Volatility

Four of the last five days have seen AAPL stock price swing +/- 3 sigma with today's drop approaching the largest drop in six months as rumors of iPhone sales weakness spread virally. Realized volatility is exploding on many different measures and AAPL implied volatility back to November highs. Of course as tensions mounts and the stock breaks Monday's closing VWAP, so margin calls on options expiring tomorrow are flopping over into various other markets as S&P 500 e-mini futures drop back below their 50DMA and VIX jumps up over 19.5% once again. Gold has pulled back in line with the USD and while the S&P 500 flip-flopped between bullishly synced with the USD and bearishly synced with Treasuries, for now equities in general are trying to catch up to longer-term Treasury weakness.

Here are four charts of wages, income and consumption. The charts depict changes from a year ago (also called year-over-year) and the percentage of change from a year ago. These measure rates of change as opposed to absolute changes, and so they are useful in identifying trends... The build-out of Internet infrastructure that culminated in the dot-com boom boosted employment, wages and consumption, and the credit-housing bubble of the mid-2000s also boosted income and consumption. Now that these temporary conditions have faded, what's left is the relentless chewing up of traditional industries by the Web as distributed software boosts productivity while slashing the number of people required to create value. What's remarkable about the first chart is the increase in volatility in recent years: the changes in wages and salaries are increasingly dramatic. This might be reflecting the dynamics of the global economy pulling wages lower while massive financial-stimulus policies of the Central State and bank (the Federal government and the Federal Reserve) act to artificially boost wages with trillions of dollars in borrowed/printed money.

Three key issues remain at the heart of current markets: the strength of the US growth cycle; the sovereign and financial risks in the Euro area; and the risks of ongoing deceleration in Chinese growth. Goldman has created proxies for these various risks and the sensitivities of different assets to those risk factors. They further note that looking at those three proxies over time confirms what general qualitative commentary has also spelled out. From late November to early February, the market relaxed about all three risks, as better global data and the impact of the LTROs on European financial risks provided a strong tailwind. From February until mid-March, China fears reappeared and the market downgraded its views of China significantly while still relaxing about European and growth risk. Since then, both European – and to a lesser degree – US growth risks have re-emerged, but at the same time there are some very tentative signs that the market is becoming a little less worried about China. They, however, remain increasingly cautious on them all: Europe seems increasingly in the hands of governments, not the ECB, raising volatility; unspectacular growth trajectory in the US continues as outlooks adjust down; and even thouigh China's risk has stabilized they have avoided active exposures 'given the muddiness of news'. Understanding which assets are more sensitive and how these risks evolve might help prognosticators understand the need to pay attention to Europe - as opposed to merely Apple's earnings.

Here is a recap of today's European bond issuance as well as the Wall Street "instaview" response to each

"You apparently can survive betting against bull market irrationality if you meet three conditions. First, you must allow a generous Ben Graham-like “margin of safety” and wait for a real outlier before you make a big bet. Second, you must try to stay reasonably diversified. Third, you must never use leverage."...It is the classic failing of value managers (and poker players for that matter) to get impatient and bet too hard too soon. In addition, GMO was not always optimally diversified. We are generally more cautious (or, if you prefer, “more experienced”) now than in 1998 with respect to, for example, both patience and diversification, and at least we in asset allocation always stayed away from leverage. The U.S. growth and technology bubble of 2000 was by far the biggest market  outlier event in U.S. market history; we had previously survived the 65 P/E market in Japan, which was perhaps the greatest outlier in all important equity markets anywhere and at any time. These were the most stringent tests for managers, and we were 2 to 3 years early in our calls in both cases. Yet we survived, although not without some battle scars, with the great help that we did, in the end, win these bets and by a lot. Hypothetically, resisting the temptation to invest too soon in 1931 may have been a tougher test of survival in bucking the market. Luckily we, and all value managers, were not around to be tempted by that one.

Several days ago we published the latest seminal paper by Artemis Capital Management, a must read for everyone confused about market dynamics in the "central-planning normal." Since a core focus of Artemis' long-running narrative has been the impact of endless interventions in markets, and their distortions of volatility, the firm's Chris Cole has prepared the following addendum animation showing the vol curve over the past 20 years, which ultimately has led to what we have dubbed a "centrally-planned, liquidity addicted, temperamental abortion".

Simply must see volatility video.

Ten more years of low returns in the stock market.  If you are one of the millions of baby boomers headed into retirement - start saving more and spending less because the stock market won't bail you out.  Now that I have your attention I will explain why this is the likely future ahead for investors. In this past weekend's newsletter I wrote that “If you put all of your money into cash today and don’t look at the market for another decade – you will be better off..."  I realize that this statement is equivalent to heresy where Wall Street is concerned but there is one simple reason behind my apparent madness - the power of "reversion". This is not a new concept by any means as witnessed by Bob Farrell's rule #1 - "Markets tend to return to the mean over time."  However, the reality of what "reversion" means is grossly misunderstood by Wall Street, and the mainstream media, as witnessed by the many valuation calls that "stocks are now cheap because the market is now trading in line with its long term average."

When it comes to evil, evil speculators driving stocks higher on endless gobs of cheap zero-cost liquidity, one will hear nary a peep out of the administration: after all: wealth effect or bust. However, when someone hears oil speculators, run and hife. Indeed, now that Obama's uber-central planning mandate has proven completely powerless to redirect the flow of zero-cost money from acquiring real, as opposed to paper-based, assets (read crude), the Teleprompter in Chief will have a sit down with the nation at 11:10 am and in the latest sermon from the White House mound, will "confront" oil speculators once and for all. His plan: why encourage margin hikes of course - the same principle that crushed the spine of the gold and silver spike in 2011. Unfortunately, unlike gold and silver, whose trading is still dominated by the Comex, energy has numerous alternative venues, such as the ICE, and increasing exchanges in China, which also happens to be the marginal demand setter with 3 consecutive months of near record imports. Which is why we are 100% confident that just like every failed attempt at central planning, all Obama will achieve is another spike in crude prices, just in time for the next global reliquification cycle, just in time for 2012's debt ceiling scandal, and just in time for the reelection.

The "value" of insurance is not always apparent until after the house burns down.

From Morgan Stanley: "In our mind, many of the approaches to algorithmic execution were developed in an environment that is substantially, structurally different from today’s environment. In particular, the early part of the last decade saw households as significant natural liquidity providers as they sold their single stock positions over time to exchange them for institutionally managed products... While the time horizon over which liquidity is provided can range from microseconds to months, it is particularly shorter-term liquidity provisioning that has become more common." Translation: as retail investors retrench more and more, which they will due to previously discussed secular themes as well as demographics, and HFT becomes and ever more dominant force, which it has no choice but to, liquidity and investment horizons will get ever shorter and shorter and shorter, until eventually by simple limit expansion, they hit zero, or some investing singularity, for those who are thought experiment inclined. That is when the currently unsustainable course of market de-evolution will, to use a symbolic 100 year anniversary allegory, finally hit the iceberg head one one final time.

Volatility is back. The S&P moved more than 1% on 4 of the 5 days, had the biggest down day of the year, and even the least volatile day was a 0.7% move.

Unlike under a gold standard, in paper money the rate of interest is subject to massive volatility. Sometimes, the government has its way, fueling rising prices and interest rates. Other times bond speculators front-run the central bank’s unlimited appetite for purchasing government bonds and the rate of interest falls. We are now in year 31 (so far) of this latter phase. As the total accumulated debt increases (feature #450 of irredeemable money is that total debt cannot go down), the effect of a change in the rate of interest becomes larger and larger. Today, even very small fluctuations have a disproportionate impact on the burden of debt incurred at every level, from consumer to business to corporate to government at every level. To say that this is destructive is a great understatement. This, rather than the quantity of money, is what people and especially economists should be focused on.

Addressing his perception of lessons learned from the financial crisis, Ben Bernanke is speaking this afternoon on poor risk management and shadow banking vulnerabilities - all of which remain obviously as we continue to draw attention to. However, more worrisome for the junkies is the total lack of QE3 chatter in his speech. While he does note the words 'collateral' and 'repo' the proximity of the words 'Shadow, Institutions, & Vulnerabilities' are awkwardly close.

It appears the chaotic volatility of last Summer is rearing its ugly head once again as credit and equity markets in Europe flip-flop from best performance in months to worst performance day after day. With Spain front-and-center as pivot security (as we have been aggressively noting for weeks), sovereigns and financials are lagging dreadfully once again. The Bloomberg 500 (Europe's S&P 500 equivalent) back near mid January lows, having swung from unchanged to pre-NFP levels back to worst of the week at today's close, European banks are leading the charge lower as the simple fact that liquidity can't fix insolvency is rwit large in bank spreads and stocks. Treasuries have benefited, even as Bunds saw huge flows, outperforming Bunds by 18bps since pre-NFP but it is Portugal +33bps, Spain +22bps, and Italy +9bps from then that is most worrisome. LTRO Stigma remains at its 4 month wides but financials broadly are under pressure as many head back towards pre-LTRO record wides. Europe's VIX is back up near recent highs around 30%. With too-big-to-save Spain seeing record wide CDS and even the manipulated bond market unable to hold up under the real-money selling pressure, the ECB's dry powder in SMP looks de minimus with only unbridled QE (since banks have no more collateral to lend) and the ECB taking the entire Spanish debt stock on its books as a solution, access to capital markets is about to case for Spain (outside of central-bank-inspired reacharounds) and as we noted earlier - every time the ECB executes its SMP it increases the credit risk for existing sovereign bondholders (and implicitly all the Spanish banks). Spain's equity market is a mere 5% above its March 2009 lows (55% off its highs).