Fail

When yesterday we presented the view from CLSA's Chris Wood that the February 29 LTRO could be €1 Trillion (compared to under €500 billion for the December 21 iteration), we snickered, although we knew quite well that the market response, in stocks and gold, today would be precisely as has transpired. However, after reading the report by Credit Suisse's William Porter, we no longer assign a trivial probability to some ridiculous amount hitting the headlines early in the morning on February 29. Why? Because from this moment on, the market will no longer be preoccupied with a €1 trillion LTRO number as the potential headline, one which in itself would be sufficient to send the Euro tumbling, the USD surging, and provoking an immediate in kind response from the Fed. Instead, the new 'possible' number is just a "little" higher, which intuitively would make sense. After all both S&P and now Fitch expect Greece to default on March 20 (just to have the event somewhat "priced in"). Which means that in an attempt to front-run the unprecedented liquidity scramble that will certainly result as nobody has any idea what would happen should Greece default in an orderly fashion, let alone disorderly, the only buffer is having cash. Lots of it. A shock and awe liquidity firewall that will leave everyone stunned. How much. According to Credit Suisse the new LTRO number could be up to a gargantuan, and unprecedented, €10 TRILLION!

Corporations are not people...

It would appear that the German public (and political class to some extent) are beginning to see the European project in the same manner as we described back in July. As the increasing burden of saving the eurozone from its own excess falls on the shoulders of every Tobias, Dirk, and Heike taxpayer in Germany, even industry leaders, such as Wolfgang Rietzle, the CEO of Linde, this weekend according to Reuters, are suggesting a line in the sand has to be drawn and that "if we do not succeed in disciplining countries then Germany needs to exit." This has been very much a view we have held for months, that instead of the periphery limping away one-by-one, the very core of the foundation will simply decide enough is enough or as Reitzle notes (among many other critically insightful comments) "the willingness of countries to reform themselves is abating if, in the end, the European Central Bank steps in." This morning Germany's FinMin Schaeuble added to the potential separation rhetoric with his comments, via Bloomberg:

• *SCHAUEBLE SAYS ECB AS LENDER OF LAST RESORT WOULDN'T CALM MKTS
• *SCHAEUBLE SAYS JOINT EURO REGION BOND SALES NOT A SOLUTION

Hardly reassuring given the dreams of every GGB owner and BTP-exposed insurance company are banking on the ECB cranking the presses to 'secure' nominal returns in the real world. Friday's mass downgrade (and S&P's more interesting Q&A) have perhaps left Germany on the hook for up to 56% of its GDP via the EFSF support mechanisms and as we noted six months ago, the moment for Atlas to shrug draws closer with every downgrade and SMP action.

It has been a busy weekend for Wall Street, which has been doing all it can to spin the S&P downgrade in the best favorable light, although judging by the initial EURUSD and EURJPY reaction, so far not succeeding. Below we present a quick report written by Goldman's Lasse Nielsen on why in Goldman's view the downgrade's "impact is likely to be limited" and also the quick notes from an impromptu call MS organized for institutional clients (which had just two questions in the Q&A section, of which only one was answered - it appears virtually noboby believes that global moral hazard will allow anyone to fail at this point, so why bother even going out of bed).

