Bosnienkrieg: Letter on the Mladic trial from the man who helped save Bihac the fate of Srebrenica

Below is a translation of a letter from Professor Schwarz-Schilling to Richard Herzinger of Die Welt c/o Achim Duebel in Berlin.  Duebel writes: "Mr. Mladic perhaps is right to be angry, sitting so lonely in the dock in The Hague. A Europe unable to learn from its past sits in the shadow behind him."  -- Chris

Dear Mr Herzinger,

The arrest of Ratko Mladic, 16 years after the monstrous genocide in Srebrenica, triggered an outstanding and deeply touching editorial in your newspaper (cit. “Our common disgrace”, 28.05.2011). I thank you for this. Your remarks remind me of my conflict at that time in Helmut Kohl’s cabinet and of what I said in December 1992: “I am ashamed to be a member of this federal government if it sticks to this course of inaction”. Some days later, with the government having continued with this shameful inaction, I submitted my resignation as federal minister. After that, my long political fight to try to prevent tragedy in the Balkans began. There were at least two and a half years between the siege of the Bosnian towns and the genocide in Srebrenica – heaven knows long enough to prevent this disaster befalling the civilian population of the Balkans.

Thank God I was not alone. My parliamentary colleagues Stephan Schwarz (CDU), Marieluise Beck (Alliance ‘90/The Greens), Freimut Duve (SPD) and many human rights-related activists, such as Tilman Zülch of the “Society for Threatened Peoples”, were fighting the same battle. Nevertheless we were a small group – to which the political class maintained a careful distance in order to avoid being drawn into the maelstrom in the Balkans and being left on the political sidelines. At that time we called upon the wider world with all the forces at our disposal, warning of the looming drama – but it was like a tsunami, which approached relentlessly. Not one European government listened or took a closer look. It was dreadful, brutal, for us all: one sees the approaching doom, yet all appeals prove to be in vain. A few hours before the capture of Srebrenica, we wrote a resolution to the Security Council to stop the predictable at the last minute! Where were the German media, where was “Die Welt”, in helping us to fire the guileless federal government into action at that time!  Yet “Die Welt”, thanks to an article by the American journalist Roy Gutman, had just brought the enormity of the Bosnian war to German public attention and brought about my direct involvement as a member of government! Just how close our small band of fighters were to despair can be gathered from our resolution of July 14th 1995, one week after Srebrenica, in the book “Srebrenica – Remembrance for the Future” on page 95 et seq. Nevertheless I would like to add some important facts and put history straight.

Coming to terms with the past has not yet begun

You write: “Today, as scepticism over humanitarian intervention grows, it is expedient to recall the moral and political price that a too lengthy hesitancy on the part of the West can cost.” I wholeheartedly concur with this assessment; the political debates in Germany today unequivocally show that the lessons of the Balkan war have still not been properly learned.

Is it common knowledge that the number of murdered civilians in Srebrenica was around three times as high as those killed in the terror attack on the World Trade Center? The deaths resulting from the World Trade Center were not practical to prevent since they amounted to a new dimension of horrific murder. The deaths at Srebrenica would indeed have been avoided if one had demonstrated clear vision and political courage. Just how much our foreign policy coordinates have faltered is shown in the vote concerning intervention in Libya in the Security Council, which seriously damaged our own interest and our political reputation. In years to come, we will still reap the effects of what Germany’s foreign policy has sown.

Further you write: “only massive armed NATO intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo could have durably halted the massacre.” Unfortunately this account is very brief and, in relation to the military intervention against Serbia, which concerns the Bosnian war, it is wrong. Hence the following historical correction.

Following the catastrophe of Srebrenica , beginning July 8th, and the capture of the UN’s “safe area”, the low point of UN and NATO policy was apparent to all. All the warnings put forward by individuals in the West – predominantly from human rights activists and a small number of politicians and some journalists – were in vain. The military leaders of Serbia and Republika Srpska were on the road to total victory and began directly after the killing orgy in Srebrenica to concentrate further military units against the remaining so-called UN safe havens. Thus, some days after Srebrenica, Zepce was taken with terrible bloodshed and then a far greater threat occurred, in which military units from Serbia were already deployed into Croatian Krajina. There the UN (UNPROFOR) was tasked with the mandate to carry out disarmament in this region. In reality the opposite occurred.  The Serbs now engaged also from the North through Croatia into Krajina, and henceforth from Croatia after several air attacks from an airport in Croatia had already been flown against Bihac using artillery and fresh troops to hit against Bihac. That is where around 130,000 people had already been in a state of siege for more than two and half years; the outcome was catastrophic.

