This page has been archived and commenting is disabled.
Morgan Stanley, Real Estate, Bad Deals, and Blogs
At least a few MDs at Morgan Stanley DO read my blog, but it is obvious
that the guys in the real estate division don't. Early in 2008 I named
Morgan Stanley the "The Riskiest Bank on the Street". The following is one of the reasons why. From Bloomberg: Morgan Stanley Surrenders Five San Francisco Office Towers Bought at Peak
[In reading this, notice the extreme irony in one of the country's
largest investment banks walking away from a property deal, and
contrast it to a homeowner in the same position. Hey, if MS can do it,
why can't I?]
Morgan Stanley,
the securities firm that spent more than $8 billion on commercial
property in 2007, plans to relinquish five San Francisco office
buildings to its lender two years after purchasing them from Blackstone
Group LP near the top of the market.The bank has been negotiating an “orderly transfer” of the towers since earlier this year, Alyson Barnes,
a Morgan Stanley spokeswoman, said yesterday in a telephone interview.
AREA Property Partners will take over the buildings, which have been
held by the bank’s MSREF V fund. Barnes declined to say when the
transfer will occur.“It’s not surprising this deal ran into trouble,” Michael Knott,
senior analyst at Green Street Advisors in Newport Beach, California,
said in an interview. “It was eye-opening among a group of eye-opening
deals. There was almost no price too high in 2007 for office space in
top gateway markets.”The San Francisco transfer would mark the second real estate deal to unravel this year for Morgan Stanley,
which bet on the property markets as prices were rising. The firm last
month agreed to surrender 17 million square feet of office buildings to
Barclays Capital after acquiring them for $6.5 billion in 2007 from
Crescent Real Estate Equities. U.S. commercial real estate prices have
dropped 43 percent from October 2007’s peak, Moody’s Investors Service
said last month.Lost Value
The Morgan Stanley buildings may have lost as much as 50
percent of their value since the purchase, Knott estimated.“This isn’t a default or foreclosure situation,” Barnes
said. “It is a negotiated transfer to our lenders.”
Morgan Stanley bought 10 San Francisco buildings in the
city’s financial district as part of a $2.5 billion purchase
from Blackstone Group in May 2007. The buildings were formerly
owned by billionaire investor Sam Zell’s Equity Office
Properties and acquired by Blackstone in its $39 billion buyout
of the real estate firm earlier that year.The buildings Morgan Stanley is giving up are One Post, 201
California St., Foundry Square I, 60 Spear St. and 188
Embarcadero. The towers have a combined 1.3 million square feet,
according to Colliers International.The bank will continue to own the other office buildings it
acquired in the Blackstone deal, Barnes said.Morgan Stanley, based in New York, was the biggest property
investor among Wall Street firms at the time of the purchase.
The transaction made the company one of the largest office
landlords in San Francisco, adding 3.9 million square feet of
office space there.Defaults Rise
Commercial mortgage defaults more than doubled in the third
quarter from a year earlier as occupancies fell, according to
Real Estate Econometrics LLC. Office vacancies will reach a
near-record 19 percent in the first quarter of 2011, broker CB
Richard Ellis Group Inc. estimated.Property sales financed with commercial mortgage-backed
securities plunged 95 percent from a record $237 billion in
2007, according to JPMorgan Chase & Co. A lack of securitized
debt is driving down values, which may fall 55 percent from
their peak, Moody’s said.San Francisco prime office rents fell 37 percent in the
third quarter from a year earlier, the biggest decline since
2001, as companies cut jobs, Colliers said. The vacancy rate
rose to 14 percent, the highest since 2005. Almost 1.4 million
square feet of space was returned to the market in the first
nine months of the year.
In September of 2007, in the very first post on my blog, I announced
that the CRE market would crash. I made the announcement again in
December of that year and even created a schedule of who would be
crashing with their CRE sales. See "Will the commercial real estate market fall? Of course it will" 09 December 2007.
Thus far, quite a few guys on that list have gone bust. How was I able
to do that you ask? Well, they paid too much money using too much
leverage at the top of what was an obvious bubble. In addition, things
were so frenetic that they were literally (well almost) day trading
assets that took 3 month or so to transfer at a roughly 7% transaction
cost. Last time I looked (okay, maybe time before last), real estate
was an income investment, not a trading vehicle for instant capital
gains. Sure you can improve the property and extract value elsewhere,
but come on... Flipping entire mutli-billion dollar portfolios in a
matter of days or weeks??? If that wasn't a sign of the top, I wouldn't
know what was.
This is an excerpt from that post in December. Notice, half of the
companies on this list either have, or will soon cough up those
properties that they bought (read the entire article for context):
If you think these numbers might look just a little hairy, just wait
and see the numbers of the companies that I am actually shorting. The
one's above were actually cut off of the short's short list, so to say.
Once you see, you will be a believer just like me - commercial real
estate is on its way down. See comments below for more on the accuracy of the book calculations I use in my analysis vs. used in this story.Details of transactions for sale of properties by Blackstone Group
Date
Particulars of transaction
Purchaser
Amount
12th June, 2007
Sold Extended Stay Hotels
The Lightstone Group LLC
$8 billion
9th August, 2007
Sold
38 assets comprised of 106 office buildings and 5.9 million square feet
in San Diego, Orange County, San Francisco, Seattle, Portland and Salt
Lake City. The properties are from the CarrAmerica West Coast
Collection that Blackstone Group purchased last year as part of a
national portfolio.GE Real Estate-owned Arden Realty
NA
17th July, 2007
Merlin Entertainments Group, the leisure park operator owned by Blackstone, sold its property assets to
London
property firm Prestbury Group plc owned by real estate investor Nick Leslau.
Prestbury Group plc
$1.27 billion
27th August, 2007
Sold
9 suburban Chicago office complexes to GE Real Estate. Blackstone
acquired these properties when it bought Equity Office Properties Trust.GE Real Estate
$1.05 billion
27th August, 2007
Sold
a portfolio of downtown Chicago properties to Tishman Speyer.
Blackstone acquired these properties when it bought Equity Office
Properties TrustTishman Speyer
$1.72 billion
9th February, 2007
Sold
6.5 million square feet of Manhattan office space Macklowe Properties.
Blackstone acquired these properties when it bought Equity Office
Properties Trust.Macklowe Properties
$7 billion
Let's fastforward to today, where we may learn the fate of another one those
guys who bought that CRE flip from Blackrock. From Crain's Chicago
Business, "Zombie fears stalk Tishman in the Loop"
A venture led by Tishman Speyer Properties L.P. has
defaulted on part of a package of loans used to finance the
$1.72-billion purchase of six prime downtown office towers during the
frenzied real estate market of 2007, sources familiar with the deal
say.
The New York developer bought the
5.7-million-square-foot portfolio from Blackstone Group, which flipped
them as part of the New York private-equity firm's $39-billion
leveraged buyout earlier that year of Sam Zell's Equity Office
Properties Trust. [Anybody reading my blog in 2007 or even knew me in 2006 could have seen this coming a mile away!]
We can all wonder how Macklowe is doing???
BlackRock loses millions on Macklowe loans | The Real Deal | New ...
Apr 7, 2009 ... BlackRock pegged the potential loss at $53.2 million from two mezzanine loans on current and former Macklowe Properties office buildings, ...
I don't know if these loans are associated with the Zell/Blackstone
flip, but at this point, does it really matter? Practically everything
touced during that 2 to 3 year period is blowing up, particularly the
2007 vintage. Ahh, what a fine taste.
Other posts of interest from that 30 day period of two years ago...
- Do you remember when I said Commercial Real Estate was sure to fall? 20 December, 2007
- The Commercial Real Estate Crash Cometh, and I know who is leading the way! 06 January, 2008
While we are at it, let's revisit some of my observations and assumptions in the "The Riskiest Bank on the Street"
post of a year and a half ago. Some may have thought I was being a tad
bit agressive. Do you think so now? Keep in mind how much leverage is
employed when these assets are funded through VIEs (actually, who the
hell knows how much leverage is effectively employed, but you can bet
your left nipple that it is a lot).
|
Unconsolidated VIEs, Exposure to loss (in $ mn) and loss ratio (in %) |
|
|
|
Source: Company data |
|
Unconsolidated VIE's |
FY 2007 |
|
|
|
$ mn |
Unconsolidated VIE assets |
Maximum exposure to loss |
Loss ratio % |
|
MBS & ABS |
7,234 |
280 |
3.9% |
|
Credit & real estate |
20,265 |
13,255 |
65.4% |
|
Structured transactions |
10,218 |
2,441 |
23.9% |
|
Total |
37,717 |
15,976 |
42.4% |
To forecast these loss ratios, we
have used the maximum exposure to loss as the worst case scenario. For
the base case, we expect the loss ratio to be lower than the maximum
exposure to loss.
|
|
Base Case |
Optimistic Case |
Worst Case |
|
Mortgage and asset-backed securitizations |
2% |
1% |
4% |
|
Credit and real estate |
50% |
30% |
65% |
|
Structured transactions |
15% |
10% |
24% |
|
|
Base Case |
Optimistic Case |
Worst Case |
|
Mortgage and asset-backed securitizations |
109 |
54 |
217 |
|
Credit and real estate |
6,080 |
3,648 |
7,953 |
|
Structured transactions |
613 |
409 |
976 |
|
Total Losses in $ million |
6,801 |
4,111 |
9,146 |
For those of you who are interested in more of my CRE opinion, see Reggie Middleton's CRE 2010 Outlook (42 pages).
Banks and investors have been emailing me about the content of this
document. Any who are interested at having my team take a look at what
you have, download the my capabilities doc (
CRE Consulting Capabilities 2009-12-17 14:17:01 655.48 Kb) and contact me to talk. I love to talk, and I'm not nearly such a smart ass in person, really!
For subscribers, here is a refresher on the historical work on Morgan Stanley:
Morgan Stanley_final_040408 2008-08-30 06:37:54 1.38 Mb
MS Simulated Government Stress Test 2009-05-05 11:36:25 2.49 Mb
MS Stess Test Model Assumptions and Stress Test Valuation
Morgan Stanley ABS Inventory 2008-08-30 06:37:32 1.65 Mb
- advertisements -
Reggie, ignore the ricos and the Green Sharts of this world.
Your record speaks for itself.
He Reggie, whats happening?
Double expresso for sure
Thanks, and it is guys such as yourself and Chomper who actually appreciate the effort that persuade me to participate in the comments section (it actually does take time away from other activities), just as the "green sharts" and "rico"s of the community dissuade me. You definitely don't have to agree with me, but there is a point at which the unfounded negativity simply turns me off.
I really value the comments because they turn a passive posting of a story into a conversation, and when the author participates the conversation is enhanced greatly. No question you'll get more unfounded negativity as you continue participating in the comments sections. It is my hope that such douchebaggery will not dissuade you even if it is a constant and unwarranted irritant.
Thank you Reggie for your very detailed profile of the challenges facing the CRE industry. I spent 5 years in the CRE industry and granted Sam Zell was not on my list of clients however when you break it down, it truly does not matter the size of the property, it boils down to the "true" return on the investment.
You are one of the only individuals I have had the opportunity to read that actually addresses some of the core CRE specifics including DSCR, NOI (a real calculated NOI after real expenses, vacancy and reserves) and CAP Rates.
I suggest Green Sharts simply do some of his/her own research regarding CRE investment fundamentals as there is ample data on the net. No one should expect your solid research to come with a spoon.
Keep up the great work and I look forward to your future posts!!!
Grandpa, if you spent 5 years in the CRE industry, perhaps you can explain this formula of Reggie's:
Below are the loss rates by state. Be aware that these are "LOSS RATES", not delinquencies or charge offs. This is what the actual losses will end up being (sans admin and legal costs, which will driver the losses higher). These loss rates are calculated as follows: Overall default rate - Recovery rate (Case Shiller - LTV) = Loss Rate
Do you even know what a rate is?
Reggie is refering to the development in losses, hence he has defined the loss series as Losses=Defaults/recoveries or
L(t)=D(t)/R(t)
differentiate that with regard to time and you get loss rate= default rate - recovery rate.
It is a crude measurement but not in any way below the standard within the industry at average.
This is basic maths and if this is beyond your understanding Id suggest you start at yahoo pages,
Plz stop trolling as your posts are highly irritating.
I bet if they did read your blog, well, I don't know where I was going with that because no one reads your blog.
Its the good old, conflict of interest. You publish shit for ZeroHedge. ZH gets the ad revenue, you get the publicity. And the average idiot reading this site gets fucked.
So it goes until there are no more readers. Taking brand capital and turning it into cash.
Needing coffee this morning are we rico.
Reggie a big thank you.
Ah, no thank you, I'm fully aware of what the fuck is going down here.