In an interview with Italian newspaper Milan Finanza on Saturday, JP Morgan CEO Jamie Dimon said that he could lose up to $5 billion from the firm's exposure to the PIIGS countries. As Reuters reports, "Dimon said the bank was exposed to the five countries (PIIGS) to the tune of around $15 billion. "We fear we could lose up to $5 billion ... We hope the worst won't happen, but even if it did happen, I wouldn't be pulling my hair out," he said. Dimon said Europe was the worst problem for the banking sector. "But the EU and euro are solid even if the states will have to be financially responsible and do all they can to develop common social policies," he said." While it is admirable of JPMorgan to disclose some of its dirty laundry, as this was a topic that received hardly any mention in the firm's prepared quarterly release, and is predicated surely by the fact that its Basel III Tier 1 Common of $122 billion dwarfs this possible impairment, there are some questions left open. Such as what happens if and when Greek CDS, now most likely before March 20, were triggered? And the logical follow up - what happens when Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy, and who knows who else (Hungary?) follow suit and decide that a coercive restructuring is actually not suicidal, even though it most certainly is once a given threshold is reached. In other words, how long can Europe tolerate the same two-tiered sovereign debt market that S&P warned about so explicitly yesterday? Finally what happens to JPM's Tier 1 Common when the European dominos impact not only the directly exposed PIIGS nations, and specifically their bonds, but all those other banks, insurance and reinsurance companies, whose current viability makes up the balance of JPM's remaining $117 billion in Tier 1? Because in its essence, stating that JPM is "fine" even if Europe were to collapse is analogous to Goldman telling Congress it would collect on its AIG CDS if and when the CDS market were to implode absent the government bailout of AIG, which itself was accountable for over $2 trillion of the entire CDS market itself.

And here we are thinking we were bearish. As it turns out, compared to London hedge fund Toscafund we are rank amateurs. Reuters reports: "A Greek exit from the euro zone would be worse than catastrophic and could provoke greater social unrest, Zimbabwe-style inflation and a military coup, said London-based hedge fund firm Toscafund. In a stark note to clients, chief economist Savvas Savouri said introducing a new currency instantaneously in the wake of a euro exit would be impossible and the delay would lead to "a run on banks and evacuation of capital that would make what has already been seen as nothing by comparison". "The word catastrophic would not do it justice enough," said Savouri, who comes from a Greek Cypriot background. "Those who imagine some post-euro-exit stability would be restored ... quite simply fail to understand the magnitude -- social, economic and political -- of such an eventuality."" Well, at least he is objective... and tells us how he really feels.

Imagine pensions not paying retiree funds, insurers not paying claims, and banks collapsing everywhere. Sounds like fun? I will be discussing this live on RT's Capital Account with the lusciously locquacious Lauryn Lyster at 4:30pm.

Chris Hedges, a Pulitzer Prize winning American journalist, author, and war correspondent, nails the reason that explains why it is so difficult to change a person’s mind when they are committed to believing something even when they are confronted with a mountain of evidence that points to the contrary. Chris states that universities have stripped away humanities and other courses that develop critical thinking skills and instead, due to the historical influences of men like Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller, focus on teaching young men and women “what to think” instead of “how to think.”

Because the latest fad amongst the voodoo shamanry known as econ Ph.Ds, especially those who have a blog in uber-liberal daily publications courtesy of a nominal gift from the status quo for valiant efforts in preserving the status quo, is to always and without fail assume that correlation is and always implies causation, we make, with the help of John Lohman, the following argument: since global leverage (via Debt-to-GDP) has a greater correlation to the "Temperature Anomaly" aka Global Warming, at 0.79, than CO₂ concentration, at 0.69, it is obvious that global warming is purely a function of ever increasing leverage, and not, as is widely accepted by various ecological consultancies, carbon dioxide concentration. And now you see how easy it is to make idiotic, and totally spurious statements (which however serve as fodder for even more idiotic peer-reviewed white papers and journal submissions this keeping lots of people employed while contributing absolutely nothing to society), which given enough time, will become religion to a new breed of shamans once the old ones are forcibly kicked out of their comfortable corner offices.

Those who depend on a strategy of pleading with central authorities to continue funding at old levels are doomed to disappointment--all systems follow an S-Curve of rapid expansion, stasis and decline. The Central State is no different. The solution is localism. By creating cheap housing with its own modest tax resources, then the village attracts young families, whose children will keep the village school from closing, and the commerce brought to the village and its post office will keep it above the "closure" threshold. Passively hoping that centralized concentrations of wealth and power will return to pre-eminence is a losing strategy, the equivalent of a cargo cult ritualistically hoping for a return to World War II-era bounty. Focusing local resources on obvious bootstrap solutions is the winning strategy, not just in the U.S. but globally.

