This page has been archived and commenting is disabled.

The First-Loss Insurance Providing EFSF Is A Truly Unique Vehicle

Tyler Durden's picture




 

Following this morning's busted issuance, it seems appropriate to take a deeper dive into the first-loss insurance that EFSF back-stopping will provide.

Via Peter Tchir of TF Market Advisors

There are still a lot of details to be worked out, but the €250 - €275 billion EFSF first loss insurance facility is starting to take shape.

The amount of exposure that the EFSF can take in any form and retain the AAA rating is capped at €452 billion Euro – the amount of guarantees provided by the AAA entities.  6 of the 17 EFSF countries are AAA (Germany 211, France 158.5, The Netherlands 44.4, Austria 21.6, Finland 14 and Luxembourg 1.9). The agencies have made it clear, that if any of those countries go on watch, or get downgraded, that would impact the rating of EFSF.  If something happened to the ratings of Luxembourg, or Finland, or even Austria, they could adjust the size down marginally.  The key will be for Germany, France, and the Netherlands to maintain their ratings – those 3 countries alone represent €414 billion of the AAA guarantees.

It looks more and more like the EFSF guarantees will be used in 3 different ways.  A portion will be used to raise money to meet commitments already made to Greece, Ireland, and Portugal.  Another portion will be allocated to provide additional capital to banks.  Finally, a portion will be used to back first-loss insurance.  There is some discussion about using it for secondary bond purchases, but at this stage, I am not sure how the EFSF would change the capital allocations or structures to do that, and in the end it may remain in the hands of the ECB anyway.

The EFSF First-Loss Insurance Program is like Nothing We Have Ever Seen Before

There are lots of examples of “guarantees” or “wraps” or “insurance” out there.  But, providers of such “insurance” normally guarantee the full notional of the underlying asset(s).  In this case, as a purchaser of such guaranteed paper, you can (if you so choose) largely ignore the credit quality of the underlying asset(s) and look directly to the credit of the guarantor for repayment.  You would do better looking at the underlying assets, but it isn’t critical as would be the case if you were buying them outright.  Fannie Mae is an example of such first-loss guarantor.  All of the “monolines” (MBIA for instance) also have this business model.  There is, however, a big difference between a full “wrap” and this partial wrap.  Since it is only partial, you need to do a greater assessment of the underlying assets than you would need to do if it was a full wrap.  The “first-loss” wrap allows the EFSF to leverage their guarantees, which is a benefit, but it doesn’t eliminate the need to focus on the underlying assets.

There are also lots of examples of credit enhancements where “first-loss” risk of a pool of assets is assumed by one group, making the “second-loss” more acceptable/safer.  Credit Card deals, CMO’s, and CDO’s all have this characteristic.  In all of these,  the first-loss tranche is created for a pool of assets.  In effect, this tranche lowers idiosyncratic risk and lets the “second-loss” investor focus on whether they are being compensated appropriately for the systematic risk.  Credit Card deals are a great example (largely because senior investors haven’t been burned).  If an underwriter has a good track record, you can assume that the credit cards they have issued will have a certain loss rate.  You don’t know in advance which customers will or won’t pay, but you don’t care so long as a big enough percentage of the losses are taken by the first-loss provider.  A CLO is  similar.  You may not know enough about individual leveraged loans, but if someone takes a 25% first-loss on a pool of 100 loans, it is easy to get comfortable that you won’t have losses on the other 75%, and you accept a return based on that.  The EFSF “first-loss insurance” is different from these structures because the “credit enhancement” is on a single specified asset.  Once again, it potentially reduces the possible loss and provides leverage, but investors cannot readily discount the underlying asset.

CDO’s and traditional “wraps” both ensure that the default of a single underlying asset doesn’t impact the second loss provider.  That is just not the case with the EFSF program.

If EFSF isn’t like a “Monoline” and isn’t like a “CDO” what is it?