Reggie is getting spanked!
But I have noticed as a member of the fight club he can take a punch.
Ya it's kind of a bitch when you're trying to stir up division and troll when nearly everyone in the group can solo a fucktard. That's gotta be demoralizing.
I must admit I love a good performance no matter how staged it its.
Here we have our sympathetic protagonist who offers nothing but free advice.
The villains question his work and motives. They scorn and ridicule.
The audience responds with care, lots of love, and disdain for the villains.
Soundtrack:
http://www.zerohedge.com/article/doesnt-morgan-stanley-read-my-blog#comm...
I'm off to prepare breakfast. Liver, fava beans, and a nice Chianti. Until we talk again, Clarice... Or should I say Agent Starling?
You're welcome, and thank you my friend.
You know, I am a fairly reasonable guy who tries to look at things from all angles. When I read things such as this, I try to look at it from your point of view.
Is it that you don't believe the quality of the analysis and opinion presented is up to par?
Is it that you feel the experts that create the analysis work for free?
Is it that you feel the quality sites such as ZH that feature high quality analysis (as compared to say, the Yahoo board), are able to do so with minimum or no revenue streams?
What is it about the being compensated portion of media that irks you so? It is this mentality that is driving practically all of the quality media ventures out of business. Ad revenue is sparse and volatile, and there is a slim chance that one can survive issuing analysis from highly paid, knowledgeable professionals strictly from ad revenue. I can't think of many outlets that have done so for an extended perioed of time. We can always have the CNBC model, which basically... Well, you know what they do.
This is a serious discussion that needs to be had, and it needs to be had without the asshole mentality, but a serious dialogue. All of you guys who love blogs need to realize that the economics of the media business have not disappeared with the advent of the web site. It has definitely been changed since the cost of distribution is dramatically lowered, but it is still a business nonetheless.
Why the hate? If they do, they they do. If they don't, then they don't.
Where is the conflict of interest, my friend? Morgan Stanley was one of my first institutional subscribers. Despite that, I don't cut them any slack. Reference the analysis. I don't see any conflict here. And what's up with that reader gets screwed comment? It appears as if the reader would have fared rather well had they taken my heed on the Blackstone flips. They would have fared rather well with PPD, GGP, the doo doo 32, and a whole host of other situations. Come to think of it, the reader would have fared rather well if they heeded the Morgan Stanley opinion as well. Hey, I am not always right, but I do put out independent analysis and opinion that should spur the reader to think.
If it is a matter of simply hate, then so be it. If you feel quality media should be free and never compensated simply because you consume it through the web versus holding a book or paper in your hand, you should enter the 21st century. Quality sources of knowledge and information are not free. If you feel the new media world is to be compensated solely through advertising, then I disagree. I really happen to like ZH, and it is one of the (very few) outlets that I participate in with my content. With that being said, they will probably need to do more than advertising to grow, hence the DARPA, which is an extremely intriguing idea.
I normally wouldn't put this much time into such a comment, but you did strike a chord. There are some guys who really think a team of professional MBAs, CFAs and PhDs can spend weeks and months on a project and then should simply give it away. I happen to think the ZH arrangement is ideal.
Its not a matter of simple hate Mr. Salesman.
The entire point of your post is to say "Morgan Stanley should have been reading my blog."
Thats not a post topic, quite frankly. Telling everyone here how correct you were is not analysis, thats just boasting.
Can Zero Hedge not find someone else to post something more insightful?
The conflict of interest, (figures I'd have to spell it out for you) is that ZH is looking for pageviews to get paid, so it doesn't matter the quality of the pageviews, just get them in, right? So they say ok Reggie, heres what we'll do, you can write posts hyping your blog, and we'll make money on it.
But because the aforementioned post is such garbage, we can clearly see that ZeroHedge is opting for the quantity and not quality of their posts. You see its perverse, but their are taking their reputation and selling it one page at a time.
Thats the conflict of interest Mr. Spinster. We're on to you.
In my capacity as a financial professional I don't take any analysis at face value. Many things I read are written by people with conflicts of interest or just generally poor analytical skills. If there is a piece of data or a thesis that I can incorporate into my work then the first step is to scrutinize the data and challenge the assumptions. In the event that I find the information useful, the messenger and their intent becomes almost irrelevant.
We're not stupid here you know.
