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GSE Privatization, Or "Fed Magic" - Here Are The Alternatives
Between Fairholme's back-up-the-truck in GSE Preferreds (demanding his fair share of the dividend), the crazy oscillations in the common stock of FNMA, and the ongoing debacle of what to with the government's implicit ownership of the US mortgage business, tonight's news from Bloomberg - that a bipartisan group of U.S. senators is putting the final touches on a plan to liquidate Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (FMCC) and replace them with a government reinsurer of mortgage securities behind private capital - is hardly surprising. Details are few and far between except to note that the proposed legislation, which could be introduced this month, would require private financiers to take a first-loss position. The new entity, to be named the Federal Mortgage Insurance Corp (or FEDMAGIC), would seek private financing to continue existing efforts to help small lenders issue securities. The 'old entity' - where existing equity and debtholders would seemingly reside would contain the existing MBS portfolio and be put in run-down mode. The following from BofAML provides a possible primer and pitfalls (we think the endgame is very unlikely to be positive for holders of the capital structure below subordinated debt) of this approach.
From Bloomberg we know:
- The GSEs will be liquidated within five years
- Private financiers will fund the newco, taking a first loss position adequate to cover price declines as steep as those seen during the recession
- Proceeds from the liquidation would first go to the US government as senior preferred shareholder (and lastly to holders of the common stock).
- The new entity will be called the Federal Mortgage Insurance Corp (FEDMAGIC)
That is all we know for sure. The following from BofAML provides the best primer for the possibilities that we have seen (beware the details are not particularly positive)...
What a privatization plan would look like
With a stroke of the pen, the government can choose to direct some or all of GSE profits away from taxpayers and back into Fannie and Freddie. This would be a first step toward recapitalizing Fannie/Freddie with the ultimate intention of selling them, as Millstein and Swagel have proposed. Instead of the current government backstop capital lines (117bn for Fannie and 140bn for Freddie) provided by the Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements, an explicit government guarantee would be purchased by Fannie/Freddie at fair market value. The government guarantee would back the MBS, not the equity, and probably not the debt, which would be spun off into a company with a mortgage portfolio that is federally managed and wound down. This government guarantee would be available for purchase by other private competitors – assuming they met strict standards – at a cost that would be a function of the riskiness of the loans and the company itself.
The proceeds of selling the recapitalized Fannie/Freddie would provide the return on taxpayer funds that policy makers have demanded, and would also accomplish the consensus policy goal of privatizing most of mortgage finance. The resulting privatized companies would compete with other private companies as issuers of MBS securities with access to government reinsurance that kicks in after private capital is wiped out.
Although we can envision such a possible path for Fannie and Freddie, we think it is highly unlikely, and we discuss why below. If the plan were to be agreed upon by Congress and put into motion, however, it’s still not clear that existing equity holders would benefit. That would depend on how the deal is structured. And given the history here and the political pressures involved, we think it would be less shareholder friendly than other such deals.
The biggest problem with privatization is privatization
One of the stickiest points of such a plan is that debt holders would be swept off into a new company that is winding down. Debt outstanding is currently about $1.1 trillion. As the current government capital backstop would be replaced with a purchased reinsurance agreement on the MBS, there would be no capital available to protect debt holders. Explicitly guaranteeing the outstanding debt would add substantially to the federal debt burden, and given historical precedent, we think it’s not an option. This is why the government designed the capital backstop plan rather than taking the companies onto the government balance sheet. Since the conservatorship began and the Preferred Stock Purchase Plan was put into place in 2008, the government has consistently stood by its promise to protect all obligations of the GSEs, today and in the future. As the Treasury department wrote on September 11 2008 in HP-1131:
The [Preferred Stock Purchase] agreement is designed to prohibit any amendment that would decrease the amount of Treasury's funding commitment or add funding conditions that would adversely affect debt or mortgage-backed securities holders. Some may speculate that a future Congress could pass a law that would abrogate the agreement. But any such law would be inconsistent with the U.S. government's longstanding history of honoring its obligations. Such action would also give rise to government liability to parties suing to enforce their rights under the agreement. The U.S. Government stands behind the preferred stock purchase agreements and will honor its commitments. Contracts are respected in this country as a fundamental part of rule of law.
