Union Of Concerned Scientists Releases Report On US Nuclear Plant Safety, Finds NRC Oversight Weakness At Indian Point NPP
From a just released report by the Union of Concerned Scientists, focusing on US Nuclear Power Plant oversight by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. "Many of the serious safety or security lapses at U.S. nuclear power plants in 2010 happened because plant owners -- and often the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) -- failed to address known safety problems." And something potentially concerning to Buchanan, NY residents where Indian Point NPP is located: "the NRC did not always serve the public well in 2010. This report analyzes serious safety problems at Peach Bottom, Indian Point, and Vermont Yankee that the NRC overlooked or dismissed. At Indian Point, for example, the NRC discovered that the liner of a refueling cavity at Unit 2 has been leaking since at least 1993. By allowing this reactor to continue operating with equipment that cannot perform its only safety function, the NRC is putting people living around Indian Point at elevated and undue risk." The report's conclusion: "when the NRC tolerates unresolved safety problems -- as it did last year at Peach Bottom, Indian Point, and Vermont Yankee -- this lax oversight allows that risk to rise. The more owners sweep safety problems under the rug and the longer safety problems remain uncorrected, the higher the risk climbs."
Indian Point section from the report:
The Indian Point nuclear plant in New York features two pressurized water reactors (PWRs). To refuel a PWR, workers flood the refueling cavity with water, which allows them to remove irradiated fuel assemblies from the reactor core and replace them with fresh fuel assemblies. The water both removes decay heat from the irradiated fuel assemblies and shields the radiation they emit, protecting the workers.
The Final Safety Analysis Reports (FSARs) submitted by the plant owner with the application for an operating license for Unit 2 stated that the refueling cavity was “designed to withstand the anticipated earthquake loadings,” and that “the liner prevents leakage in the event the reinforced concrete develops cracks.” When the NRC issued the operating license for Unit 2, the leakage prevention function of the liner for the refueling cavity became part of the licensing basis. However, NRC inspectors at Indian Point recently found that the liner has been leaking 2 to 20 gallons per minute since at least 1993 (NRC 2010v), and that the plant owner has not yet delivered on repeated promises to fix the leak. That means the device installed to prevent leakage after an earthquake is leaking before an earthquake even occurs. The liner has no other safety function. Yet NRC managers have dismissed the longstanding problem, noting that the refueling cavity leaks only when it is filled with water (NRC 2010o).
These inspectors are repeating the very same mistakes the NRC made at the Millstone nuclear plant in Connecticut 15 to 20 years ago. In March 1996 the NRC made the cover of Time magazine—and not as regulator of the year. Time called the NRC out for failing to enforce its own rules. Workers at Millstone routinely transferred all the fuel from the reactor core to the spent fuel pool during each refueling outage, despite a regulatory requirement to do so only under abnormal conditions. Workers also nearly always violated a regulatory requirement to wait a few hours before transferring fuel out of the reactor core, to allow radiation levels to drop, thus lowering the threat to workers and the public from the movements.
That means the Indian Point owner could fix the refueling cavity liner so that it no longer leaks. Or the company could seek NRC approval for leaving the cavity liner as is, if an evaluation shows that the plant would then maintain required safety margins. Or the owner could seek NRC’s approval to modify the plant or its procedures to compensate for the leaking liner.
However, the Indian Point owner has chosen option 4: to do absolutely nothing to resolve the safety nonconformance, daring the NRC to respond. That was the very same option the Millstone owner chose in the early 1990s—which led to the reactor shutdown and the NRC’s efforts to prevent such a situation from ever happening again.
The laissez-faire approach to safety at Indian Point contrasts sharply with the approach at Turkey Point Unit 3 in Florida, after a similar problem surfaced in 2010. On July 29, workers at that plant detected a through-wall crack in the drain pipe from the refueling cavity transfer canal (FPL 2010). Workers could not repair the crack until they drained the refueling cavity, but the owner committed to making the repair immediately after they did so.
The owner also committed to “daily walkdowns for increased leakage or new leak locations while the transfer canal is filled.” In other words, workers would inspect that area each day for water leaking from the damaged drain pipe. Rather than fall back on the NRC’s apparent indifference to leaks from the refueling cavity, this owner took steps to manage the risk until workers could correct the degraded condition.
The NRC’s performance at Indian Point is worse than that 15 to 20 years ago at Millstone, for the simple reason that the agency has put measures in place to prevent the next such fiasco. The NRC has explicitly directed resident inspectors to determine whether nuclear plants are operating within their licensing bases, and whether they are adhering to the agency’s guidance given any discrepancies.
The resident NRC inspectors at Indian Point did their job by flagging the degradation of the liner for Unit 2’s refueling cavity, and the fact that the plant does not conform to its licensing basis. However, NRC managers have deviated from their own post-Millstone guidance by accepting the degraded, nonconforming condition without any analysis showing that the plant has critical safety margins. There is just no excuse for the NRC to revert back to its pre-Millstone nonchalance regarding nuclear reactors that operate outside their licensing bases.
Union of Concerned Scientists Releases Report on the NRC and Nuclear Plant Safety in 2010
WASHINGTON (March 17, 2011) -- Many of the serious safety or
security lapses at U.S. nuclear power plants in 2010 happened because
plant owners -- and often the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) --
failed to address known safety problems, according to a report released today by the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS). Below is the executive summary of the report.
