Federal Reserve

A peek into the 60's manipulation and why the CFTC is a joke.

• Fed Holds Off for Now on Bond Buys  (Hilsenrath)
• Bonds Show Return of Crisis Once ECB Loans Expire (Bloomberg)
• Greek Debt Talks Enter Third Day After ‘Substantial’ Discussions (Bloomberg)
• Sharp clashes at Republican debate ahead of vote (Reuters)
• Lagarde Joins Warning on Fiscal Cuts Before Davos (Bloomberg)
• Investors exit big-name funds as stars fail to shine (Reuters)
• Payday lenders plead case to consumer agency (Reuters) - the EFSF included?
• EU Toughens Fiscal Pact Bowing to ECB Objections, Draft Shows (Bloomberg)
• Minister Urges Japan to Use Strong Yen (FT)
• China Eyes Pension Fund Boost for Stock Market (Reuters)
• China Manufacturing Contraction Boosts Case for Easing: Economy (Bloomberg)

"Suckers" - Alan Grayson discusses the Federal Reserve's purchase of debt from Bear Stearns, including debt from recently foreclosed Red Roof Inn's.

The reason I don’t write about markets so much anymore is because I don’t believe there are markets any longer. Sure there are flashing prices on the screens for various assets and those can be addicting to look at on a daily basis, but I think these “markets” are now merely a mechanism for government propaganda and a method to ultimately fleece more money from the uniformed masses that play in it by the casino operators and their puppets in government. It’s basically a hologram. I have alluded to this in recent interviews, but I myself feel extremely uncomfortable being involved at this point in a way I have never felt before. For now, I am still willing to play the game with some of my own capital but I fear I may regret this decision and that the smart thing would be to pull out completely and go entirely into hard assets as well as real estate abroad. This game is not safe. By definition, the longer the period of tension building the more explosive the release will be when it ultimately happens. This period has already been going on for almost five months with only minor releases so I think we are already staring down the barrel of something horrific. Should they actually succeed and delaying the release until after the election I expect the release scenario to be downright cataclysmic. Should they succeed to delay it that far I hope I am wise enough to pull the remainder of my assets out of this casino beforehand and get entirely physical.

Instead of opting for a publicly transparent BWIC in the disposition of its Maiden Lane II assets, the Fed has once again gone opaque - long a critique of the Fed's practices which have required repeated FOIAs in the past to get some clarity on its secret bailouts and transactions - and proceeded with a private sale, without any clarity on the deal terms, in which it sold $7 billion in face amount of Maiden Lane II assets direct to Credit Suisse. The alternative of course would be the same snarling of the MBS and broadly fixed income market that we saw in June of last year. In other words, the Fed looked at the options: transparency and risk of grinding credit demand to a halt, or doing what it does best, which is to transact in the shadows, and avoid capital markets risk. It opted for the latter. As to why the Fed decided to go ahead with a deal shrouded in secrecy? "The New York Fed decided to move forward with the transaction only after determining that the winning bid represented good value for the public." "I am pleased with the strength of the bids and the level of market interest in these assets," said William C. Dudley, President of the New York Fed. Because if there is one thing Bill Dudley and the Fed knows is gauging what is in the best interest of the public... and the callorie content of the iPad of course.

Anyone wondering why FSLR just jumped, it is because as was just made known, David Einhorn's Greenlight has decided to close its FSLR position, after bleeding that particular corpse dry. "Our largest winner by far was our short of First Solar (FSLR) which fell from $130.14 to $33.76 paper share and was the worst performing stock in the S&P 500." Einhorn also announces that he was among the "evil" hedge funds who dared to provide market clearing transparency and buy CDS on insolvent European governments: "We also did well investing in various credit default swaps on European sovereign debt." As for losers, Einhorn and Kyle Bass can commiserate: "For the second year in a row, our biggest loss came from positions designed to capitalize on eventual weakening of the Yen." He summarizes the global economic environment as follows: "The global environment is very complicated. On the one hand the Federal Reserve has taken a much-needed break from quantitative easing (at least for the moment). Accordingly, inflation in oil and food has abated, providing relief to the US economy. Bearish forecasts that the US was headed back into recession proved wrong for the third time since the end of the last recession. On the other hand, Asia appears to be in much worse shape than it was at this time last year and could be a drag on the world economy going forward. Very few people trust any of the economic data coming out of China, making it difficult to gauge the situation there. Some of the smartest people we know have very dim views. The Chinese have been a leading growth engine for the last two decades and are largely credit with leading the world out of the recession in 2009. A change in their economic circumstances could really upend things." Yet the best thing is his summary of the current investing climate in our utterly and hopelessly reactionary broken markets.

Tomorrow the BLS will announce that last week's initial claims number was revised to over 400K, the first time this important level has been breached, this time in an adverse fashion, in the past 2 months. But why is 400K important, and why do economists and pundits put impact on this particular number? Here is Bank of America with the explanation in the form of a historical matrix, correlating the historical relationship between these time series, highlighting the notable patterns observed in the past several decade, and what it all means for the big picture.

