New York Fed
In another well-funded research study, the New York Fed has, via its Liberty Street Economics blog, unveiled its explanation for why volatility is low (obviously missing the Kevin Henry-Citadel dark-pool VIX-slamming machinations that are so evident on an almost daily basis). Their findings are a little awkward for The Fed... the current volatility environment appears substantially different from what happened prior to the financial crisis. However, the Fed's conclusion, as Helen Thomas notes, is worrisome - low interest rates tend to mute volatility (something we already knew) - but if that is the case (from their findings) then implicitly: If low volatility is caused by low rates which in turn cause low volatility, what happens when rates go up?
First a secret "Doomsday book", and now this?
In his latest note Albert brings up in his latest note titled '?Basket trade?' suggests "Sell everything and run for your lives” (which has nothing to do with Edwards being a correct permabear in a world in which the house of cards is kept standing day after day only thanks to over $10 trillion and rising in central bank liquidity, and everythning to do with this). The point is whether increasing volatility across all major asset classes (notably FX and increasingly so in equities) will finally spill over into bonds, but in an inverted way - one where unlike stocks where vol surges when prices crash, would see bond volatility soar as a result of matched surge in bond prices, something which as we showed earlier today is becoming an increasing concern as bond yields around most places in the world have tumbled to record lows.
"Despite the low level of interest rates, mortgage affordability for first-time buyers remains roughly at the long-term average levels whereas the aggregate home buyer's affordability remains well below the long-term average. As the servicing of student loan debt is part of the Debt-To-Income calculation, the new regulatory (Bernanke-busting) regime compounds the already substantial challenges confronting the first-time home-buyer's access to mortgage credit. We believe the average student debtor is likely unable to secure a typical home mortgage due to their debt-to-income ratio."
Carmen Segarra said, “I come from the world of legal and compliance, we deal with hard evidence. It’s like, we don’t deal with, you know, perceptions.”
How ironic. Segarra worked at the Fed.
- How you know it is all a lie: Pelosi Presses Obama to Talk Up Stronger U.S. Economy (BBG)
- Secret Goldman Sachs Tapes Put Pressure on New York Fed (NYT), Uh, no they don't
- Clashes Break Out at Hong Kong Protest Site (WSJ)
- N.Y. Fed Lawyer Says AIG Got Billions Without Paperwork (BBG)
- Ebola’s Disease Detectives Race to Track Others Exposed (BBG)
- UPS, FedEx Want Retailers to Get Real on Holiday Shipping (WSJ)
- No more mailman at the door under U.S. Postal Service plan (Reuters)
Something quite "crazy" indeed (not our words).
Here come the revisionists with new malarkey about the 2008 financial crisis. No less august a forum than the New York Times today carries a front page piece by journeyman financial reporter James Stewart suggesting that Lehman Brothers was solvent; could and should have been bailed out; and that the entire trauma of the financial crisis and Great Recession might have been avoided or substantially mitigated. That is not just meretricious nonsense; its a measure of how thoroughly corrupted public discourse about the fundamental financial and economic realities of the present era has become owing to the cult of central banking. The great error of September 2008 was not in failing to bailout Lehman. It was in providing a $100 billion liquidity hose to Morgan Stanley and an even larger one to Goldman. They too were insolvent. That was the essence of their business model. Fed policies inherently generate runs, and then it stands ready with limitless free money to rescue the gamblers. You can call that pragmatism, if you like. But don’t call it capitalism.
There is nothing like the release of secret tape recordings to clarify an inconclusive debate. Actually, what the tapes really show is that the Fed’s latest policy contraption - macro-prudential regulation through a financial stability committee - is just a useless exercise in CYA. Macro-pru is an impossible delusion that should not be taken seriously be sensible adults. It is not, as Janet Yellen insists, a supplementary tool to contain and remediate the unintended consequence - that is, excessive financial speculation - of the Fed’s primary drive to achieve full employment and fill the GDP bathtub to the very brim of its potential. Instead, rampant speculation, excessive leverage, phony liquidity and massive financial instability are the only real result of current Fed policy.
If you can't beat it, may as well bid it. That, at least, is the take home lesson to Nanex' Eric Hunsader who says that after listening to the "Goldman Tapes" I'm putting everything in GS - because these guys can do whatever the hell they want"...
And no, it certainly can not be characterized as doing God's work............................
I don't want to spoil the revelations of "This American Life": It's far better to hear the actual sounds on the radio, as so much of the meaning of the piece is in the tones of the voices -- and, especially, in the breathtaking wussiness of the people at the Fed charged with regulating Goldman Sachs. But once you have listened to it -- as when you were faced with the newly unignorable truth of what actually happened to that NFL running back's fiancee in that elevator -- consider the following:
- You sort of knew that the regulators were more or less controlled by the banks. Now you know.
- The only reason you know is that one woman, Carmen Segarra, has been brave enough to fight the system. She has paid a great price to inform us all of the obvious. She has lost her job, undermined her career, and will no doubt also endure a lifetime of lawsuits and slander.
So what are you going to do about it? At this moment the Fed is probably telling itself that, like the financial crisis, this, too, will blow over. It shouldn't.
"In conclusion, this analysis finds little evidence of the permanent structural damage to the economy’s productive potential that many commentators see as the main culprit for the subpar recovery from the Great Recession..." and Surprise... "our model suggests that monetary policy played an important role in cushioning the blow from the financial crisis and in sustaining the recovery, which could have been significantly more disappointing without the aggressive actions undertaken by the Fed."
In the past, they were early, but they were right.