European Central Bank

The bail out is a cynical ruse, not to benefit Greece as a whole, but to benefit the banks and other creditors (the ECB and the IMF) who should take their medicine and move on. The one thing keeping the whole blighted euro project in place is an arrogant denial of the facts. A loss of political face now is a small price to pay for a much better outcome that will disadvantage far fewer people than the disorganised chaos into which Euroland will descend if the current bunch of lunatics are not put back in the asylum. Is this a Europe we want to be part of?

To help remind readers of what happens when the entire world engages in wholesale currency war, here is a complete list of all the recent FX interventions, courtesy of Stone McCarthy.

After what were described as "marathon" negotiations, Greece and its creditors have agreed to the terms of the country’s third bailout program. Although some remain optimistic, the general consensus seems to be that, as Finnish Foreign Minister Timo Soini said over the weekend, "we should just admit that this isn't going to work."

"If Greece collapsed and Grexit would be tomorrow’s reality, we would lose 3-4 billion euros more or less at once. So I hope that the EU and euro zone, that in due course, we can face the facts and say enough is enough and that we must do something else."

... in under a minute, the hateful script had taken offline the entire system in much the same manner as chucking a spanner into a running engine might stop a car. The databases, as always, were flushing their precious data onto many different disks as this happened, so massive, irreversible data corruption occurred. That was it, the biggest computer system in the bank, maybe even the world, was down. And it wasn't coming back up again quickly. At the time this failure occurred there was more than $12 TRILLION of trades at various stages of the settlement process in the system. This represented around 20% of ALL trades on the global stock market.

In a murky world of market fantasy, our first guideposts are the fundamentals themselves. Supply and demand can be misrepresented for a time through manipulated statistics, but the tangible effects of decline cannot be. Our secondary guideposts are the paths that internationalists and central banks bulldoze through the fiscal forest. To anyone with any sense, the endgame is clear: Total centralization is the goal, and economic fear is the tool they hope to use to get there. We have written on numerous solutions to this threat in past articles; but the first and most important action is for each of us to acknowledge, wholeheartedly, that the system we know is ending. It is over. What replaces that system will either be up to us or up to them. Only by admitting that there is an end to the fantasy, a painful end, will we then be able to help determine our future reality.

What if the assumptions about a U.S. economic recovery and Fed rate hikes were wrong? Could observers be mistaken now about the trajectory of the Dollar vs. the Euro as they were back in 2000? Confidence is the only thing that really undergirds modern fiat currencies. But confidence can be very ephemeral...disappearing as quickly as it arrives. The U.S. Dollar benefits from confidence that the Euro currency may just be unworkable, that the U.S. economy will continue to improve, and that the Fed will raise rates throughout the remainder of 2015 and into 2016. If these expectations are unfulfilled, there could be a Euro reversal.

A non-bombastic analysis of the events and data in the week ahead, with insulting anyone or resorting to conspiracy theories.

The IMF made some frowing decisions...

With Greece facing a critical €3.2 billion payment to the ECB on August 20, creditors are under immense pressure to conclude official discussions on a third bailout program within the next three weeks. Now, Focus magazine says some German officials doubt whether the quadriga's timeline is realistic. 

The IMF failures in Greece bring back vivid memories of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98... As the Indonesian episode should teach us, the IMF’s management can be very political and often neither trustworthy nor competent. Greece offers yet another chapter.

Jim Rickards, “I think it’s always very important to own gold. I’ve recommended that investors have about 10% of their portfolio in the yellow metal.” “If I’m right and some catastrophic event is on the horizon, then that 10% would be your portfolio insurance.”

"How would US Treasury bulls in the private sector react if they knew in advance that the second largest owner of Treasuries, the PBOC, was a forced seller of Treasuries. Such compelled selling would be obvious before US markets opened each morning as downward pressure on the RMB exchange rate in Asia forced the PBOC to liquidate foreign currency assets to defend the fixed exchange rate. Would even Treasury bulls stand in the way of such a large and predictable liquidation? If they didn’t then the second phase of The Great Reset would come to pass and the decline of EM external deficits would force tighter monetary policy in both EM and DM."

• Fed Officials May Offer More Clarity on Rates (WSJ)
• Stocks rebound, shrugging off volatile and weak China (Reuters)
• Three-Day Selloff Knocks 11% From China Shares (WSJ)
• China shares fall again as Beijing scrambles to calm markets (Reuters)
• VAT hikes to make Greek destination less popular (Kathimerini)
• Varoufakis - Something is rotten with the eurozone’s hideous restrictions on sovereignty (FT)
• EU denies Varoufakis 'tax control' claims (FT)

To understand what really happened  earlier today, one should read the Bloomberg explanation, according to which it was the ECB which rejected proposals by Greek authorities to reopen country’s financial markets with no restrictions in place for both Greek and foreign traders, citing an Athens Exchange spokeswoman. And just like that, we wave goodbye to the Hellenic Republic, and greet the Mediterranean Vassal Province of Mario and Merkel. Because as of this moment, no Greek decision can be taken without the direct or indirect express prior approval of either the ECB and/or Berlin.