Without knowing the exact format, the EFSF first-loss insurance looks a lot like a Binary or Digital CDS.  Those trades have a fixed payout if a Credit Event occurs.  They never became that popular in the regular CDS market because you were more exposed than ever to some form of technical default, and recoveries in general are very volatile – ranging from 0 to par.  We don’t know the exact format (insurance, wrap, guarantee, structured note, etc.) that the EFSF will take, but it looks like they will be providing something that pays a fixed amount if there is a default.  Recovery plays a key role here. If  there was a default and recovery was higher than 75% for a sovereign – although this doesn’t exactly seem likely – the payment under the “first-loss” insurance would be zero.  If a default occurs with respect to a European Sovereign with recovery below 75% (which seems a pretty safe assumption at this stage), the first-loss insurance would be the full 25%. Thus, a “digital” or “binary” outcome.  For now also, lets assume that they find a way to make everyone believe that the guarantee will act as the market expects it should (as opposed to all the questions raised by the EU manipulating the situation to deliberately avoid a Credit Event in respect to Greek CDS specifically, and Sovereign CDS in general).

What is the Value of a Binary CDS

Let’s look at a trade where if a default on a specific entity (or asset) occurs, and the owner of the insurance receives 25% of the bond notional he owns.  There are two concepts here: the “theoretical price”, and the “practical price”.  The theoretical price is based on the likelihood of a payment being triggered (in this case default).  So if the insurance were to be written on an extremely safe entity, the value of the first-loss insurance would be close to 0%, since default is very unlikely and thus no contingent payment under insurance is likely to occur.  On the other hand, if the insurance were to be written on an extremely risky entity, the value should approach the 25%.  In this case, the risk of default of the underlying entity would drive the theoretical value.

For the practical price, what someone is willing to pay for this option is a function of the quality of the entity that provided the guarantee.  If the guarantor is unlikely to pay because it too is near default, then even if the “theoretical” value was 25%, the price such first-loss insurance would trade at or “practical” value would be close to 0%.

So a first loss guarantee on Portugal written by the EFSF would have a value close to 20% (high probability of default, coupled with high quality insurance provider).  A first loss guarantee on Italy will have some mid-level value, and could over time trend to zero if Italian credit improves, and could drift towards 20% if Italy worsens while the AAA guarantors remain strong.  A first loss guarantee on France would have little value, and would never have a value much greater than about 13% (the portion of 25% that the AAAs without France are responsible for paying).

Finally it is important to note that if recovery were to be more than 75%, this first-loss insurance would cease to be binary because the payout now could range from 0% to 25% depending on actual recovery rate.

These details are important, because whoever is managing the EFSF can use them to maximize the benefit of the EFSF guarantees, or to waste the guarantees.

With €250 Billion of First Loss Guarantees to Issue, how should the EFSF do it?

There are a few big questions that the EFSF must make as they embark on this scheme.  Each decision is important and no choice is obviously superior than the other, each has its own drawbacks and benefits.  Some will help more if a one-time shot in the arm is all the market really needs (which I doubt) and some are better as a way to deal with another big round of weakness (which I suspect we will get).  We see 3 key decisions that need to be made – form of guaranty payouts, asset specific or country specific, and tied to new issues only or not.

Form of Guaranty Payouts – Wrap or CDS

The EFSF can choose to either make payments that cover “originally scheduled” interest and principal payments on a specific bond.  That is how a typical “monoline wrap” works.  If the underlying bond didn’t pay its coupon, then the EFSF would pay the coupon on 25% of the bond.  This works much better if the guaranty is linked to a specific bond and isn’t freely tradable.  Each time a new bond is issued with a wrap, the flows of that specific bond are what are guaranteed.  It can work with the guaranty being able to be stripped, but works best when it cannot be.  The big benefit of this, is that the guarantors don’t have to come up with as much cash up front.  The big 25% payment is only when the “wrapped” bond is maturing.  That would reduce immediate rating pressure if one of the countries defaulted.  The market will not like this form of wrap.  Delayed “wrap” payments don’t usually cause much concern for purchasers of “wrapped” bonds, but given the correlation between the guarantor and the defaulting bond, delay of guaranty payments increases the risk of no guaranty payments.  If Italy defaults, you want the EFSF to pay now, because the likelihood that the EFSF is in worse shape itself in the future, has increased.

