Bundesbank: "Mein Entschluss: Anschluss-Plus" - Germany Reveals The European Annexation Blueprints

Tyler Durden's picture

We were wondering how long it would be before Germany, following in the footsteps of such luminaries as Hank Paulson and Tim Geithner, would formally announce to the world that with it now openly calling the shots in Europe, it would be its way or the mutual assured destruction way. We just got our answer courtesy of the just released August Outlook from the Bundesbank, in which the German national bank lays out the framework of the upcoming European anschluss play by play, as Germany prepares to roll out the Fourth Reich welcome mat without ever spilling a drop of blood. After all: why injure the soon to be millions of debt slaves? To wit from the report: "Unless and until a fundamental change of regime occurs involving an extensive surrender of national fiscal sovereignty, it is imperative that the no bail-out rule that is still enshrined in the treaties and the associated disciplining function of the capital markets be strengthened, and not fatally weakened." Translation: "we will gladly help everyone out... in exchange for a little of that vastly overrated fiscal sovereignty... Did we say a little? We meant all of it..."

Here are the salient points from the just released Bundesbank manifesto of Mutual Assured Anschluss or else:

Overall, there is a risk that the originally agreed institutional framework of the monetary union will increasingly become eroded.

As noted, there is but one proposed solution:

Unless and until a fundamental change of regime occurs involving an extensive surrender of national fiscal sovereignty, it is imperative that the no bail-out rule that is still enshrined in the treaties and the associated disciplining function of the capital markets be strengthened, and not fatally weakened.

You want your stupid brilliant monetary union? Fine.

You want us to pay for it? Sure.

The cost? Your "extensive" national independence.

Full passage:

The recent resolutions transfer sizeable additional risks to the countries providing assistance and their taxpayers, and go a long way towards communitising risks caused by unsound public finances and misguided macroeconomic policies in individual euro-area countries. This weakens the foundations of monetary union, which is based on the principles of national fiscal responsibility and the disciplining effect of capital markets, without noticeably increasing the influence and control over individual national fiscal policies as a quid pro quo. Overall, there is a risk that the originally agreed institutional framework of the monetary union will increasingly become eroded. While fiscal policy will continue to be determined by democratically elected parliaments at national level, the resultant risks and burdens will increasingly be borne by the Community in general and the financially sound countries in particular, without this being offset by any concrete powers to intervene in the sovereignty of national fiscal policies. No comprehensive change in the European treaties is currently envisaged that would democratically empower a central entity to exert some control over national budgetary policies. This means there is a danger that the euro-area countries’ propensity to incur debt may increase even further, and the euro area’s single monetary policy will be increasingly susceptible to the temptation to adopt an accommodating stance. Unless and until a fundamental change of regime occurs involving an extensive surrender of national fiscal sovereignty, it is imperative that the no bail-out rule that is still enshrined in the treaties and the associated disciplining function of the capital markets be strengthened, and not fatally weakened.

h/t Geoffrey Batt