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Philly Fed's Plosser Speaks: Too Big To Fail Must End

Tyler Durden's picture




 

Charles Plosser speaks before the Global Interdependence Center. In a nutshell while the Fed member decries regulatory reform and says the Fed must not lost any powers in supervising banks, he notes that new bureaucracies are not needed (as expected) and that the Too Big To Fail concept must finally end. He says

 


Good morning and welcome to the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia. The Philadelphia Fed has had a long relationship with the
Global Interdependence Center. For more than 30 years, we have
participated in GIC meetings with policy leaders from around the globe.
We have benefited from the many good ideas that have emerged from these
discussions.

That is why the Philadelphia Fed is proud to host today's event —
part three in this timely conference series on financial
interdependence in the world's post-crisis capital markets.

As you see in the agenda, we will hear perspectives from members of
Congress, investment experts, and economists. I am particularly pleased
that the keynote speaker is my colleague Eric Rosengren, president of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.

The financial crisis of the last two years will alter the structure
and performance of global capital markets in many ways. Competition and
market forces will change many financial products and the way they are
delivered. Financial products and innovations that failed the market
test will disappear or change. And that is how it should be. We should
not underestimate the power of the market and its adaptability.

Yet global financial markets will also be shaped, for better or
worse, by the nature of financial regulatory reforms under
consideration by lawmakers in numerous countries. For example, recent
discussion in Washington has centered on which regulatory agency should
have which supervisory powers and over what types of institutions. One
proposal would eliminate the Fed's oversight of state-chartered member
banks in favor of a focus on the largest institutions. Other proposals
would transfer all bank supervision and regulation to a separate,
single bank regulator. Taking away the Fed's supervisory role on Main
Street or Wall Street would be unwise. As the central bank, the Fed has
the depth of experience and expertise to monitor banks of all sizes.
And these responsibilities support and complement the central bank's
ability to meet its Congressional mandates for financial stability and
monetary policy.

In 1997, the U.K. took bank regulation from the Bank of England and
gave it to the Financial Services Authority. Based on its experience
with a separate regulator during this crisis, the U.K. government is
considering moving regulatory activity back into the central bank —
just the opposite of some U.S. proposals.

Chairman Bernanke submitted a report to Congress that clearly
outlines the sound reasons for retaining bank supervision in the
Federal Reserve.1
The current crisis underscores the importance of having a regulatory
framework that addresses both the safety and soundness of individual
institutions and the macro-prudential risks of the financial system as
a whole. Given the Fed's traditional central banking roles, including
having lender of last resort responsibilities, overseeing the stability
of financial and payment systems, and setting monetary policy, it is
uniquely situated within the government with the necessary expertise to
deliver on both pieces of this regulatory mandate.

In my view, the proposals for regulatory reshuffling, at best, miss
the point of what is required for meaningful reform and, at worst,
weaken the current regulatory framework. The real danger is that such
proposals increase the likelihood of future crises rather than fixing
the problem. Instead of elaborate restructuring, I suggest we focus on
three key initiatives that will truly improve our regulatory system.

First, I believe Congress should amend the bankruptcy code to
include a new chapter for large nonbank financial institutions. In my
view, the most important issue any reform must address is the
too-big-to-fail problem. Without a credible resolution mechanism to
allow the orderly failure of large and interconnected financial firms,
we will be setting the stage for the next crisis.

Foremost on the agenda should be the recognition that no firm should be too big to fail.

Any resolution mechanism should address systemic risk without
requiring taxpayer support. To foster market discipline and reduce
moral hazard, the resolution mechanism must ensure that a failed firm's
shareholders are wiped out and that creditors bear losses. Most
important, the resolution mechanism must be credible. Managers, owners,
and creditors must believe that firms on the verge of failure will, in
fact, be allowed to fail. Therefore, we must limit regulatory
discretion or forbearance and the potential for political interference.
The resolution regime must not become a mechanism for more bailouts. I
am concerned that the current legislative proposals allow far too much
discretion and could lead to more bailouts, not fewer.