Other benefits of this “wrap” approach is that the EFSF could just decide to make the payments even if there wasn’t a default.  This would directly shift 25% of the debt burden from the underlying country to the EFSF.  I’m not sure the EFSF would ever do that, but I could see circumstances that it would make sense – if France and Germany actually return to growth, while Italy or Spain remain stagnant.

The wrap also avoids having to have too much focus on defining default.  So long as investors are receiving coupon there is no default, and if the country doesn’t pay the coupon, the EFSF pays the coupon on 25% of the issue.  Simple and really just Failure to Pay trigger.

The other approach would to have a CDS style settlement.  Once a default (however it is defined) occurs, the EFSF pays out 100% - recovery, up to a maximum of 25%.  That is the simplest form (once anyone agrees on the default language).  This form of “insurance” would be the easiest to trade independently of a specifically insured bond.  The payout is likely to be 25% since recovery is likely to be below 75% (assuming people are comfortable with how a payout triggering event is defined).  The fact that this is easily tradable is offset by the fact that this would trigger fairly immediate EFSF payouts right after a European sovereign has defaulted.  It will put pressure on the funding of the guarantors and may be enough to immediately spread the contagion.  The contagion would come from the fact that EFSF members would need to issue bonds to make the payments and some amount of loss would be hitting bondholders in general since the EFSF only covers a portion of losses).

I have glossed over what would be a “triggering” event for the guaranty payout, but with all that is going on already in the CDS market, I suspect that this would be a non trivial issue in the real world.

I think I would go with the “wrap” approach rather than a “CDS-like” approach.  It has reduced flexibility, isn’t quite as appealing to the market, but gives some hope that the contagion wouldn’t immediately drag down the AAA’s, and doesn’t hinge on some definition of “default” that the market may reject as being too easily manipulated.

Freely Tradable of a New Type of Bond

The original “proposal” that was sent around included the idea of making the guaranty “freely” tradable.  If people can really trade the guaranty “freely” I imagine quickly it would wind up in hands of people hoping to profit from being short.  So they will probably try and make sure you hold some bonds in order to hold the guaranty.  That is workable, but less effective than being truly tradable.

The main benefit is that it should help all of the debt of a country.  By making the guaranty applicable to any bond, all bonds should benefit.  Since banks and corporations in a country will price debt using the sovereign debt as a benchmark, there is additional benefit to pushing the entire yield curve better.  On the other hand, the effect of the guaranty on new issues is very much diluted.  New Issues will price at the slightly improved sovereign yield (once the value of the attached guaranty is stripped out).  So the country won’t see as much of a benefit on new issues as it would if the guaranty was attached to a specific bond and not stripped out.  They may also be cannibalizing sales.  There may be a class of investor that wants riskier, un-hedged bonds.  They won’t be able to get those bonds, so the EFSF may not gain maximum benefit from the guaranty as they are effectively giving it to some investors who didn’t need it to invest in those bonds.

If the guaranty is freely tradable, it won’t be long before the prices of guaranty’s are headlines and drive the markets.  “The 5 year EFSF Italy Guarantee just traded at 22% implying a high probability of default.”  As the bond vigilantes attack France, the 3 year EFSF Spanish Guarantee dropped from 24% to 19% in spite of escalating problems in Spain – the market is concerned about France’s willingness to honor its EFSF obligations”.  Etc.  If the governments are worried that a few billion of net CDS exposure is what drives the bond markets, wait until they see the monster they unleash with 250 billion of EFSF guarantees trading daily.

The EFSF can try and link the guaranty to specific bond and try to ensure that it isn’t tradable.  We all know, that just means a desk will be set up to try and synthetically strip it, or figure out how to trade CDS against it, etc.  So it would be nice to say it isn’t tradable, the reality is, the market will try and find ways to whip it around anyways.  A guarantee in “wrap” form makes it less fungible anyways, so once again, leads to the conclusion that wrap and non tradable go together, and that CDS style and freely tradable work together, but mixing the other combinations are less effective.

