Yield Curve

I have suggested for weeks, I suggested in my piece yesterday, that you take some money off the table, sell some of your bullets, and re-deploy. Quantitative Easing is coming to an end and there will be ramifications for the bond markets and, eventually, for the equity markets. The days of free money, newly printed money, are coming to a close as America begins to right itself and as our banking system is mostly out of the woods. The longer end of the curve, hit hard yesterday, is heading to higher yields in my opinion. We will also begin to see inflation creep in for a variety of reasons and I point specifically to the price of gas at the pump which, while no one was looking, has hit its all-time highs this week as each penny of increase adds $1 billion to household spending and gasoline has risen thirty cents in the last month.

As the situation in Greece plays out exactly as we expected, no matter how much confidence Merkel and Papademos believe they have in a successful PSI, we thought it worth looking at the implications of the holdouts being 'punished'. For sure, as Peter Tchir notes, confusion reigns supreme, though we are probably due for a 'China saves the world' rumor any moment now, because too many people enjoy the fact that we haven't had a 1% down day yet this year.

Not many websites, analysts or authors have both the balls/temerity & the analytical honesty to take Goldman on. Well, I say.... Let's dance! This isn't a collection of soundbites from the MSM. This is truly meaty, hard hitting analysis for the big boys and girls. If you're easily offended or need the 6 second preview I suggest you move on.

If it seems like it was only 5 days ago that Greek bonds could be had for the blockbuster yield of 638%, it is because it was As of today, the same bond was yielding an even more ridiculous 763% (and remember when the MSM fluffers were telling you to buy these at the bargain basement yield of 100% in September 2011?). This price has nothing to do with the Fitch action on the country which is irrelevant, and all to do with the fact that, as noted previously, the cash coupon on the post-reorg bonds was cut once again, this time from 3.6% to just 2%, and the current price on non UK-law bonds is merely indicative of the cash on cash return investors in these bonds expect to make. It also means that the market expects a redefault in just about 1 year. And yes, we realize that at bond prices in the high teens, the yield curve is absolutely meaningless but it is still highly entertaining to watch as Greek bond yields are about to hit quadruple digits, which in itself is very indicative of the recoveries one can expect in a global sovereign ponzi, and yet the powers that be tell us this is a perfectly normal phenomenon, i.e., there is no default, and thus there is no reason to hedge for it. Alas, the whole world has gone mad.

All the pseudo-scientific yada-yada on economic theory are just hollow bones thrown to journalists and pundits to have something to “chew” on and write about. The only thing that matters is the monetization of more and more government debt, and how to sell it to the public. Paul Krugman would argue that despite all the “quantitative easing” inflation has not really picked up. At zero percent interest rates, money has no preference – there is no opportunity cost of just “lying around” without interest. Investing money for 4 years for 0.15% return is not “riskless return” – it’s “return-less risk”. Perversely, the Fed has created a situation where raising interest rates would probably lead to inflation. It is boxed into ZIRP (zero interest rate policy) for infinity. Things will get serious once the Fed adopts a policy called N-GDP targeting. Instead of inflation, the Fed will try to “target” nominal GDP. If real GDP growth is zero, the nominal GDP growth will be made up entirely of inflation. Debt is a nominal unit, and it is supported by nominal GDP. In order to keep the ratio between GDP and debt halfway bearable, GDP must be inflated. It is a tax on everybody holding dollars, since the value of those will decline. Meanwhile, the Japanese are resorting to stealth interventions to break the Yen’s strength.    Currency wars have gone from “cold” to “hot”. The Fed’s printing of dollars is forcing other central banks to purchase them and selling their own currency in the hope of stemming their own currency’s rise. This makes them involuntary buyers of Treasury bills and bonds, making it easier for the US government to finance its deficit.

Over the weekend, we commented on Dylan Grice's seminal analysis which excoriates the central planning "fools", who are perpetually caught in the "lost pilot" paradigm, whereby the world's central planners increasingly operate by the mantra of “I have no idea where we’re going, but we’re making good time!” and which confirms that in the absence of real resolutions to problems created by a century of flawed economic models, the only option is to continue doubling down until terminal failure. Basically, the take home message there is that once "economists" get lost in trying to correct the errata their own models output as a result of faulty assumptions (which they always are able to "explain away" as one time events), they drift ever further into unknown territory until finally we end up with such monetary aberrations as "liquidity traps", "zero bound yields" and, soon, NIRP (which comes after ZIRP), if indeed the Treasury proceeds with negative yields beginning in May under the tutelage of the Goldman-JPM chaired Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee. Today, it is Bill Gross who takes the Grice perspective one step further, and looks at implications for liquidity, and the lack thereof, in a world where one of the three primary functions of modern financial intermediaries - maturity transformation (the other two being credit and liquidity transformation) is terminally broken. He then juxtaposes this in the context of Hyman Minsky's monetary theories, and concludes: "What incentive does a US bank have to extend maturity to a two- or three-year term when Treasury rates at that level of the curve are below the 25 basis points available to them overnight from the Fed? What incentive does Pimco or banks have to buy five-year Treasuries at 75bp when the maximum upside capital gain is two per cent of par and the downside substantially more?" In other words, Pimco is finally grasping just how ZIRP is punking it and its clients. It also means that very soon all the maturity, and soon, credit risk of the world will be on the shoulders of the Fed, which in turn labor under a false economic paradigm. And one wonders why nobody has any faith left in these here "capital markets"...