Nobody is sitting here thinking that all this content and analysis costs nothing to anybody. And if anyone wants to act on Reggie's analysis they will conduct whatever secondary research on the data or on Reggie himself to ensure the ideas are sound and they are comfortable with the messenger.
This vitriol is completely unnecessary. And, stupid.
Period.
In on the racket are you?
Is it that you don't believe the quality of the analysis and opinion presented is up to par?
Yes. I don't think your analysis is up to par. I asked you a pretty simple question on two different threads, to explain a formula you cited for calculating bank losses on residential real estate that made no sense whatsoever to me. That formula generates a bunch of numbers that fill up a table that looks like analysis but if the formula is wrong the analysis is less than worthless. You claim to be too busy to explain it, or I haven't paid you to explain it, or if I have a better way please provide it to you and you'll publish it. You are inferring that you employ MBAs, CFAs and PhDs. You put out a stream of long rambling documents but you can't manage a paragraph to explain a formula? How is somebody supposed to evaluate your work if you won't answer basic questions about it?
I really happen to like ZH, and it is one of the (very few) outlets that I participate in with my content. With that being said, they will probably need to do more than advertising to grow
Is that an admission that you're paying ZH to advertise your services on their site?
The way the blogging world works, that should be clearly disclosed by ZH. Readers should not have to try to figure out what is content and what is advertising. Many of the other "contributors" don't appear to be advertising because they're not using their real names and/or they're not pitching any products or services as you are.
I told you I don't troll ZH looking for unanswered questions. If you really, really need to contact me, you know where my blog is. You are also contradicting yourself. If you feel the analysis is subpar, why are you always commenting on my posts. Simply skip them on move on to someone who you feel has above par analysis. Plain and simple. You don't see me hunting you down to comment on what you have to say, do you?
You should also stop trying to create drama. I don't pay ZH, I simply contribute content and I think you know that. Do you think you are doing ZH a favor by fanning flames of controversial bullshit and gossip. I answered your question about the mortgage analysis. If you don't like the way its done, you are free to publish your own methodology. I am at a loss as to what you feel does not make sense about it, but since you are bitching more than contributing to the analysis I assume that analysis is not your goal.
The analysis that I present has a very strong track record. The Zell/Blackstone/MS post above is a perfect example. I am not always right, but I am right more often than not - at least thus far.
Having to waste my time responding to non-sense such as this is one of the reasons I don't participate more in the comment sections of venues other than my own.
Green Sharts. Cut to the chase. So, you think real estate hasn't gone bust and that CRE isn't in the process of going bust? I think everything else you say is focusing on noise.
Reg, as a former CRE/RE guy, I very much enjoy reading your posts. Keep up the solid work.
You don't "troll" ZH looking for unanswered questions? The question has been posted twice directly into a forum that you originated and in which you were participating. Here is your comment that I'm questioning, once again:
Below are the loss rates by state. Be aware that these are "LOSS RATES", not delinquencies or charge offs. This is what the actual losses will end up being (sans admin and legal costs, which will driver the losses higher). These loss rates are calculated as follows: Overall default rate - Recovery rate (Case Shiller - LTV) = Loss Rate
I'll say it again. This calculation makes no sense. You posted it at ZH yet you direct me to your blog and ask me to give you an alternative if I have a better way of doing it. You could explain it in a paragraph or two in far less time than you're taking to explain why you can't take the time to explain it. But you can't explain it because it's nonsense. You know that most people who don't do financial analysis are easily impressed by spreadsheets full of numbers and charts and graphs. People who do financial analysis know that if the data is flawed or the formula is flawed or the logic is flawed then the output is worthless. Actually it is less than worthless, it's costly because it gives false confidence.
The funny thing is that you've said you don't make stock recommendations even to your subscribers, you provide analysis and want them to use it to do their own analysis. So a natural outcome of that process would be "Hey Reggie, I've been looking at this table and could you explain why this formula makes sense? I don't understand it." If the analysis you post here can't be discussed here, why are you here?
You don't see me hunting you down to comment on what you have to say, do you?
When people question something I post and I see it, I respond.
I explained it to already, and if you have done all of this bitching yet have failed to tell me what is wrong with it.
This comes from publicly available data. Post a correction if you have an issue, or move on. I am about to continue my day, I suggest you do the same.
it doesn't make sense reggie... thats whats wrong with it.