Given these criteria, I believe a modified bankruptcy process would
be a better mechanism than proposals to expand the bank resolution
process under FDICIA to cover nonbank financial firms and bank holding
companies. It seems far too easy in the heat of a crisis to deem that
systemic risks are too high to let an institution fail. Yet, as we have
seen, when firms expect to be protected from failure, they take greater
risks at the taxpayer's expense and, in so doing, sow the seeds of
other crises.

No doubt, lawmakers will need to work out the details of a new
bankruptcy chapter, including who would force an institution into
bankruptcy. I would favor allowing not only the regulator, but also
creditors, to place a troubled financial firm into bankruptcy when it
is unable to meet its financial obligations. This would enhance market
discipline and lower regulatory discretion.

Another issue involves how to handle qualified financial contracts,
including swaps, repos, and derivatives of those firms in bankruptcy.
Current law exempts these contracts from various provisions of the
bankruptcy code, including the automatic stay provisions. In other
words, the contracts are permitted to close out even though the firm is
in bankruptcy. Some argue that these exemptions prevent systemic risk.
Yet others argue that these exemptions actually raised the systemic
risks surrounding Bear Stearns, AIG, and Lehman.2

The international nature of these large financial firms means that
we must work to ensure international coordination of a bankruptcy
process. Yet it is not uncommon or impossible to fail international
firms. We also need to ensure a timely bankruptcy process, so the
bankruptcy proceedings do not drag out for years. I do not think that
either of these challenges is insurmountable.

I am not arguing to replace the current process of resolving small
and medium-sized bank failures outside of bankruptcy — the FDIC has
demonstrated its ability to resolve these institutions quickly (usually
over a weekend) and at relatively low cost to the taxpayer. However,
the handling of the largest financial institutions during this crisis
has persuaded me that the system cannot easily expand to encompass
large firms without biasing the outcomes toward bailouts rather than
resolution. Thus, I favor a bankruptcy mechanism as a more credible
solution to the too-big-to-fail problem.

My second recommended action is to clarify the Federal Reserve's
umbrella supervision role for financial holding companies. Under
current legislation, the Federal Reserve supervises bank holding
companies and serves as umbrella supervisor of financial holding
companies, while the appropriate functional regulators supervise the
subsidiaries. For example, the SEC supervises an investment-banking
subsidiary, while a state insurance commission supervises an insurance
subsidiary, and the designated federal or state bank supervisor watches
over the commercial banking subsidiary.

To reduce regulatory burdens, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act External Link
limits the Federal Reserve's power to examine subsidiaries that have a
functional regulator. So the Fed has relied on the functional regulator
for information about holding company subsidiaries. I believe Congress
should clarify that the Fed has umbrella supervisory powers and the
responsibility to exercise them, including collecting supervisory
information on the holding company and all of its subsidiaries on a
routine basis. These changes would not broaden the supervisory powers
of the Fed — or any other agency. Indeed, under Gramm-Leach-Bliley, the
Fed has been given authority to examine and take action against any
subsidiary that may pose a material risk to the financial safety and
soundness of an insured depository affiliate, or the domestic or
international payment systems. Clarifying the Fed's umbrella
supervisory role would encourage regulators to work together to take a
comprehensive look at the systemic risks of consolidated financial
organizations. This thorough review of each firm would help the Fed in
its macro-prudential mission to help ensure financial stability and the
integrity of the payments system.

Further, I believe Congress should also clarify the Fed's financial oversight responsibilities by requiring a semi-annual Financial Stability Report for Congress and the public, much as it requires the Fed to submit its Monetary Policy Report.
This report would also improve the transparency and accountability of
the Fed's financial oversight responsibilities, which would help ensure
public trust and credibility.

