Yesterday’s Japanese Downgrade Illustrates Our Proclamation Of The Paths To Contagion
I spent the majority of 2010 and a decent portion of 2009 warning
that massive debt simply does not just “go away”, particularly after
significant asset devaluation. The result of these two actions (once
combined) is the evaporation of equity, the waning of value, and the
ultimate destruction of capital. Sovereign nations and global financial
institutions alike have been dodging, ducking, weaving, fibbing, lying,
closing their eyes, sticking their collective heads in the sand and
kicking the can down the road for 3 years now. This is not the end of
the world, but it is the end of the massive amount of economic capital
that so many swear is still abound. The longer we take to acquiesce and
accept this foregone conclusion, the harder the pill will be to swallow –
“can kicking” be damned.
And on that note, Bloomberg reports: Japan’s Credit Rating Cut to AA- by S&P on Mounting Debt Burden
Japan’s credit rating was cut for the
first time in nine years by Standard & Poor’s as persistent
deflation and political gridlock undermine efforts to reduce a 943
trillion yen ($11 trillion) debt burden. The world’s most indebted
nation is now ranked at AA-, the fourth-highest level, putting the
country on a par with China,
which likely passed Japan last year to become the second-largest
economy. The government lacks a “coherent strategy” to address the
nation’s debt, the rating company said in a statement. The outlook for
the rating is stable, S&P said.
The yen and bond futures fell on concern the downgrade will push up the cost of borrowing for Japan,
where public debt is about twice the size of gross domestic product.
Vice Finance Minister Fumihiko Igarashi this week said the government
must fix its finances to avoid a debt crisis that could trigger a “global depression.”
“I hope this serves as a warning for the government, they have absolutely no sense of crisis,” said Azusa Kato,
an economist at BNP Paribas in Tokyo. “Once bond yields spike and the
fire is lit, the amount needed to finance Japan’s borrowing needs is
going to jump and it’s going to be too late.”
The yen fell after the announcement,
later paring declines and trading at 82.77 per dollar as of 7:23 p.m. in
Tokyo. Ten- year bond futures for March delivery declined to 139.55 at
the Singapore Exchange.
I have a trending currency model to be distributed to professional/institutional subscribers,
but encountered a last minute technical glitch. It will be be available
by next week, and can be used to see the medium and long term trends
quite clearly for those in interested in the macro perspective.
… Thirteen Japanese companies
included in the benchmark Topix stock index are more highly rated than
AA- by S&P, including Toyota Motor Co. An S&P spokeswoman
declined to say whether company-rating downgrades will follow. Shiori Hashimoto, a spokeswoman for Toyota City, Japan-based Toyota, declined to comment.
It is possible for companies to have
higher ratings than the local or foreign currency ratings of their home
country, S&P said in a May 2009 report. The best candidates have a
robust export base, little reliance on the public sector and sell
products with “relatively inelastic” demand. The S&P report said
businesses with sales mainly in local currency, subject to regulation
and heavily dependent on imports probably won’t pass stress tests
without “heavy overcollateralization or reserves.”
Downgrades in Europe
Japan joins developed economies including Portugal and Spain
in being downgraded as emerging nations bounce back more strongly from
the global recession. The previous change to Japan’s rating by S&P
was an upgrade in 2007, before the financial crisis. The nation lost its
AAA rating, the highest grade, in 2001 after holding it since 1975.
With domestic investors holding more than 90 percent of Japanese government bonds,
the downgrade “probably won’t prompt them to move money out of Japanese
bonds into foreign assets because the problem of sovereign debt is
worsening worldwide,” said Naomi Hasegawa, a senior debt strategist in Tokyo at Mitsubishi UFJ Morgan Stanley Securities Co., a unit of Japan’s largest lender by assets.