In other words, privatization could be a big legal mess for the Treasury department. Even the MBS reinsurance guarantee envisioned in the privatization model would likely be more limited than what the Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement provides. Depending on exactly how the MBS backstop would work, under what conditions and with what limitations it would apply, it could render both MBS holders and debt holders in a vulnerable position.
In addition to what could be substantial disorder in agency financial markets, it’s also not clear that anyone would want to buy the GSEs from the Treasury department after they were deemed sufficiently capitalized. This is a matter of the future profitability of the GSEs: how high a fee the GSEs could charge in the future, and what volume of MBS securities they could produce. The Treasury would be forgoing profits (earnings sweeps) today in hopes of gaining something later. Our sense is that within the context of a private mortgage finance system, volumes of MBS production would be much lower overall than they are today, and fee pricing would be so competitive that it would likely require the same sort of ultra-specialization that we see in most industries today.
The idea of Fannie/Freddie maintaining a monopoly on securitizing and guaranteeing all conforming loans seems to be very wishful thinking in such a competitive environment, especially if the machinery of securitization is separated out into the Common Securitization Platform as the FHFA is currently doing. It is not clear what advantage Fannie and Freddie would have in such an environment, where loan data is available for all insurance companies to price risk competitively, and the profitable and complex portfolio management businesses are stripped away.
The other problem is FHFA doesn’t seem to like it
In addition to these issues that make us negative on buying preferred or common equity today, there is the problem that the FHFA is now leaning away from the privatization model. The most recent discussion of the future of GSE reform coming from FHFA, which is arguably the most important voice on the matter, is that there are two main paths to choose from: one is the issuer model, which encompasses any system of regulated private entities who issue and insure MBS (like Fannie and Freddie) with purchased government backstop insurance, and the other is the security model, which would be a world of structural subordination in private-label securities market in which buyers of securities are essentially the capital providers.
In the security model the buyers of lower-rated tranches would essentially be the capital providers, and no large-scale government re-insurance backstop would be necessary except for special crisis conditions where either Ginnie Mae or FHLB or some other special government entity could become activated. The FHFA has not made a final decision. Instead it is leading the discussion. But it is clear that it favors the security model, because in a nutshell, the issuer model will always be fraught with the sticky problem of how to conduct a private enterprise with an integral government component.
We are still far from knowing the future of Fannie and Freddie, and we expect the common and preferred stock to rise when Freddie announces its $20 or $30 billion of dividend payments in the next quarter or two.
But we think the endgame is very unlikely to be positive for holders of the capital structure below subordinated debt.
In our view it is all a matter of timing, and our recommendation would be keep the trade horizons very short and not hope for the best.
Putting the Bloomberg news and the BofAML 'strawman' together, it seems like:
- current equity and debtholders remain with BADFANNIE along with the existing MBS portfolio in wind-down liquidation mode... and
- newco FEDMAGIC will be created - via new private financing - that explicitly buys the government's guarantee 'rights'. This fee pays back the government, but
- there are many hurdles yet
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Keep the trade horizons very short and hope for the best?
Last I heard "hope" was not on investment strategy. It certainly hasn't paid off in elections.
"private financeers"
Is that how the criminals refer to taxpayers nowadays?
It will be private alright. This is how the Fed wants to unwind its monthly MBS lifeline, which have been plunging for a second month in a row, as an anticipation of this.
Alright, 3 glasses of wine and a green nikkei and this is our 10pm red meat. Time to retire for the evening.
....so that fonz can wake up to a fresh pot of coffee and a green dow...............................
i pretty much do drink a pot of coffee each day lately
There's plenty of room left under the rug to sweep things, apparently.
Why don't we just float some "perpetual bonds" and be done with it. Or better yet, just write it off with the stroke of a pen and declare it all "null and void".
This is "Hogwarts Academy" finance. Wave the magic wand..... poof. All gone. Until Valdemort shows up again.
G'night, Fonz. G'night, Doc. G'night Jon-boy.
.......would require private financiers to take a first-loss position....
............... followed by a first-backstopped stick save by the govt.............
Voldemort that ran the Fed from '79 to'87? That Voldemort?
'...require private financiers to take a first-loss position...'.
They are batshit crazy or found a way to pass off losses to taxpayers eventually, and cover their bigger losses elsewhere, more likely.
Never underestimate the devious GS and JPM, agents of the un-Federal no-Reserve Bored....not the BIS in its totality.