My third recommended action is to integrate market discipline into
our regulatory structure rather than relying solely on more
regulations. Consider regulations governing financial institution
capital. One of the lessons of the financial crisis is the speed with
which capital ratios can decline. A firm can move from
"well-capitalized" to "undercapitalized" almost overnight, and then
face enormous difficulties in raising capital during a crisis. This
argues in favor of raising regulatory capital ratios for financial
institutions.

Yet, rather than simply raising capital requirements, regulators
should marshal market forces by requiring financial firms to hold
contingent capital in the form of convertible debt that would convert
into equity in periods of financial stress. Contingent capital would be
less costly than simply raising capital requirements, since it is
triggered only under bad economic conditions, when capital is most
costly to obtain. Thus, it reduces the incentives for financial firms
to seek ways to evade dramatically higher capital requirements. The
ready contingent capital also avoids the need for fire sales of assets
to raise capital, which can exacerbate an economic downturn. And
perhaps most important, it can reduce the necessity of government
rescues and bailouts.

Contingent capital would enhance both regulatory supervision and
market discipline. The market price of such debt would provide
regulators with a valuable signal about the financial health of the
firm and about the market's perception of systemic risk. In addition,
the threat of the debt's conversion to equity would mobilize creditor
discipline. We should also consider requiring higher levels of capital
for banks that pose greater systemic risks. This might be done by
basing capital requirements not only on credit risk but also on
liquidity risk and asset growth. These steps would strengthen market
discipline and improve financial stability. And regulators can add
these capital requirements without additional legislation.

I believe these three actions would go a long way toward improving
financial stability. Enacting a credible bankruptcy process to solve
the too-big-to-fail problem, clarifying the Fed's umbrella supervision
and financial stability roles, and enhancing market discipline are
steps we must take to lower the probability of a future crisis. We
could simplify the entire financial regulatory legislative initiative
by focusing on these three key elements. We do not need huge new
bureaucracies, or a complete restructuring of our regulatory agencies.

These are a few of my own thoughts on post-crisis reform. Today,
we'll have the opportunity to hear many more and consider how to
progress toward a sound solution that will safeguard the integrity of
our market mechanisms. I look forward to the presentations and
discussion.

 

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Wed, 03/03/2010 - 10:40 | 252196 Hondo
Hondo's picture

Tell this bozo to shut the F*** up unless he is going to vote against the king bozo Bernake.

Wed, 03/03/2010 - 10:59 | 252217 Anonymous
Anonymous's picture

I simply can't agree with him about increasing the FRB powers. Examination of their actions over the last two years shows they haven't increased their ability one iota, merely used powers that were dormant. Something tells me they have more than enough at hand to make sure capital markets operate fluidly without having to become supreme ayatollah of the financial world.

Wed, 03/03/2010 - 11:01 | 252221 bingaling
bingaling's picture

These bureaucrats are so behind the curve it amazes me . Post crisis????what the hell is he talking about ? They are barely holding this piece of Sh*t market together and the economy is just whitewashed gov't reports and spin from the MSM .Don't tell me these guys actually believe their own lies. The changes he is talking about should have been made about a year ago or b4 . This would be funny if my blood and flesh weren't involved .

Wed, 03/03/2010 - 13:30 | 252470 Boop
Boop's picture

ZOMG - they believe their own propaganda? Bloody 'ell.

Wed, 03/03/2010 - 11:03 | 252223 bugs_
bugs_'s picture

Nobody expects the philly fed!

Wed, 03/03/2010 - 11:17 | 252243 deadhead
deadhead's picture

Fisher from Dallas said same thing today/yesterday.

The ONLY thing I believe from the Fed is that they will keep ZIRP going until the end of mankind.

Wed, 03/03/2010 - 11:36 | 252280 Cognitive Dissonance
Cognitive Dissonance's picture

They are trying to create reality by changing perceptions. As silly as it might sound when you hear it said or see it written, perception is, or does become, reality.