By creating a new bond that is 25% guaranteed the EU can find an asset for risk averse investors and ones for those investors willing to take more risk.  It is possible that they get better execution on the new issues by offering some EFSF guaranteed bonds and some traditional bonds at each issue.    The guaranteed bonds should provide a much lower coupon for the sovereign, but the overall market for existing non-guaranteed bonds will be weaker and that does flow through the entire system of that country as it is what is used for a benchmark.

I’m very torn on what is better, but lean towards attaching to specific bonds, mostly because I think the “wrap” form is the way to go, and the “wrap” works better in the asset specific format than as freely tradable.  I also think that for a group that spends so much time trying to crush the CDS market, they will realize they are far more comfortable with non-tradable guarantees.

When and How Much to Issue?

This is the really tricky and crucial decision.  The first thing to remember here is that the EFSF is notionally constrained.  It doesn’t matter if it issues a guarantee of France or Portugal.  A €20 billion guarantee linked to either country would reduce the notional of future guarantees by the same amount, regardless of the fact that the “value” of the guaranty is dramatically different.  Banks and hedge funds tend to think in terms of “risk”.  They would both be more comfortable with a larger position in France than Portugal based on vol, risk, etc.  We can argue whether this isn’t what caused the problem in the first place, but it is how risk managers are trained to behave.  The EFSF is based strictly on notional issued and it has a constrained notional.  The guarantees are actually a scarce resource.  They can only issue €250 billion.  They need to maximize the value of that.

Does it make sense to offer guarantees when the market is trading reasonably well?  If outright bonds can be sold at 5% yields for 5 years, should a guarantee be attached?  You don’t get much benefit from the guarantee in that case, but the notional is used up.  If the situation gets out of control, like a Portugal, how much does the guarantee really help.  If they are issuing guarantees that are worth almost the full notional, the EFSF will be deemed as very risky, and it may not help drive much of a new issue anyways.  If bonds can be bought in the secondary market at 60% of par, a 25% first loss protected bond, may not get that much interest.  The risk/reward would likely favor purchasing the 60% of par priced bond in the secondary market.  If you bought the new issue, you could lose 15% more than if you bought the other bond in the secondary market.  In theory you would get a higher coupon on the new issue, so at some point, if default is avoided, you can outperform, but it will be a decision based on time to default and just how massive the coupon is (the bond priced at 60% can appreciate in value).  That high coupon might not help the sovereign much anyways, merely delay the time to default for a bit longer. So if the guaranty has a high intrinsic value at time of issuance, the leverage effect is much lower.

My gut feel is that this facility shouldn’t be used when bonds can be issued below 6% (or maybe even 7%) since the notional is used up quickly with limited value being received for the guaranty.  It also probably doesn’t work if yields get above 10% because the second loss is too risky, so you don’t get the leverage and the benefit to the issuing country is marginal at best.

I would recommend going with going with a two-tier system.  Wrapped bonds where the wrap is asset specific, and tradional bonds.  As a country needs to do an auction, the amount of straight debt and guaranteed debt can be varied.  If the market is doing well, maybe 100% can be done as a straight bond, thus reserving the notional for future use.  If the market is widening, but still in control, maybe a bigger deal can be offered to the market, so that the notional is used while still efficient.

As countries deteriorate, they may have to be allowed to default because not only will the EFSF get little or no leverage, it will get attacked.  Investors will not wait for the EFSF to run out of notional before going after countries that haven’t fixed their core problems or even going after the EFSF good members if they have taken on too much debt.  Once the end of guarantees is in sight (if not before then) countries that still have fundamental problems will face renewed pressure.  Limiting the use of guarantees when they aren’t being sold for good value, would give more time to the Eurozone to correct its problems, but may not be enough to shake us into a period where PIIGS default is off the table.

Alternatively, they could flood the market with PIIGS guarantees right away.  That could spark a big rally in the bond markets.  Maybe that is enough to regain confidence and growth.  It could equally fail to do anything, and with no dry powder left, the deterioration could accelerate rather than being delayed long enough to fix.

No easy answers, but EFSF doesn’t even have the right people to ask the right questions

Some decisions will have to be made soon.  The form of the guarantee and whether it is freely tradable or not.  Those decisions could be changed over time, but they need to be made sooner rather than later to give the market some confidence and a focus.