Exactly. The whole idea is a bag of shit, and dishonest from the get go.
Quite. The BIS is an international organisation, not a pet of nazionists anymore, although some might think so.
Bin bastids. They declare forward. OK. Let the world move forward, not waste time on failures.
Is it going to be a black magic women(the song) running the FEDMagic? Or are they confusing the FED printer which is also called FEDMAGIC.
Wise words from my father: don't get angry, get even.
Black magic Satanists declare their intent, hiding in plain sight. Gosh. More than upsetting to think the world has come to this.
Goebbels and Nazionists, satanists.
Traders must be most ruthlessly rational in this kind of environment, for the sake of their family, friends, community.
A little songster John Lennon said: be honest, you will not have many friends, you will have the right friends.
Most trading nowadays is done by machines, algorithms. Bloodless machines.
Deux ex machina warmongers.
Knowing what I know about bond buyers-this is good for Treasuries and munis and bad for MBS and agency debentures. Once the smoke clears then reassess.
"On behalf of the hundreds of thousands of Fairholme Funds shareholders who helped to rebuild American International Group, Bank of America, CIT Group, General Growth Properties, MBIA Inc., and others after the Great Recession - we stand ready to do our part."
OH.
MY.
GOD.
That is just.... so.... incredibly disturbing!
Douche ex machina
$hit, innit?
They Will Put Barney Frank in charge of FEDMAGIC.
Barney Frank is the poster fuckster for the freak bumb boys of the Trilateral Commission. Their rape of markets and nations; all in it to win it for their monarchists, vatican, and nazionists....and enjoying their rape of boys from tax funded care homes in particular.
Barney Frank is a freak, blackmailed by nazionists, and he will do their hateful bankster bidding.
Mossad and the CIA know he will.
"we think the endgame is very unlikely to be positive for holders of the capital structure below subordinated debt) of this approach"
Naive analysis.
Given that every deal by the govt is now engineered so that no banker buddies lose - there will be loopholes du-jour to allow for all existing stakeholders (barring common stock) to be completely compensated + profits. Almost guaranteed to happen otherwise lobbyists will threaten to not re-elect those who create losses for bankster clients.
Grave miscalculation for nazionists this time.
Money is 24/7. Live by the sword. Die by the sword.
well the article is lacking in a lot of detail so before flying off the handle here i'd sure like to know a few details. are we talking FUTURE debt not being guaranteed? or CURRENT debt? that seems important. also...the equity has already been sent to the pink sheets...so doing nothing...is embarrassment the word i'm looking for? sure doesn't seem like there's an interest in cleaning up the capital market structure here...something rather odd given the massive recovery in tax receipts...or maybe not odd at all. not that i expect ZH to dig further on this of course. what else...oh, "the missing war effort." hmmmm. that seems kinda like...you know dude..."one of those things that needs to be financed too" so like...yo, brau...maybe you should get this phucking mess cleaned up and shit. dude. anywho....
Will they accept student loans as down payments. That's all I want to know.
Probably they will accept students as down payments, if they are able-bodied and willing to be indentured to a term of service.
omg i smell a rat. this is nothing but another damned screw job by the bankers and billionaires. just when fannie mae was starting to cut out the middle man and earn back on the huge investment by us taxpayers they want to forego that payback and just take the risk and let the maggots have all the profits? fuck that. i guess with loan loss funds dwindling the bankers have to find some other way to fuck us all in the ass for a bonus.
oh, and this bit: Private financiers will fund the newco, taking a first loss position adequate to cover price declines as steep as those seen during the recession...
BULL FUCKING SHIT! THOSE MAGGOTS NEVER TAKE A LOSS!
They dress it up like poor uncle sam can't afford all these bonds on the books and the privateers would be happy to take a loss. What they really mean is they want to fuck everyone good and hard and the usa gubbermint mortgage monopoly is kicking their asses. Tough shit assholes, you took the bailout, now reap the whirlwind.
Goldman advisors? When pigs fly/float... Oh yea Smithfield.... PIGS PIGS liquidate... has the making of a Humpty Dumpty rime.
How do you see this effecting MREITS?
only a fool would think that this legislation written by the financial industry will help anyone but banks etc, just as the legislation written by big pharma called obamacare helped anyone but the health care industry.
buying legislation.
america's most profitable business.
Free houses for everybody!