The Potential for Spillover Effects Simply Cannot Be Ignored If You Look At This From An Empirical Perspective
A key risk in sovereign default is the spillover effect due to interlinkages in the financial system, reference”Financial Contagion vs. Economic Contagion: Does the Market Underestimate the Effects of the Latter?” Sovereign defaults transmit risks ACROSS
asset classes, and a crisis in one country can easily engulf others due
to cross border exposures. Empirical data points out that sovereign
default are usually clustered. The Asian financial crisis of 1997–98,
when sovereign debt problems hopscotched from economy to economy, is a
testimony to what could happen to Europe this time around. In addition,
the spillover effect also affects corporate bond yields as company’s
ability to borrow money not only depends upon its own creditworthiness,
but also on the financial health of its home-country. When investors
lose confidence in the government’s ability to use public finances they
demand a premium to access capital to corporates, raising the financing
costs. A downgrade in sovereign ratings/default also has negative affect
on the stock markets.
The charts below show bond volatility and equity volatility across
major markets – US, UK, Germany and Japan. Both equity markets and bond
markets across geographies are strongly correlated thus demonstrating
cross border intervention. In addition, we have also shown interlinks
between equity and bond market demonstrating cross-asset correlation.
Last year, we introducing the “BoomBustBlog Sovereign Contagion Model“,
wherein we spent many analyst man/months to create a realistic model to
capture the potential for social unrest, financial and economic
contagion as they could skip across sovereign borders, continents, asset
classes and hemispheres. We are in the final stages of a significant
update to this model, which still stands as what we consider a tour de
force in realistic risk modeling. Nearly every MSM analyst roundup attempts to speculate on who may be
next in the contagion. Most analysis looks at gross claims
between countries, which of course can be very illuminating, but also
tends to leave out many salient points and important risks/exposures.
In order to derive more meaningful conclusions about the risk
emanating from the cross border exposures, it is essential to closely
scrutinize the geographical break down of the total exposure as well as
the level of risk surrounding each component. We have therefore
developed a Sovereign Contagion model which aims to quantify the amount
of risk weighted foreign claims and contingent exposure for major
developed countries including major European countries, the US, Japan
and Asia major.
I. Summary of the methodology
- We have followed a bottom-up approach wherein we have first
identified the countries/regions with high financial risk either owing
to rising sovereign risk (ballooning government debt and fiscal deficit)
or structural issues including remnants from the asset bubble
collapse, declining GDP, rising unemployment, current account deficits,
etc. For the purpose of our analysis, we have selected PIIGS, CEE,
Middle East (UAE and Kuwait), China and closely related countries
(Korea and Malaysia), the US and UK as the trigger points of the
financial risk dissemination across the analysed developed countries.
- In order to quantify the financial risk emanating in the selected
regions (trigger points), we looked into the probability of the risk
event happening due to three factors – a) government default b) private
sector default c) social unrest. The probabilities for each factor were
arrived on the basis of a number of variables determining the relative
weakness of the country. The aggregate risk event probability for each
country (trigger point) is the average of the risk event probability
due to the three factors.
- Foreign claims of the developed countries against the trigger point countries were taken as the relevant exposure
The exposures of each developed country were expressed as % of its
respective GDP in order to build a relative scale for inter-country
- The risk event probability of the trigger point countries was
multiplied by the respective exposure of the developed countries to
arrive at the total risk weighted exposure of each developed country.
Additional analysis and opinion:
- Financial Contagion vs. Economic Contagion: Does the Market Underestimate the Effects of the Latter?
- The Truth Behind Portugal’s Inevitable Default – Arithmetic Evidence Available Only Through BoomBustBlog
Anatomy of a Portugal Default: A Graphical Step by Step Guide to the
Beginning of the Largest String of Sovereign Defaults in Recent History
- Will Spain Default? The Answer Is Not Hard To Determine If You Take An Objective Look At The Numbers And Recent History!
- The ECB Loads Up On Increasingly Devalued Portuguese Bonds, Ensuring That They Will Get Hit Hard When Portugal Defaults
Has It That The Germans Are Starting To Consider Real World Solutions
To The Greek Debt Dilemma – Restructuring, Exactly As We Anticipated!
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