It is now common knowledge that the U.S. and Israel developed the
Stuxnet computer virus in order to slow down Iran's nuclear program.
As the New York Times noted in January:
Over the past two years, according to intelligence and military experts
familiar with its operations, Dimona has taken on a new, equally
secret role — as a critical testing ground in a joint American and
Israeli effort to undermine Iran’s efforts to make a bomb of its own.
Behind Dimona’s barbed wire, the experts say, Israel has
spun nuclear centrifuges virtually identical to Iran’s at Natanz, where
Iranian scientists are struggling to enrich uranium. They say Dimona
tested the effectiveness of the Stuxnet computer worm, a destructive
program that appears to have wiped out roughly a fifth of Iran’s
nuclear centrifuges and helped delay, though not destroy, Tehran’s
ability to make its first nuclear arms.
“To check out the
worm, you have to know the machines,” said an American expert on
nuclear intelligence. “The reason the worm has been effective is that
the Israelis tried it out.”
Though American and Israeli
officials refuse to talk publicly about what goes on at Dimona, the
operations there, as well as related efforts in the United States, are
among the newest and strongest clues suggesting that the virus was
designed as an American-Israeli project to sabotage the Iranian
Officially, neither American nor Israeli
officials will even utter the name of the malicious computer program,
much less describe any role in designing it.
officials grin widely when asked about its effects. Mr. Obama’s chief
strategist for combating weapons of mass destruction, Gary Samore,
sidestepped a Stuxnet question at a recent conference about Iran, but
added with a smile: “I’m glad to hear they are having troubles with
their centrifuge machines, and the U.S. and its allies are doing
everything we can to make it more complicated.”
the accounts of a number of computer scientists, nuclear enrichment
experts and former officials, the covert race to create Stuxnet was a
joint project between the Americans and the Israelis, with some help,
knowing or unknowing, from the Germans and the British.
And the Telegraph noted last month:
A showreel played at a retirement party for the head of the Israeli
Defence Forces has strengthened claims the country's security forces
were responsible for a cyber attack on the Iranian nuclear programme.
video of Lieutenant General Gabi Ashkenazi's operational successes
included references to Stuxnet, a computer virus that disrupted the
Natanz nuclear enrichment site last year, Ha'aretz reported.
Although Israel has not officially accepted responsibility for the
Stuxnet attack, evidence of its role has been mounting since it was
first discovered last July.
Attributing the source
of cyber attacks in notoriously difficult, but security researchers
say factors including complexity of the operation, which would have
required human sources inside the Iranian nuclear programme, point strongly to the Israeli security forces.
As PC World pointed out last November,
sophisticated Stuxnet is a "game changer" for companies and
governments looking to protect their networks, said Sean McGurk, acting
director of the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration
Center in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
of last week, there were still about 44,000 computers infected with
Stuxnet worldwide, with about 60 percent of them in Iran, said Dean
Turner, director of Symantec's Global Intelligence Network. About 1,600
of the current infections are in the U.S., he said.
demonstrates that industrial control systems are more vulnerable to
cyberattacks than in the past for several reasons, including their
increased connectivity to other systems and the Internet," he said.
"Further, as demonstrated by past attacks and incidents involving
industrial control systems, the impact on a critical infrastructure
could be substantial."
Indeed, one of the
computer experts quoted by the New York Times, German cyber-security expert
Ralph Langner, noted in a Ted talk last month that Stuxnet could
be used to attack Western nuclear power plants and other types of
As Israel National News writes today:
[Langner] went on to describe the risk that Stuxnet could be used to blow up power plants:"The idea here is not only to fool the operators in the control
room. It actually is much more dangerous and aggressive. The idea here
is to circumvent a digital safety system.... when they are
compromised, then real bad things can happen. Your plant can blow up
and and neither your operators nor your safety system will notice it.
That's scary. But it gets worse - and this is very important, what I
am going to say. Think about this: this attack is generic. It doesn't
have anything to do with specifics with centrifuges, with uranium
enrichment. So it would work as well, for example in a power plant or
in an automobile factory. It is generic. And as an attacker you don't
have to deliver this payload by a USB stick, as we saw it in the case
of Stuxnet. You could also use conventional worm technology for
spreading. Just spread it as wide as possible. And if you do that,
what you end up with is a cyberweapon of mass destruction.""That's the consequence that we have to face," he said, deliberately,
while showing a map that marked Western countries (Israel not
included) in green. "So unfortunately, the biggest number of targets
for such attacks are not in the Middle East. They are in the United
States, in Europe and in Japan. So all the green areas, these are your
target-rich environments. We have to face the consquences and we
better start to prepare right now."***It
seems possible that he thinks Israel could use the worm against
Western targets. Why the German consultant thinks Israel would want to
do this, one can only speculate.
In a correspondence with cyber-security firm Symantec some six months ago, Langner named a "hacker underground" as the possible threat:
"You fail to understand that the hacker underground has been
studying control systems for years without any success. You fail to
understand that this community will eagerly dismantle Stuxnet as a
blueprint for how to cyber-attack installations from the cookie plant
next door to power plants."
The New York Times
recently reported that the Stuxnet virus could possibly still be
infecting Iranian systems and that it may unleash additional havoc on
Has Stuxnet Already Caused Damage Outside of Iran?
Since the Japanese earthquake, Michael Rivero has posted hundreds of articles arguing that the Stuxnet virus has "gotten loose" and attacked other nuclear power plants outside of Iran.
The former editor of the Japan Times - Yoichi Shimatsu - writes:
engineers suggested that the electric power inside the plant was
knocked out by something other than the tsunami. I have pointed to this
possibility early on, that the quake and control disruptions could have
made the control computers vulnerable to the Stuxnet virus.
According to Yomiuri, Stuxnet was in Japan as of October of 2010. However, I find it hard to believe that it was not the massive earthquake and the enormous tsunami which knocked out the power (although I suppose a virus could have exacerbated the damage).
There have been a lot of strange stories about unexplained nuclear power plant shutdowns. For example, as Fox News reported last week:
nuclear reactor at Plant Vogtle in eastern Georgia has been taken out
of service until authorities determine why it unexpectedly shut down.
have no idea whether or not the shutdowns were caused by Stuxnet
accidentally spreading to other reactors, instead of just hitting its
intended target: Iran.
But at the very least, the virus
created by the U.S. and Israel to slow down Iran's nuclear program has
opened a "Pandora's box" which leaves our nuclear plants and other
sensitive facilities open to attacks by hostile governments or rogue