The NRC and Nuclear Power Plant Safety in 2010: A Brighter Spotlight Needed
David Lochbaum, Union of Concerned Scientists
This report is the first in an annual series on the safety-related
performance of the owners of U.S. nuclear power plants and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC), which regulates the plants. The NRC’s
mission is to protect the public from the inherent hazards of nuclear
In 2010, the NRC reported on 14 special inspections it launched in
response to troubling events, safety equipment problems, and security
shortcomings at nuclear power plants. This report provides an overview
of each of these significant events -- or near-misses.
This overview shows that many of these significant events occurred
because reactor owners, and often the NRC, tolerated known safety
problems. For example, the owner of the Calvert Cliffs plant in Maryland
ended a program to routinely replace safety components before launching
a new program to monitor degradation of those components. As a result,
an electrical device that had been in use for longer than its service
lifetime failed, disabling critical safety components.
In another example, after declaring an emergency at its Brunswick
nuclear plant in North Carolina, the owner failed to staff its emergency
response teams within the required amount of time. That lapse occurred
because workers did not know how to activate the automated system that
summons emergency workers to the site.
Outstanding Catches by the NRC
This report also provides three examples where onsite NRC inspectors
made outstanding catches of safety problems at the Oconee, Browns Ferry,
and Kewaunee nuclear plants—before these impairments could lead to
events requiring special inspections, or to major accidents.
At the Oconee plant in South Carolina, the owner fixed a problem with
a vital safety system on Unit 1 that had failed during a periodic test.
However, the owner decided that identical components on Units 2 and 3
could not possibly have the same problem. NRC inspectors persistently
challenged lame excuse after lame excuse until the company finally
agreed to test the other two units. When it did so, their systems
failed, and NRC inspectors ensured that the company corrected the
Poor NRC Oversight
However, the NRC did not always serve the public well in 2010. This
report analyzes serious safety problems at Peach Bottom, Indian Point,
and Vermont Yankee that the NRC overlooked or dismissed. At Indian
Point, for example, the NRC discovered that the liner of a refueling
cavity at Unit 2 has been leaking since at least 1993. By allowing this
reactor to continue operating with equipment that cannot perform its
only safety function, the NRC is putting people living around Indian
Point at elevated and undue risk.
The NRC audits only about 5
percent of activities at nuclear plants each year. Because its spotlight
is more like a strobe light -- providing brief, narrow glimpses into
plant conditions --the NRC must focus on the most important problem
areas. Lessons from the 14 near-misses reveal how the NRC should apply
its limited resources to reap the greatest returns to public safety.
we have not reviewed all NRC actions, the three positive and three
negative examples do not represent the agency’s best and worst
performances in 2010. Instead, the examples highlight patterns of NRC
behavior that contributed to these outcomes. The positive examples
clearly show that the NRC can be an effective regulator. The negative
examples attest that the agency still has work to do to become the
regulator of nuclear power that the public deserves.
Overall, our analysis of NRC oversight of safety-related events and
practices at U.S. nuclear power plants in 2010 suggests these
• Nuclear power plants continue to experience
problems with safety-related equipment and worker errors that increase
the risk of damage to the reactor core -- and thus harm to employees and
• Recognized but misdiagnosed or unresolved safety problems often
cause significant events at nuclear power plants, or increase their
• When onsite NRC inspectors discover a broken
device, an erroneous test result, or a maintenance activity that does
not reflect procedure, they too often focus just on that problem. Every
such finding should trigger an evaluation of why an owner failed to fix a
problem before NRC inspectors found it.
• The NRC can better
serve the U.S. public and plant owners by emulating the persistence
shown by onsite inspectors who made good catches while eliminating the
indefensible lapses that led to negative outcomes.
• Four of
the 14 special inspections occurred at three plants owned by Progress
Energy. While the company may simply have had an unlucky year,
corporate-wide approaches to safety may have contributed to this poor
performance. When conditions trigger special inspections at more than
one plant with the same owner, the NRC should formally evaluate whether
corporate policies and practices contributed to the shortcomings.
chances of a disaster at a nuclear plant are low. When the NRC finds
safety problems and ensures that owners address them -- as happened last
year at Oconee, Browns Ferry, and Kewaunee -- it keeps the risk posed
by nuclear power to workers and the public as low as practical. But when
the NRC tolerates unresolved safety problems -- as it did last year at
Peach Bottom, Indian Point, and Vermont Yankee -- this lax oversight
allows that risk to rise. The more owners sweep safety problems under
the rug and the longer safety problems remain uncorrected, the higher
the risk climbs.
While none of the safety problems in 2010
caused harm to plant employees or the public, their frequency -- more
than one per month -- is high for a mature industry. The severe
accidents at Three Mile Island in 1979 and Chernobyl in 1986 occurred
when a handful of known problems -- aggravated by a few worker miscues
-- transformed fairly routine events into catastrophes. That plant
owners could have avoided nearly all 14 near-misses in 2010 had they
corrected known deficiencies in a timely manner suggests that our luck
at nuclear roulette may someday run out