Charting The Simple Reason Why Every 'Bailout' In Europe Will Be Faded
The bailout bullishness half-life is shrinking - dramatically - as it appears traders have become more aware of reality (and unreality). As we have noted again and again, the self-referencing, self-aggrandizing, self-pleasuring European government and banking systems are becoming more and more symbiotically linked. As JPM CIO Cembalest notes for Spain, Plan A was the 2010 announcement of government austerity targets. Plan B was the 2011/2012 ECB lending program to Spanish banks - to the point where Spanish banks now own around 50% of Spanish government debt. Neither plan worked and so on to Plan C - recap Spanish banks to cover the expected losses forthcoming. Recapitalization of the banks versus funding the sovereign is of course a semantic issue given the nature of the interplay. As Credit Suisse noted this weekend... "Portugal cannot rescue Greece, Spain cannot rescue Portugal, Italy cannot rescue Spain (as is surely about to become all too abundantly clear), France cannot rescue Italy, but Germany can rescue France.” Or, the credit of the EFSF/ESM, if called upon to provide funds in large size, either calls upon the credit of Germany, or fails; i.e., it probably cannot fund, to the extent needed to save the credit of one (and probably imminently two) countries that had hitherto been considered 'too big so save', without joint and several guarantees."
Spain's reach-around is clear...