Following our note on the flattening (and update on the steepening) in the Chinese yield curve (RMB 10Y - 2Y to be specific) last November, we have continued to keep an eye on the relationship between the Shanghai Composite and the bond market for signals that all is not well in the recent 'soft-landing' rally. While Chinese shares have seen their best January ever, the RMB curve has flattened quite notably. As Morgan Stanley points out in an FX Pulse update today, the yield curve is an early indicator for local shares, which should not be a surprise given the still restricted Chinese capital account. While we have seen this kind of divergence in the US (where given free capital flows the relationship between yield urves and the equity market has loosened over the past 30 years), in China the relationship is still tight and further flattening of the Chinese curve would call into question the equity market rally (and soft-landing thesis). The flattening RMB yield curve suggests the local bond market has become skeptical of Chinese growth prospects. Should the RMB curve flatten further from here, the anticipated decline of commodity currencies (AUD most specifically for US equity carry traders) could be sooner than expected.

While sounding just a tad preachy in his February newsletter, Bill Gross' latest summary piece on the economy, on the Fed's forray into infinite ZIRP, into maturity transformation, and the lack thereof, on the Fed's massive blunder in treating the liquidity trap, but most importantly on what the transition from a levering to delevering global economy means, is a must read. First: on the fatal flaw in the Fed's plan: "when rational or irrational fear persuades an investor to be more concerned about the return of her money than on her money then liquidity can be trapped in a mattress, a bank account or a five basis point Treasury bill. But that commonsensical observation is well known to Fed policymakers, economic historians and certainly citizens on Main Street." And secondly, here is why the party is over: "Where does credit go when it dies? It goes back to where it came from. It delevers, it slows and inhibits economic growth, and it turns economic theory upside down, ultimately challenging the wisdom of policymakers. We’ll all be making this up as we go along for what may seem like an eternity. A 30-50 year virtuous cycle of credit expansion which has produced outsize paranormal returns for financial assets – bonds, stocks, real estate and commodities alike – is now delevering because of excessive “risk” and the “price” of money at the zero-bound. We are witnessing the death of abundance and the borning of austerity, for what may be a long, long time." Yet most troubling is that even Gross, a long-time member of the status quo, now sees what has been obvious only to fringe blogs for years: "Recent central bank behavior, including that of the U.S. Fed, provides assurances that short and intermediate yields will not change, and therefore bond prices are not likely threatened on the downside. Still, zero-bound money may kill as opposed to create credit. Developed economies where these low yields reside may suffer accordingly. It may as well, induce inflationary distortions that give a rise to commodities and gold as store of value alternatives when there is little value left in paper." Let that sink in for a second, and let it further sink in what happens when $1.3 trillion Pimco decides to open a gold fund. Physical preferably...

As of a few hours ago, Goldman's Francesco Garzarelli has officially told the firm's clients to go ahead and short 10 Year Treasurys via March 2012 futures, with a 126-00 target. While Garzarelli is hardly Stolper (and we will have more on the latest Stolpering out in a second), the fact that Goldman is now openly buying Treasurys two days ahead of this week's FOMC statement makes us wonder just how much of a rates positive statement will the Fed make on Wednesday at 2:15 pm. From Goldman: "Since the end of last August, we have argued that 10-yr US Treasury yields would not be able to sustain levels much below 2% in this cycle. Yields have traded in a tight range around an average 2% since September, including so far into 2012. We are now of the view that a break to the upside, to 2.25-2.50%, is likely and recommend going tactically short. Using Mar-12 futures contracts, which closed on Friday at 130-08, we would aim for a target of 126-00 and stops on a close above 132-00." As a reminder, don't do what Goldman says, do what it does, especially when one looks the firm's Top 6 trades for 2012, of which 5 are losing money, and 2 have been stopped out less than a month into the year.