Bob Janjuah, despite never leaving, is once again back, even if he really has nothing new to say: "Western policy makers, at the national and G20/IMF level, still seem to have no response to solvency problems other than printing more money, loading on more debt, and hoping that "time" sorts it all out. In other words, the extension of ponzi schemes which are being used to cover up our lack of competitiveness and real productivity growth through the use of money debasement and leverage....Apologies to all for not telling you anything new or very different. One day, when we collectively abandon the neo-communist experiment in the West that relies on more debt and printing money in order to maintain the status quo, then I will hopefully have a different and far more positive view of the years ahead. I look forward to this time. But for now, expect more of the same as in 2011. And I know it's a few weeks early, but as I am unlikely to write anything for at least a month, Kung Hei Fat Choi. The year of the dragon will soon be upon us."

There was not much to note in the overnight session, where aside from artificial market-boosting developments out of China (noted here) which have carried over into a risk-on mood for the US market, however briefly, Europe has been virtually unchanged following two quiet auctions by Austria and the Netherlands. Austria sold a total of €660m of 4% 2016 bonds, and €600m of 3.65% 2022 bond. Avg. yield 2016 bond 2.213% vs 1.96% in the previous auction, in other words the shorter borrowing costs roses, and the longer ones fell. Holland sold a total of €3.105b of 0.75% 2015 bonds; the target was up to €3.5b. with an average yield 0.853%. End result EURUSD is virtually unchanged for the day at 1.2770 as of this writing despite some serious short covering earlier (as expected), while the Italian BTPs remain unch at 7.15%. What is probably more disturbing and is to be expected, is that now virtually all the free cash from the December 21 LTRO (all €210 billion of it) and then some has been allocated to the ECB, where the Deposit Facility usage rose by nearly €20 billion overnight to a new record of €482 billion, €217 billion more than the December 21 notional. The question that should be asked is just what do banks know that lemming long-only investors don't. Hint - ask UniCredit.

We did a double take when we read the following lead sentence from a just released Bloomberg report on what is about to take place in China: "China’s stocks regulator will “actively” push pension and housing funds to begin investing in capital markets, and encourage long-term investors such as insurers and corporate pension plans to buy more shares." To paraphrase Lewis Black - we will repeat this, because it bears repeating - "China’s stocks regulator will “actively” push pension and housing funds to begin investing in capital markets, and encourage long-term investors such as insurers and corporate pension plans to buy more shares." And that is the last ditch effort one does when one has no choice but to push "long-term investors" into the last giant ponzi. Of course, this being China, "long-term investors" means anyone at all, and "pushing" ultimately involves either 9MM or a 0.44 caliber. And what was said earlier about mocking mainstream media spin - well, the first opportunity presents itself a few short hours later - when Bloomberg, the same agency that wrote the above report, tells us that "Asian Shares Rise Amid Global Economic Optimism." Odd - no mention of the fact that China is now pushing habitual gamblers, which over there is another name for "investors" into what is openly an invitation (at gunpoint nonetheless) into the latest and greatest bubble. That said, we give this latest artificial attempt to boost stocks a half life of several days max before the SHCOMP plunges to new lows for the year.

Why Do We Write Again and Again About SOPA?  Because It Would Kill the Internet and Free Speech ...

Ben Bernanke's zero-interest rate policy (ZIRP) and command-economy efforts to maintain mispricing of risk, debt and assets are destroying capital and capitalism. No wonder his policies have failed so miserably. Bernanke's policy is to punish capital accumulation and reward leveraged debt expansion. Rather than enforce the market's discipline and transparent pricing of risk, debt and assets, Bernanke has explicitly set out to re-inflate a destructive, massively unproductive credit bubble. This is why Bernanke has failed so completely, and why he will continue to fail. He is not engaged in capitalism, he is engaged in the destruction of capital, investment discipline and the open pricing of risk, debt and assets.