It follows the concept of the big lie. Tell enough people a lie enough times and it becomes fact simply because it is now firmly planted into the public mind. This is well documented and the purpose of propaganda, advertising etc.

I understand that we all like to believe we are sentient creatures who can tell the difference between lies and truth. And for the average ZH reader, that might be so. But for the great unwashed masses who go through life without ever seriously engaging the thought process and questioning what is around them, they are definitely affected by the mind control.

I can't tell you how many people (including clients) who are doubtful of this so called "recovery" BUT the market is up, unemployment doesn't seem to be getting worse, they are still employed, the news and the leaders are telling them things are better so why fight it.

Let me repeat that. Why fight it. So they begin to spend a little more, buy that new car, go out to eat and generally begin to change their behavior, becoming less frugal. And this behaviour change actually helps to improve things in the economy, making perception (to a certain extent) reality.

I'm not saying things are as good as we're being told. And the fundamentals are terrible and trending backwards. But there's a lot to be said about the big lie creating an altered reality.

Wed, 03/03/2010 - 12:30 | 252381 percolator
percolator's picture

CD, excellent comments to which I agree, but this will make the next collapse all the greater.

Wed, 03/03/2010 - 20:25 | 253063 dnarby
dnarby's picture

People always leave out the last part of the Quote by Goebbles.

“If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it.

The lie can be maintained only for such time as the State can shield the people from the political, economic and/or military consequences of the lie.

It thus becomes vitally important for the State to use all of its powers to repress dissent,

for the truth is the mortal enemy of the lie, and thus by extension, the truth is the greatest enemy of the State.

Wed, 03/03/2010 - 11:18 | 252245 Anonymous
Anonymous's picture

Lip Service

they must be getting ready to really shank us

the old kiss and shank routine

Wed, 03/03/2010 - 11:20 | 252249 Anonymous
Anonymous's picture

Oh, these guys are all completely on-message. They know all that's standing between them and the abyss of history are nice, cheap, calming words.

Wed, 03/03/2010 - 11:24 | 252255 doublethink
doublethink's picture

 

"The last duty of a central banker is to tell the public the truth."  -- Alan Blinder, [then] Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve, on PBS's Nightly Business Report in 1994

Wed, 03/03/2010 - 11:25 | 252259 SV
SV's picture

...the FDIC has demonstrated its ability to resolve these institutions quickly (usually over a weekend) and at relatively low cost to the taxpayer...

Ohhh, I don't know about that - OneWest keeps coming to mind and if this is low cost well...

Wed, 03/03/2010 - 17:10 | 252807 faustian bargain
faustian bargain's picture

yeah, and not only that, the cost to the taxpayer is supposed to be 'zero', as far as I can understand. The DIF is in the red, so with every new bank closure/transfer, we're backstopping the eff-dick.

Wed, 03/03/2010 - 11:26 | 252261 Joanito
Joanito's picture

Too big to fail is too big to fail until proven otherwise.  I actually think that eventually the bond market will dictate the failure of the too big to fails, but so far I've been plenty wrong.  All these neutered fed imbeciles can do is talk.  They are powerless.  These statements just make these guys look even more moronic and powerless.  The black hole is too big.... to fail. 

Wed, 03/03/2010 - 11:35 | 252274 dumpster
dumpster's picture

even the fed .. is not to big to fail

Wed, 03/03/2010 - 12:39 | 252398 Anonymous
Anonymous's picture

One proof that Bernanke is a stooge is that he hasn't embraced too big to fail. this is a letter I sent to the ft today.

