Goldman's Take On Europe's "Marshall Plan" Newsflow

Tyler Durden's picture

As news comes fast and furious out of Europe, here is Goldman's take on the so far unconfirmed details of the latest Marshall Plan in Europe, which unlike last time comes before the war. Incidentally, Europe just approved debt monetization, only unlike in the US, it will do it off balance sheet, via the EFSF "CDO" SPV.

From Goldman's Franceso Garzarelli

On Greece: A 'Managed (and Generous) Deleveraging' Package

  • The second package for Greece will be funded by the EFSF. Total committed issuance by this vehicle just for the program countries could exceed EUR100bn, out of a current lending capacity of EUR440bn (of which AAA-countries support EUR255bn). AS EXPECTED, BUT THE SIZE OF THE EFSF COULD BE INCREASED FURTHER
  • EFSF loans to Greece will be modified and extended from 7.5-yrs to 15-yrs. This would represent the second extension of maturities. AS EXPECTED
  • Rate on NEW conditional loans to Greece (EUR70bn) could be as low as 3.5%. Currently swap +300bp on 15-yr loan would mean reduction from 6.5% to 3.5%. Probably similar terms also for Ireland and Portugal. BETTER THAN EXPECTED
  • ‘Marshall plan’ for Greece to spur investment; no details; but big emphasis on growth, key variable for debt sustainability, Note that co-financing on EU funds had already been lowered to 15%. BETTER THAN EXPECTED, PENDING DETAILS
  • No details on private sector PSI: debt buyback, rollover, swap; all should be voluntary; probably will trigger 'selective default', but ECB will probably compromise. STILL UNCLEAR, BUT BROADLY IN LINE

On the systemic stability: Both items on our ‘wish list’

EFSF empowered to buy in secondary markets with input from ECB; BETTER THAN EXPECTED, PENDING clarification on SIZE and ACCOUNTABILITY
EFSF able to recapitalize banks in non-program countries through loans to governments; BETTER THAN EXPECTED, ditto.

IF ALL OF THIS IS CONFIRMED, VERY positive relative to expectations. Particularly the systemic stuff is a big step forward to unconditional mutual help. If sovereign cross-correlation of default is low, ex ante risk sharing helps everyone participating