday "will roll out a platform allowing lenders to issue securities backed by student loans directly to investors." 

With little on the event calendar in the overnight session, the main news many were looking forward to was Italy's auction of €2.5 billion in 5 and €4 billion in 10 year paper, to see just how big the fallout from the Hung Parliament election was in the primary market. As SocGen explained ahead of the auction: "The target of Italy's 2017 and 2023 BTP auction today is a maximum EUR6.5bn, but in order to get to that tidy amount the Tesoro may be forced to offer a hefty mark-up in yield to compensate investors for the extra risk. Note that Italian 6-month bills were marked up at yesterday's sale from 0.731% to 1.237%. Who knows what premium investors will be asking for today for paper with the kind of duration that is not covered by the ECB OMT (should that be activated)? Will Italian institutions, already long BTPs relative to overall asset size, be forced to hoover up most of the supply?" The outcome was a successful auction which, however, as expected saw yields spike with the 4 year paper pricing at 3.59% compared to 2.95% before, while the 10 Year paper priced some 60 bps wider to the 4.17% in January, yielding 4.83%. The result was a brief dip in Italian OTR BTP yield, which have since retraced all gains and are once again trading in the 4.90% range on their way to 5%+ as JPM forecast yesterday. And as expected, talk promptly emerged that the auction was carried by "two large domestic buyers" in other words, the two big local banks merely levered up on Italian paper hoping furiously that they are not the next MF Global.

The European Commission formally endorsed the financial transaction tax agreed to by eleven of the 27 members. The tax will be set at 0.1% for stocks and bonds and 0.01% for derivatives. The tax will go into effect at the start of 2014, by which time the participating countries will give it formal approval.

There seems to be two purposes of the tax. The first is to raise revenue. The EC projects the tax will raise 30-35 bln euros annually where ever and whenever an instrument from eleven is traded. This would seem to block the ability to avoid the tax by moving transactions out of the eleven countries. It reinforces the "residence principle". This essentially means that if some one is a resident of the eleven countries, or acting on behalf of a resident, the transaction will be taxed anywhere it takes place. The other purpose is to deter the high frequency trading, which some officials see as largely unnecessary and potentially destabilizing.

The name Christian Bittar is well-known to regular Zero Hedge readers. Recall from "Deep Into The Lieborgate Rabbit Hole: The Swiss Hedge Fund Link?": " just like in the case of Barclays (with Diamond), JPM (with Bruno Iksil), UBS (with Kweku) and Goldman (with Fabrice Tourre), there always is a scapegoat. Today we find just who that scapegoat is. From Bloomberg: "Regulators are investigating the possible roles of Michael Zrihen at Credit Agricole, Didier Sander at HSBC and Christian Bittar at Deutsche Bank, the person said on condition of anonymity because the investigation is ongoing." We proceeded to do a circuitous analysis to find that despite assumptions to the contrary, not only has Mr. Bittar not been expelled from the industry for manipulating Libor, but he is still collecting fat paychecks at Swiss hedge fund BlueCrest, Europe's third largest, with some $30 billion under management. Today, courtesy of Bloomberg we get the details of how Mr. Bittar departed Deutsche, and just what his responsibilities there were.

The markets are holding up on hopes of additional stimulus from the Central Banks. Some bulls are even calling for QE 4 at the upcoming Fed meeting, despite the fact that QE 3 was launched a mere three months ago and was open-ended (meaning it would not end until the Fed deemed it time).

The crowded liquidity-fueled pump-fest of the last few months is beginning to unwind. Look around at where the damage occurred. Equities and Credit were smashed; the USD is practically unchanged; Treasuries very marginally bid; commodities sideways (aside from Oil's oscillations). The close did see some of the other asset classes start to catch down to equity and credit but based on our models, we see the S&P 500 having retraced about half its short-term mispricing relative to Treasuries. All the over-pumped sectors were the biggest laggards - Financials, Industrials, Materials, and Tech - but from the 11/25/11 beginning of the global coordinated central bank pump, there is still plenty of downside for stocks. Our greatest concern now is if high-yield bond ETFs are unwound (where so much liquidity is concentrated) and forces cash bond liquidations - there is simply no depth to soak up that move and the entire secondary market will reprice (and shut the primary market - which has lived on flows for so long).

Back in January, Zero Hedge proposed a pair trade, which to date has returned well over 100% on a blended basis, namely the shorting of local law peripheral European bonds, while going long English law (or strong covenant) bonds (a relationship best arbed in Greece, when various foreign-law issues were tendered for at par to avoid a bankruptcy, even as the local law bond population saw a massive cram down a few months later as part of the second Greek "bailout"). In big part, this proposal stemmed from the work of Cleary Gottlieb's Lee Buccheit, who has been the quiet brain behind the real time restructuring of Europe's insolvent states. In fact, one can say that what is happening in Europe was predicted to a large extent in his "How to Restructure Greek Debt" and "Greek Debt; The Endgame Scenarios." Which is why we read his latest white paper: "The Eurozone Debt Crisis - The Options Now", because it presents, in clear, practical terms, just what the flowchart for Europe looks like, unimpeded by the ceaseless chatter and noise of clueless politicians and career bureaucrats who have never heard the term pro forma or fresh start. In brief, Buccheit, unlike all European politicians, is hardly optimistic.