You've never explained it or I wouldn't still be asking the question. If you knew the formula made sense and you could defend it you wouldn't be asking me to "post a correction".
But since you're bobbing and weaving I'll go ahead and point out some of the flaws in the formula:
Below are the loss rates by state. Be aware that these are "LOSS RATES", not delinquencies or charge offs. This is what the actual losses will end up being (sans admin and legal costs, which will driver the losses higher). These loss rates are calculated as follows: Overall default rate - Recovery rate (Case Shiller - LTV) = Loss Rate
Loss Rate does not equal Default Rate minus Recovery Rate. For example, if you have a pool of mortgages of which 20% default and the average recovery rate on the defaulted loans is 50%, your formula says the loss rate is 20% - 50% = -30%. -30%? What is that, a profit?
The function is multiplicative, not additive. Loss Rate on the pool equals Default Rate times (1- Recovery Rate). If defaults are 20% and the recovery rate on defaults is 50%, the loss rate is .2 X (1-.5), or 10%. So the overall value of the pool is 90%. 80% pay in full, 20% default and you lose half on those. .8 + .1 = .9.
And then you say Recovery Rate = Case Shiller - LTV. That makes no sense whatsoever. Case Shiller is indexed to a particular starting point in time, while loans are originated at various points in time. And Case Shiller varies widely by geography, as do pools of loans.
Where do I send the bill for my services? I won't charge much as this is pretty basic stuff. I would have thought your team of MBAs, CFAs and PhDs would have caught the error.
Not wanting to wave the red cape, but it was obvious without your assistance that a 50% recovery on a 20% default would equal a 10% loss. Did you really think a sentient ZH reader would come up with -30? For the would be REIT investor who was exploring options back then, my take away is this. Reggie was not only (heavily) mostly right - but he was demonstrably early and right. An important distinction.
Now, let's address your issues, which I am actually taking time away from my day to do, despite the fact you're being an asshole about it.
This is short hand to describe the logic flow in the spreadsheets linked above, the spreadsheets which you obviously didn't take the time to download, nor glance at, because if you did you would have easily understood where I was coming from. They reference 2nd lien loans with a CLTV close to or over 100% and/or non-conforming loans, many of which have negative equity when applying a collateral loss rate using Case Shiller as a proxy, segregated by default rate.
The methodolody is clearly laid out in the spreadsheet, hence I used short hand to convey with the understanding the reader either looked at the attachments or would do so if they wanted to know more. Go through the spreadsheet and see if it makes sense, BEFORE you BITCH!
Why doesn't it make sense? Case Shiller is used as a proxy for approximate home values. It is irrelevent when the loan is originated, if it is underwater and the payor defaults 120 days past due, one should expect a loss upon foreclosure. If you would have bothered to go through the model that you are complaining about, you would have found that Shiller index was applied on a state by state basis against the default rates (also on a state by state basis) segregated by FICO score, LTV, CLTV seasoning, among many other factors, then weighted by loan amounts outstanding, per georgraphic region and loan type. All in all, an awful lot of work to be giving out for free, particularly just to hear someone bitching about charging for work. Do us both a favor and just avoid my posts when you see my name on it.
Well thanks for finally responding, even if I don't find your explanation understandable. As I said earlier, the loss rate on a pool of mortgages is a multiplicative function so the formula you quote that calculates it with subtraction doesn't make sense to me.
I just started to download your spreadsheet and got a "Warning: Macros may contain viruses" message. I doubt they do but I'm not going to download it and then try to dig through it and figure out the macros and formulas and follow the train of thought of you and/or whoever else built the spreadsheet.
I will do us both the favor and avoid your posts in the future.
Many, Many, Many thanks!!! Bring Rico along with you.
Now that's what I'm talking about. Beautiful. Thanks for taking the time to put the smack down, Reggie.
You occasionally have some interesting and insightful things to say. But the quality and depth of what Reggie posts here is miles ahead of anything you (or me for that matter) have to say. Since we're all critical thinkers here I certainly appreciate you noting any issues you have with formulas and data.
Regardless, on this one, you're just being a dick.
"Since we're all critical thinkers here"
Thanks for the laugh.
Banks and investors have been emailing me about the content of this document. Any who are interested at having my team take a look at what you have, download the my capabilities doc ( CRE Consulting Capabilities 2009-12-17 14:17:01 655.48 Kb) and contact me to talk.
ABC. Always Be Closing.