All commentators regarding banning naked cds miss the point. The real issue is breaking up the large financial firms into much smaller units. There is nothing wrong with speculating with a naked cds. there is something very wrong when a large financial firm (Goldman) knows it is hiding the true financial position of Greece through a credit default swap and receiving fees. the problem is compounded when the prop desk may be then trading long Greek debt on ever decreasing volumes via an algo trade, and at the same time Goldman is writing bespoke derivative contracts behind closed doors that pay off when that debt fails. It is clear this has been an accepted practice in the industry and must not be allowed. The same thing happened with sub prime.

break the firms up so they can't do this. You receive payment from writing the bonds, you can only hedge what you have physical possession of. Lets be clear this is what the Volcker rule is really about. Getting rid of the prop desk would make this practice very difficult for the big firms and that's why they are fighting it so hard. the prop desk rule is about market manipulation and the big firms do not want to give up this very profitable advantage.

This also relates to your story on page 20 regarding Goldman and JP Morgan entering metal warehousing. the income stream from the operation is secondary to the gains to be made via trading. Goldman knows when there is large amounts of product in storage, and can even put it there itself. the prop desk on open exchanges can push up the price, while at the same time the firm can write bespoke derivative contracts off an exchange knowing they have a huge stockpile in inventory. When it suits Goldman they can then release the stockpiles into he market. the public sees the price rising, while the insiders who control supply demand functions are making bets with insider knowledge they control.

When are you folks going to start to wake up to this abusive practice. You break up these firms so they can't do this sort of thing. Or their trading books have to be open and transparent. One thing for sure you can't have the people writing the debt/bonds be able to take naked positions against it.

This isn't that hard to figure out. I accumulate a large position in a firm all the way up. I then buy puts (maybe for even more shares than I own. via the prop desk I start to sell the shares, When there is a potential rally I dump shares into the market. I've made money on the way up, and then push the market down when I want.

I truly wish all you commentators started to abandon this talk of "free markets" the destruction on many hedge funds, and wall street banks has allowed excessive concentration in global finance making a mockery of the true purpose of the capital markets. That's the real reason we need to break up these big firms, perhaps have a transaction tax, and get the Volcker rule in place. It's isn't just about stability, it's about restoring both confidence and purpose to the markets.

Wed, 03/03/2010 - 12:41 | 252401 Anonymous
Anonymous's picture

It's up to the fed players to step outside from behind the curtin and force bernake to actually do his job.

Wed, 03/03/2010 - 12:43 | 252405 Mark Beck
Mark Beck's picture

Contingent Capital, an unneeded non-solution, which is as unworkable as Mr. Plosser's remarks. If you work at the FED you can come up with any new structured whatever, and call it effective. To propose such a thing, and not provide a small doc to explain how it will really work, is highly irresponsible. But, I have to say, a common occurance at the FED.

Some questions:

Why do we need to complicate capital requirements? What is so difficult about a capital requirement for banks or the banking part of BHCs?

By providing a Contingent Capital mechanism are we not interlinking firms at yet another level, if so then, does this not increase systemic risk?

----------

Perhaps the people who benefit most are the ones writing the Contingent Capital option deal and making their fees up front.

----------

I lot of what he says is public relation non-sense.

"We should not underestimate the power of the market and its adaptability."

Through the purchase of real estate MBS you are directly manipulating the market. Not only that you own a lot of the market. Really, you are the market (1.25T worth), until the time you attempt to sell it to someone else.

Mr. Plosser wants the bankruptcy process to work. But it was the TREASURY/FED that provided capital to prevent BHC insolvency. It is easy to let to big to fail, fail. Don't prop them up.

He would be well served to just keep his mouth shut.

Mark Beck

 

Wed, 03/03/2010 - 12:48 | 252409 Anonymous
Anonymous's picture

He is just a talker. If the Government wanted to end the TBTF it would have done it by now.

Wed, 03/03/2010 - 13:34 | 252481 Ned Zeppelin
Ned Zeppelin's picture

Having a number of contrasting views publicly expressed by Fed talking heads helps create the illusion that policy is crafted by thoughtful discussion, rather than by the dictat from behind the curtain that is the true practice.   Pay no attention to this. 

Wed, 03/03/2010 - 18:29 | 252910 Real Estate Geek
Real Estate Geek's picture

 

Autarky, NOW!

 

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