As WikiLeaks' Star Fades, A Post-Mortem Of Its Operational Infrastructure Emerges

Tyler Durden's picture

Now that it is increasingly becoming apparent that WikiLeaks may have jumped the shark on their Bank of America suspense build up, defense against what data the whistleblowing organization may or may not actually have is rapidly becoming a moot point. One word of advice: instead of Assange deciding just how disastrous any/all documents in his possession may be, perhaps he can finally release them to the general public so those who actually know what they are looking at can decide for themselves and process any data rapidly. Of course, that would destroy the circus freak aspect of the whole fiasco... Reuters earlier noted that the BofA document is actually likely quite innocuous, per Julian's own admission: "Assange has said privately he does not know if his cache of internal Bank of America (BAC.N) data, whose public release he has suggested might be imminent, contains any big news or scandal, according to three people familiar with the WikiLeaks leader's private discussions about the material." Yet that has not prevented private firm Plantir Technologies from putting together a presentation describing the distributed architecture of Wikileaks (and how really there is little one can do to take Wiki down).

On its website earlier, Wikileaks posted the following:

In a document titled "The WikiLeaks Threat" three data intelligence companies, Plantir Technologies, HBGary Federal and Berico Technologies, outline a plan to attack Wikileaks. They are acting upon request from Hunton and Williams, a law firm working for Bank of America. The Department of Justice recommended the law firm to Bank of America according to an article in The Tech Herald. The prosed attacks on WikiLeaks according to the slides include these actions:

  • Feed the fuel between the feuding groups. Disinformation. Create messages around actions of sabotage or discredit the opposing organizations. Submit fake documents and then call out the error.
  • Create concern over the security of the infrastructure. Create exposure stories. If the process is believed not to be secure they are done.
  • Cyber attacks against the infrastructure to get data on document submitters. This would kill the project. Since the servers are now in Sweden and France putting a team together to get access is more straightforward.
  • Media campaign to push the radial and reckless nature of WikiLeaks activities. Sustain pressure. Does nothing for the fanatics, but creates concern and doubt among moderates.
  • Search for leaks. Use social media to profile and identify risky behavior of employees.

Anyone contemplating launching a wikileaks competitor is urged to read the presentation, if for no other reason than to learn from the (heretofore) best: