With the Federal Reserve now openly endorsing the ponzi scheme nature of the US stock market, it would be expected that any releases out of the Fed or its regional offices would be strictly within the limits of preapproved propaganda. Which is why we were stunned when we read the following research piece released from the Dallas Fad, titled: "The Fallacy of a Pain-Free Path to a Healthy Housing Market" in which we read unpleasant facts that traditionally are relegated only to the dark and murky world of the blogosphere. Among these are the following pearls: "Prices, in fact, have begun to slide again
in recent weeks. In short, pulling demand forward has not produced a
sustainable stabilization in home prices, which cannot escape the
pressure exerted by oversupply", "About 3.6 million housing units,
representing 2.7 percent of the total housing stock, are vacant and
being held off the market....Presumably, many are among the 6 million distressed
properties that are listed as at least 60 days delinquent, in
foreclosure or foreclosed in banks’ inventories." (the bulk of which are still populated by squatters who pay no mortgage, yet who are not booted by the lender banks, and who instead can redirect the money to uses such as iPad purchases), and this stunner: "With nearly half of total bank assets backed by residential real estate, both homeowners on the cusp of negative equity and the banking system as a whole remain concerned amid the resumption of home price declines.....The latest price declines will undoubtedly cause more economic dislocation. As the crisis enters its fifth year, uncertainty is as prevalent as ever and continues to hinder a more robust economic recovery. Given that time has not proven beneficial in rendering pricing clarity, allowing the market to clear may be the path of least distress." This is a stunning admission: in essence the Fed itself is advocating for mark-to-market, and the ensuing bloodbath that would ensue with bank book, and market, capitalization. Will this proposal by authors Danielle DiMartino Booth and David Luttrell see more traction at the Fed or promptly disappear in someone's inbox? Our money is on the latter.
The Fallacy of a Pain-Free Path to a Healthy Housing Market
by Danielle DiMartino Booth and David Luttrell
In the mid-1990s, the
public policy goal of increasing the U.S. homeownership rate collided
with a huge leap in financial innovation. Lenders shifted from
originating and holding mortgages to originating and packaging them for
sale to investors. These new financial products enabled millions of
Americans who hadn’t previously qualified to buy a home to become
owners. Housing construction boomed, reaching a postwar high—9.1
million homes were built between 2002 and 2006, a period when 5.6
million U.S. households were formed.
The resulting oversupply
of homes presents policymakers with a formidable challenge as they
struggle to craft a sustainable economic recovery. Usually a driver of
economic recoveries, the housing market is foundering as an engine of
policymakers since the 1930s have sought to increase the homeownership
rate. By the late 1960s, it had reached 64.3 percent of households,
remaining there through the mid-1990s, in apparent equilibrium with
household formation during a period of sustained U.S. economic growth. A
fresh push to increase ownership drove the rate up 5 percentage points
to its peak in the mid-2000s. Home price gains followed the rate
Reverting to the Mean Price
As gauged by an
aggregate of housing indexes dating to 1890, real home prices rose 85
percent to their highest level in August 2006. They have since declined
33 percent, falling short of most predictions for a cumulative
correction of at least 40 percent. In fact, home prices still must fall 23 percent if they are to revert to their long-term mean (Chart 1).
The Federal Reserve’s purchases of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
government-sponsored-entity bonds, which eased mortgage rates,
supported home prices. Other measures included mortgage modification
plans, which deferred foreclosures, and tax credits, which boosted
entry-level home sales.
success of these efforts is important to determining the trajectory of
the economic recovery and providing policymakers with a blueprint for
future action. New-home sales data, though extremely volatile, are
considered a leading indicator for the overall housing market. Since
expiration of the home-purchase tax credit in April, sales have fallen
40 percent to an average seasonally adjusted, annualized rate of
283,000 units. This contrasts with the three years through mid-2006
when monthly sales averaged 1.2 million on an annual basis. Before the
housing boom and bust, single-family home sales ran at half that pace.
Because current sales are at one-fifth of the 2005 peak, new-home
inventories—now at a 42-year low—still represent an 8.6-month supply. An
inventory of five to six months suggests a balanced market; home
prices tend to decline until that level is achieved.
One factor inhibiting the new-home market
is a growing supply of existing units. The 3.9 million homes listed in
October represent a 10.5-month supply. One in five mortgage holders
owes more than the home is worth, an impediment that could hinder
refinancings in the next year, when a fresh wave of adjustable-rate
mortgages is due to reset. The number of listed homes, in other words,
is at risk of growing further. This so-called shadow inventory
incorporates mortgages at high risk of default; adding these to the
total implies at least a two-year supply.
mortgage-servicing industry has struggled with understaffing and
burgeoning case volumes. The average number of days past due for loans
in the foreclosure process equates to almost 16 months, up 64 percent
from the peak of the housing boom. One in six delinquent homeowners who
haven’t made a payment in two years is still not in foreclosure. Mounting bottlenecks suggest the shadow inventory will grow in the near term.
Notably, not all
homeowners in arrears suffer financial hardship due to unaffordable
house payments. Those with significant negative equity in their homes
may choose to default even though they can afford to make the
payments. Such “strategic default” is inherently difficult to measure;
one study found 36 percent of mortgage defaults are strategic.
Though the effect is not readily quantifiable, the growing lag between
delinquency and foreclosure provides an added inducement for this form
Mortgage Modification Limits
One set of policies
to aid home-owners in dire straits involves mortgage modifications,
though these efforts have only minimally reduced housing supplies. The
most far-reaching effort has been the Making Home Affordable Program
(previously the Home Affordable Modification Program, or HAMP), in
effect since March 2009. After only one year, cancellations—loans
dropped from the program before a permanent change was
completed—eclipsed new modifications (Chart 2). Since March, the
number of cancellations has continued to exceed new trial
modifications, which involve eligibility and documentation review, and
successful permanent modifications.
The fact that many
mortgage holders have negative equity in their homes stymies
modification efforts. In the case of HAMP, the cost of carrying a house
must be reduced to 31 percent of the owner’s pretax income. Even if
permanent modification is achieved, adding other debt payments to
arrive at a total debt-to-income ratio boosts the average participant’s
debt burden to 63.4 percent of income. In many cases, the financial
innovations of the credit boom era, enabling owners to monetize home
equity, encouraged high aggregate debt.
A study found that in a best-case outcome, 20 to 25 percent of modifications will become permanent.
In 2008, one in three homeowners devoted at least a third of household
income to housing; one in eight was burdened with housing costs of 50
percent or more. Failed modifications suggest that, without strong income growth, the bounds of affordability can be stretched only so far.
intervention, modest home price declines could be allowed to resume
until inventories clear. An analysis found that home prices increased
by about 5 percentage points as a result of the combined efforts to
arrest price deterioration.
Absent incentive programs and as modifications reach a saturation
point, these price increases will likely be reversed in the coming
years. Prices, in fact, have begun to slide again in recent weeks. In
short, pulling demand forward has not produced a sustainable
stabilization in home prices, which cannot escape the pressure exerted
by oversupply (Chart 3).
Lingering Housing Market Issues
About 3.6 million
housing units, representing 2.7 percent of the total housing stock, are
vacant and being held off the market. These are not occasional-use
homes visited by people whose usual residence is elsewhere but units
that are vacant year-round. Presumably, many are among the 6 million
distressed properties that are listed as at least 60 days delinquent,
in foreclosure or foreclosed in banks’ inventories.
of inadequately documented foreclosures and the resulting calls for a
moratorium on foreclosures—what was quickly coined
“Foreclosuregate”—threaten to further delay housing market clearing.
While home price declines may be arrested as foreclosure paperwork
issues are resolved, the buildup of distressed supply will only grow
over time. Perhaps less obviously, some lenders with the means to
underwrite new mortgages will remain skeptical about the underlying
value of the collateral.
With nearly half
of total bank assets backed by residential real estate, both homeowners
on the cusp of negative equity and the banking system as a whole
remain concerned amid the resumption of home price declines.
This unease highlights the housing market’s fragility and suggests
there may be no pain-free path to the eventual righting of the market.
No perfect solution to the housing crisis exists. The latest price
declines will undoubtedly cause more economic dislocation. As the
crisis enters its fifth year, uncertainty is as prevalent as ever and
continues to hinder a more robust economic recovery. Given that time
has not proven beneficial in rendering pricing clarity, allowing the
market to clear may be the path of least distress.
Booth is a financial analyst and Luttrell is a research analyst in the
Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
- See Irrational Exuberance,
2nd ed., by Robert J. Shiller, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 2005 and 2009, as updated by author
calculations using the Census Bureau’s new-home sales report, the
National Association of Realtors’ existing-home sales release and
Capital Economics’ July 13, 2010, U.S. Housing Market Monthly report.
- Data from LPS Applied Analytics.
“The Determinants of Attitudes Towards Strategic Default on Mortgages,”
by Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza and Luigi Zingales, Economics Working
Papers no. ECO2010/31, European University Institute, July 2010
(previously circulated as “Moral and Social Constraints to Strategic
Default on Mortgages,” NBER Working Paper no. 15145, National Bureau of
Economic Research, July 2009). The number of strategic defaulters as a
percentage of total defaulters rose to 35.6 percent in March 2010 from
23.6 percent in March 2009.
“Foreclosure Pipeline to Govern Home Price Inflation: A Dialogue with
Mortgage Servicers and Policy Officials,” Zelman & Associates, May
- See “The State of the Nation’s Housing 2010,” Joint Center for Housing Studies, Harvard University, June 2010.
“Housing Markets and the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009: Lessons for the
Future,” by John V. Duca, John Muellbauer and Anthony Murphy, Journal of Financial Stability, vol. 6, no. 4, 2010, pp. 203–17.
estate secures 58 percent of all U.S. bank loans, and real
estate-backed assets account for 46 percent of total bank assets. See
“U.S. Housing: How Bad For Banks?” BCA Research Daily Insights, Sept.
27, 2010. CoreLogic reports that a 5 percent decline in home prices
would result in an additional 2.5 million underwater borrowers. See
“Housing: Stuck and Staying Stuck,” by Nick Timiraos and Sara Murray,
wsj.com, Sept. 24, 2010.