Here are today's economic highlights, for anyone who cares and is deluded to think that any economic numbers actually still matter and drive the market and not vice versa.

We don't have to run through the maze 5 times before we know what lever to push! 

We can also shed light on the difference between a real free market and a simulacrum of a "free market" by asking: does anyone seriously believe the stock market would be higher if all market intervention and manipulation by the Central State and Central Bank (and their proxies) ceased? We can extend this by asking: what if public companies were banned from issuing "beat by a penny" pro forma earnings and other accounting tricks? What if the "shadow banking system" was outlawed, and all assets and liabilities were transparent? Does anyone seriously believe the fragile financial system that depends on shadow banking for its dodges and profits would survive transparency and marked-to-market accounting? Americans have no real experience of free, transparent financial markets or of rigorously transparent accounting by their Central State, the Federal Reserve, public corporations or the financial sector. They have been presented facsimiles of accurate statistics and accounting, and simulacra of transparent markets. When those participants' faith in the Status Quo's fairness and transparency declines below a critical threshold, then they withdraw or limit their participation, and the system enters a self-reinforcing death spiral.

The great lie that drives the fiat global financial locomotive forward is the assumption that there is no other way of doing things.  Many in America believe that the U.S. dollar (a paper time-bomb ready to explode) is the only currency we have at our disposal.  Many believe that the corporate trickle down dynamic is the only practical method for creating jobs.  Numerous others have adopted the notion that global interdependency is a natural extension of “progress”, and that anyone who dares to contradict this fallacy is an “isolationist” or “extremist”.  Much of our culture has been conditioned to support and defend centralization as necessary and inevitable primarily because they have never lived under any other system.  Globalism has not made the world smaller; it has made our minds smaller. By limiting choice, we limit ingenuity and imagination.  By narrowing focus, we lose sight of the much bigger picture.  This is the very purpose of the feudal framework; to erase individual and sovereign strength, stifle all new or honorable philosophies, and ensure the masses remain completely reliant on the establishment for their survival, forever tied to the rotting umbilical cord of a parasitic parent government. 

I continue to believe that the large difference between the valuation of WFC and C is actually about right and is a function of the high-risk business model at C.  Say what you want about the piles of cash, Dick Bove, C has a gross yield on lending assets that is more than 350bp above the industry average, a function of a subprime internal default target for the average customer.  This is a deliberate business model choice and one that, frankly, makes it hard for me to justify buying C. 

"King would say 'Please finish what I started.' "

One of the more useful Wall Street fictions is the naive notion that big players and small-fry equity owners alike love low-volatility "melt-up" markets that slowly creep higher on low volume. The less attractive reality is that big trading desks find low-volatility "melt-up" markets useful for one thing: to sucker retail buyers and less-adept fund managers into an increasingly vulnerable market. Beyond that utility, low-volatility "melt-up" markets are of little value to big trading desks for the simple reason that there is no way to outperform in markets that lack volatility. The retail crowd may love a market that slowly gains 4% for the year, barely budging for months, but such a market is anathema to big traders. It's always useful to ask cui bono--to whose benefit? In this case, highly volatile markets don't benefit clueless retail equities owners, as they are constantly whipsawed out of "sure-thing" positions. From the big trading desk point of view, this whipsawing provides essential liquidity, as retail traders and inept fund managers trying to follow the wild swings up and down provide buyers. I have a funny feeling the "smart money" has built up a nice short position here and as a result the market is about to "unexpectedly" decline sharply. The ideal scenario for big trading desks here is a sudden decline that panics complacent retail traders and managers into selling (or leaving their stops in to get hit).

With Fed officials a laughing stock (both inside and outside the realm of FOMC minutes), Bank of Japan officials ever-watching eyes, and ECB officials in both self-congratulatory (Draghi) and worryingly concerned on downgrades (Nowotny), the world's central bankers appear, if nothing else, convinced that all can be solved with the printing of some paper (and perhaps a measure of harsh words for those naughty spendaholic politicians). The dramatic rise in central bank balance sheets and just-as-dramatic fall in asset quality constraints for collateral are just two of the items that UBS's economist Larry Hatheway considers as he asks (and answers) the critical question of just how safe are central banks. As he sees bloated balance sheets relative to capital and the impact when 'stuff happens', he discusses why the Eurozone is different (no central fiscal authority backstopping it) and notes it is less the fear of large losses interfering with liquidity provision directly but the more massive (and explicit) intrusion of politics into the 'independent' heart of central banking that creates the most angst. While he worries for the end of central bank independence (most specifically in Europe), we remind ourselves of the light veil that exists currently between the two and that the tooth fairy and santa don't have citizen-suppressing printing presses.