Are the markets already front running a potential announcement of a third round of Quantitative Easing (QE 3)?   Maybe so.  We had expected QE3 at the end of last summer as the economy weakened substantially from the impact of the Japanese earthquake/debt ceiling debate/Eurozone crisis trifecta.  However, with political pressures running high due to the raging battle in Congress raising the debt ceiling there was little support from the public for further intervention.  Furthermore, with inflation, as measured by CPI, already outside of the Fed's comfort zone, the Fed opted to institute "Operation Twist" (O.T.) instead. With the Euro-Crisis on the broiler, another debt ceiling debate approaching, the U.S. economy struggling along as Europe slips into a recession and corporate earnings being revised down there are plenty of reasons for stocks to decline in price.  Yet, they have continued to inch up.  With short interest on stocks having plunged in recent weeks it certainly sounds like the markets are betting on something happening and soon.

Yesterday, in a must read post, Gluskin Sheff's David Rosenberg played the devil's advocate and presented a much needed experiment in contrarianism, attempting to unravel what it is that bulls may be seeing in the economy and the market (an analysis which may have to be revised after today's pro forma 400K in initial claims and deplorable retail sales update). While we don't know if anyone was converted into the permabullish fold as a result, it certainly was useful to have a view of what "sliding down the wall of satisfaction" means currently . Today, Rosie is back to his traditional skeptical self with today's publication of the "Laments of a Bear", which is yet another must read inverse view of everything that yesterday was not. Our advise to readers: be aware of both sides of the argument and make up your own mind. Plus at the end of the day the only thing that really matters is what side of the bed Bernanke wakes up on...

In his latest letter, Bill Gross, obviously for his own reasons, essentially channels Zero Hedge, and repeats everything we have been saying over the past 3 years. We'll take that as a compliment. Next thing you know he will convert the TRF into a gold-only physical fund in anticipation of the wrong-end of the "fat tail" hitting reality head on at full speed, and sending the entire house of centrally planned cards crashing down. "How many ways can you say “it’s different this time?” There’s “abnormal,” “subnormal,” “paranormal” and of course “new normal.” Mohamed El-Erian’s awakening phrase of several years past has virtually been adopted into the lexicon these days, but now it has an almost antiquated vapor to it that reflected calmer seas in 2011 as opposed to the possibility of a perfect storm in 2012. The New Normal as PIMCO and other economists would describe it was a world of muted western growth, high unemployment and relatively orderly delevering. Now we appear to be morphing into a world with much fatter tails, bordering on bimodal. It’s as if the Earth now has two moons instead of one and both are growing in size like a cancerous tumor that may threaten the financial tides, oceans and economic life as we have known it for the past half century. Welcome to 2012...For 2012, in the face of a delevering zero-bound interest rate world, investors must lower return expectations. 2–5% for stocks, bonds and commodities are expected long term returns for global financial markets that have been pushed to the zero bound, a world where substantial real price appreciation is getting close to mathematically improbable. Adjust your expectations, prepare for bimodal outcomes. It is different this time and will continue to be for a number of years. The New Normal is “Sub,” “Ab,” “Para” and then some. The financial markets and global economies are at great risk."

Writing as someone who was strongly stock-oriented for most of a long investing career, I can assert that at today's low dividend yields, it is difficult to see stocks as strong trees on which to rely. The Smithers parameters provide cautionary evidence for the bulls who point to current "low" price-earnings ratios and "sunny skies almost forever" views of corporate profits and predict stock market returns well above bond yields for years to come.

Throughout this entire crisis (going back to 2007), the governments and central banks have made efforts to “fix” certain things. If LIBOR gets too high, then they take action, that at least temporarily improves LIBOR. Those who look at the “improved” data and think the problem has been fixed have been proven wrong, as the market exposes other holes and eventually even the government and central bank money can’t keep the prices artificial for too long without forever increasing the amount of public money at risk. There may be no better example of that phenomena than the Euro Basis Swaps. To some degree, this rate measures the difficulty that European companies (banks) have when trying to get dollars. The First “globally coordinated” action in September brought the rate back from-110 to -80. That faded until it hit an almost scary -160. The Second “globally coordinated” swap line action got us all the way back to -110 (about the same level that had sparked the first action). We retraced some of those gains, saw fresh gains on the back of LTRO, but again have stabilized at rates that are worse than what the policy makers have targeted. Where would these rates be without intervention? Should we be happy about the improvement, or should we be concerned that in spite of all the intervention, this is the best they could do?

The spread between Spanish 2Y and 10Y bonds has dropped to record lows as the yield curve inverts most since 1994. Troughing intraday at -12bps at its most inverted, today's as-good-as-failed Spanish bill auction sends an ugly message to the market that risk appetite is non-existent. At -5bps, if we end today at this level, it will be the first inverted close since August 1994.