Curious why the EURUSD has taken off like a stung dog again? The same reason as always: posturing out of Germany that contrary to previous Reuters misreports, it actually is happy with Spain doing a mini-bailout. To wit:

• GERMANY OPEN TO PRECAUTIONARY CREDIT FOR SPAIN, LAWMAKERS SAY

And now the ball is back in Rajoy's court, as Spain will have no choice but to implement this mini-bailout, which is not the full ESM rescue package, but will allow the ECB to buy piecemeal Spanish debt (as opposed to merely dangling the threat it will do so). The bad news is that like QEternity, the open-endedness of the ECB threat to monetize Spanish debt is far more powerful than the actual process. Furthermore, the entire Spanish bailout, not just the partial one, has already been long priced in in its bonds. In other words, this is nothing but posturing, but one meant to push Spain ever closer to requesting not only a small bailout request (one which would not allow the ESM to monetize Spanish debt in the primary market, but will allow ECB to buy Spanish bonds in the secondary market), but a full blown one. Finally, never forget that to Germany this is all a process geared for one simple thing: keeping Europe's biggest and most relatively undercapitalized bank - Deutsche Bank - afloat. If this means rescuing it via the guise of Spain, so be it.

While hardly a crash, today's AAPL driven market swoon is certainly not the stuff centrally-planned market confidence is built on (not to mention yet another day of various abnormal stock trading patterns in some of the more retail-heavy held stocks which will hardly break the pattern of domestic capital flowing out of equities and into bonds). And as we have seen in the past two weeks, when even green days have resulted in the infamous "market conditions" clause being triggered for companies attempting to sell equity or raise debt, today's red day, assuming of course, the fat pipe between Citadel and the FRBNY is not unclogged for the last hour of trading ramp, may mean that a surge of "market conditional" excuses by companies and underwriters is imminent. The reason: as the WSJ reports there are no less than 10 IPOs in the next 3 days. Should today's market tone persist into the close, we would be very surprised if even half of these price in a market in which the primary market bid disappears on even a -0.01% close.

Now that the ESM has been officially inaugurated, to much pomp and fanfare out of Europe this morning, many are wondering not so much where the full debt backstop funding of the instrument will come from (it is clear that in a closed-loop Ponzi system, any joint and severally liable instrument will need to get funding from its joint and severally liable members), as much as where the equity "paid-in" capital will originate, since in Europe all but the AAA-rated countries are insolvent, and current recipients of equity-level bailouts from the "core." As a reminder, as part of the ESM's synthetic structure, the 17 member countries have to fund €80 billion of paid-in capital (i.e. equity buffer) which in turn serves as a 11.4% first loss backstop for the remainder of the €620 billion callable capital (we have described the CDO-like nature of the ESM before on many occasions in the past). The irony of a country like Greece precommiting to a €19.7 billion capital call, or Spain to €83.3 billion, or Italy to €125.4 billion, is simply beyond commentary. Obviously by the time the situation gets to the point where the Greek subscription of €20 billion is the marginal European rescue cash, it will be game over. The hope is that it never gets to that point. There is, however, some capital that inevitably has to be funded, which even if nominal, may prove to be a headache for the "subscriber" countries. The payment schedule of that capital "invoicing" has been transformed from the original ESM document, and instead of 5 equal pro rata annual payments has been accelerated to a 40%, 40%, 20% schedule. And more importantly, "The first two instalments (€32 billion) will be paid in within 15 days of ESM inauguration." In other words, October 23 is the deadline by which an already cash-strapped Spain, has to pay-in the 40% of its €9.5 billion, or €3.8 billion, contribution, or else.

At least it is not the China bails out Europe one: thankfully that one is now finished. Instead it is something almost as stupid -i.e., something that was floated, then denied, then floated again, then redenied, from Reuters:

• EURO ZONE CONSIDERING FIRST LOSS INSURANCE FOR SPANISH BONDS UNDER ASISSTANCE PROGRAMME - EU SOURCES
• SCHEME COULD COST EU RESCUE FUND ABOUT 50 BLN EUROS FOR ONE YEAR, ENABLE SPAIN TO MEET FULL BORROWING NEEDS -SOURCES
• NO DECISION TAKEN YET ON BOND INSURANCE SCHEME, MAY BE SEVERAL WEEKS AWAY -SOURCES

Considering the source, Reuters, was pretty much 100% wrong on Monday when it said the Spanish bailout was imminent and Germany contingent, something Germany refuted shortly thereafter, we give this rumor about the same "likelihood" of being credible as every other one that Europe is fixed. But at least it managed to get the EURUSD higher by 20 pips.

From the financial repression and encumbrance of the central banker to the wild speculators and their angry 'fast-money' flows, we continue to hang on every tick in Europe's bond markets (for both validation of a political leader's view or confirmation of his asininity). The sadder truth is that Europe's secondary bond trading market has shriveled. Spain's Treasury just released August's daily average Spanish government bond trading volumes and they have plunged over 40% YoY - now at levels (under EUR40bn per day) not seen since 1996 (pre-Euro-zone). It strikes us that once they lose the secondary market then the primary market will be very close behind (thanks to liquidity concerns among other things) - unless of course the ECB really does soak up all future issuance and hold-to-maturity.