The Croatian-Bosnian alliance forced the turning point in the war

At that point, from Zagreb, I repeatedly campaigned for humanitarian aid for the desperate people there and was able, in part, to accomplish this with the help of Ukrainian helicopters. The defence troops of Bosnian army general Atis Dudakovic were at an end and Dudakovic had made it clear to the Government of Federation in Sarajevo that he could only hold the sieged “safe area” of Bihac for a short time. There was no apparent way out other than to ask the Croats, with whom one had been in combat only a short time before (Mostar), for their help in defending against the Serb attacks. This request for help was the reason to convene the Split conference, which took place at the end of July and at which the two presidents Izetbegovic and Tudjman, the two defence ministers, as well as their generals and several Bosnian and Croatian politicians took part, to discuss the situation that had arisen. The only international figures taking part in this conference were the American ambassador in Zagreb, Mr. Galbraith, and I – who had already taken over dispute resolution in Bosnia. In view of the situation I travelled immediately from my holiday location in the South of France to Split. The American ambassador and I were the only two foreigners present at and authorized for this conference.

Tudjman was still very reluctant to embrace the call for assistance from Izetbegovic since his proposal in the previous autumn to use the Croatian army to allow a corridor from Croatia to Bihac (c. 25km) had been brutally rejected by the international community, especially the U.S. and Germany. Through the catastrophe of Srebrenica and the hastily convened conference of European foreign ministers in London a new situation arose: the foreign ministers’ conference, as usual, composed a protest resolution but did not once mention Bihac as a UN safe area (even though I had specifically mentioned the importance of an appropriate formulation to the German foreign minister at the time!). That was on July 18th in London. This futile conference did bring about a change of course on the part of the U.S. First though we had to convince Mr. Tudjman that he would not experience a further rebuff to a renewed request by the Croats, as had been the case in the previous autumn. Through his conversation with Tudjman, Galbraith increasingly convinced him of the United States’ changing attitude. At the same time, I tried during lunch to convince President Izetbegovic that he, with wholehearted seriousness, had to direct a formal request to Tudjman, to overcome Tudjman’s resistance. I used the occasion to tell him of the affront that Tudjman had received concerning his proposal at the time of his visit to Bonn, and that the corridor that he and his defence minister had planned was not allowed to be established

Thus the two of us managed to move the two presidents towards one another and, albeit somewhat hesitantly, to bring about the most important decision in the entire Bosnian war: that is that the Croatian army, supported illegally with training and weapon supplies by the Americans, was free to launch an offensive against the Serbs to prevent another Srebrenica! While the change of course in the Department of State occurred smoothly, the Federal Republic apparently did not notice this change of policy even though I reported it immediately to the Foreign Office. While I was in the South of France I was informed by telephone by the Croatian Foreign Minister that one had nothing better to do from the German side than to summon the Croatian ambassador in Bonn and to reproach him over how the Croatian government could come to launch such an offensive. It was only when I informed Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who was staying in St. Gilgen at Wolfgangsee at this time, and asked him to intervene, that a change of course also on the part of Germany with respect to Croatia become apparent. Germany then made submissions similar to the Americans with their demarche to President Tudjman, whose text I had sent by fax to Helmut Kohl at Wolfgangsee.
 
NATO wanted to protect Serbia

The Croatian army’s offensive, later joined by Bosnian troops, was surprisingly successful. It was certainly the first time that the Serbian troops were not shooting the civilian population in the besieged towns without fear; now they had genuinely to fight with Croatian and Bosnian ground forces. The Serbs took flight and Croat and Bosnian troops penetrated very quickly across the border into Republika Srpska and were only about 50 km from Banja Luka.

As this sudden military situation became apparent, the alarm bells began to ring in Western capitals! A coalition of those who had long demanded NATO intervention, as well as those friendly to the Serbs who absolutely did not want NATO intervention, now formed. The latter were now ready for rapid intervention since there was the risk that the whole of Republika Srpska would be overrun by Croatian and Bosnian troops. In reality that was the motive and the cause for NATO intervention. NATO actions dealt with the destruction of Serb communication centers and infrastructure. In the same way, the intervention aimed to stop the Croatian offensive and to force the withdrawal of Bosnian-Croat troops to beyond the Federation borders.  Today ironically, Republika Srpska, which was thus saved by NATO and received its legitimacy in Dayton, is now the thorn in the side of Bosnia-Herzegovina: at every opportunity Republika Srpska boycotts the institutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina and endangers its existence.

I have to thank you once again for your article in die Welt, which for me – not for “16 years” but for “19 years” – described powerfully what really happened. You can perhaps imagine how painful it has been for me to bear this burden of German policy for the past 19 years. I thank you that you have spoken the truth in an open, honest and straightforward manner.

Yours sincerely,

Prof. Dr. Christian Schwarz-Schilling

Comments

[malek]

Thanks for posting that article.

To all the "NATO aggression" posters: nobody here stated NATO led a perfect intervention without civilian casualties, but what exactly should have been done after Sarajevo and Srebrenica?

[psychobilly]

Atrocities were carried out on all sides, but the worst crimes in the Balkans were committed by U.S./NATO military forces and their proxies (e.g., KLA, fascist Tudjman regime in Croatia, Islamic fundamentalist Izetbegovic regime in Bosnia). NATO targets in Yugoslavia for example were 60% civilian, including hospitals (33), schools (344), apartment complexes, power plants, water plants, and factories. This is hardly surprising given that the aim of the 79 days of aerial bombardment, according to NATO Commander General Wesley Clark, was to "demolish, destroy, devastate, degrade, and ultimately eliminate the essential infrastructure of Yugoslavia." Another small, poor and relatively defenseless nation flattened by the heroic U.S. military. The intentional and wanton destruction of civilians and civilian infrastructure on this scale dwarf the crimes of Milosevic et al.; and that's not even getting into the whole sordid history of U.S./NATO meddling in the region. 

[prole]

I doubt Herr "Dr. Professor" said one truthful thing in the whole letter, though I admit I could only stomach the first four lines and a glance at the conclusion.

[krypplephite]

That there is some serious bullshit built on a foundation of bullshit and compounded with 16 years of additional bullshit - Plus the vig.

I haven't got it in me to refute this point by point, but suffice it to say that you would need a total ignorance of mathematics, suspension of disbelief,  as well as a time machine in order to believe what has come to be the historical record regarding the NATO intervention in the Balkans.

[thetrader]

NATO wanted to protect Serbia

What planet are you from?

[Undecided]

+1000

[mack the knife]

My advice to readers of zerohedge: ignore the drivel above and check out www.antiwar.com for a real take on the Bosnia conflict. Justin Raimundo and N. Malic have both written extensively on this.

[malek]

My advice to readers of zerohedge: ignore the drivel above and check out www.antiwar.com for a real take on the Bosnia conflict. Justin Raimundo and N. Malic have both written extensively on this.

Looks like much bigger drivel there.
Using the search function on the antiwar website, I find close to nothing from Justin Raimundo on Srebrenica: http://www.antiwar.com/srebrenica.html

N. Malic asks a lot of questions but gives no answers how a different, but still reasonable explanation might look like:
 Who are the 4,000 people whose bodies have been exhumed from grave pits between Srebrenica and Tuzla?
Are we to assume they all died a peaceful death, but preferred to be buried in grave pits?

[Undecided]

+1

[mack the knife]

thanks for posting this propaganda piece whitewashing NATO aggression in the Balkans!

No doubt Mladic is lonely in the dock, when are Clinton, Blair and the rest lynch mob going to join him? 

[astrofibo]

SP500 Buy any pullback until august 17 2011!

http://astrofibo.blogspot.com/2011/06/sp500-60min-buy-any-pullback-until.html