Managing when to use the guarantees is a far more difficult problem.  There is no right answer, but someone is going to have to be responsible, and their decisions on how to use this scarce resource will control how long the program is effective or if it is even effective at all.  The EFSF needs people  of its own to figure it out – the banks, and even central banks have so many of their own agendas, that someone needs to be strong to make sure this program isn’t completely wasted or used horribly ineffectively.  I ultimately don’t think the program does that much, but someone in charge there needs to be doing it right to give it any chance.  Regling, while likely a strong choice when the EFSF was going to make highly negotiated bilateral loans to individual countries, doesn’t seem up to the task of managing this now massive, and highly complex structured EFSF.  The recent trip to China trying to pitch investing in something, anything, without any idea of what something or anything would be, is just one example.

Why we have wound up at the stage that issuing binary options on sovereign debt is a good solution, I don’t know, but since we are there, it might as well be done as well as possible.

What about SPITALY?

They could try and jointly wrap a big block of Italian and Spanish bonds.  Make it somewhat more CDO like.  Let’s say they do €350 of Spain and €650 of Italy.  If Italy defaults, the second loss holder would likely have a loss, so it still doesn’t protect the 2nd loss holder against even one default,  If Spain were to default, then there would be money left over, but the reality is that you would not have much protection on your Italy EFSF hedge, and it would ensure that investors were now looking to hedge Italian exposure and probably again at a time that Italian debt is in deep trouble because of the Spanish default.  Something like this would give the biggest bang for the Euro up front, but does nothing but ensure contagion if it isn’t enough to solve the problems.  The two big countries that the EFSF is trying to protect are both too big, default likelihood is too high, and the deep pockets just aren’t deep enough, and the fact that every country involved is highly correlated, makes any wrap or CDO solution marginal at best because it unravels at the first default.
 

 

- advertisements -

Comment viewing options

Select your preferred way to display the comments and click "Save settings" to activate your changes.
Wed, 11/02/2011 - 13:13 | 1837486 Fips_OnTheSpot
Fips_OnTheSpot's picture

GET THIS http://t.co/hgkSHMUr

 

The wannabe-kid in Feb/2012 after EFSF.

Wed, 11/02/2011 - 13:47 | 1837630 Strider52
Strider52's picture

Sort-of OT, but worth reading: What the Greeks REALLY feel about Germans, from a boots-on-the-ground traveller:

From Turd Ferg's blog:

http://www.tfmetalsreport.com/comment/80405#comment-80405

Wed, 11/02/2011 - 13:14 | 1837500 Deadpool
Deadpool's picture

"The first man gets the oyster, the second man gets the shell." Andrew Carnegie

Wed, 11/02/2011 - 13:15 | 1837504 GeneMarchbanks
GeneMarchbanks's picture

Unique... for 'special' investors.

Wed, 11/02/2011 - 13:15 | 1837507 Irish66
Irish66's picture

logic again, done as well as possible

Wed, 11/02/2011 - 15:28 | 1838203 slewie the pi-rat
slewie the pi-rat's picture

i'll bet luxembourg is begging the ratings agencied for a downgrade!

Wed, 11/02/2011 - 13:20 | 1837518 SheepDog-One
SheepDog-One's picture

Rube Goldberg designed a lot of 'truly unique vehicles' as well.

2D Photography Rube Goldberg - YouTube

Wed, 11/02/2011 - 13:20 | 1837530 disabledvet
disabledvet's picture

Massive bank failure in Europe. Tomorrow.

Wed, 11/02/2011 - 13:39 | 1837611 CrimsonAvenger
CrimsonAvenger's picture

Reasoning?

Wed, 11/02/2011 - 13:20 | 1837532 LongSoupLine
LongSoupLine's picture

Empty boxes under the tree covered in "pretty paper".

Wed, 11/02/2011 - 13:27 | 1837565 Cassandra Syndrome
Cassandra Syndrome's picture

The morphine is wearing off the trading pits. Reality is a bitch, bitchez...

Wed, 11/02/2011 - 13:33 | 1837587 SheepDog-One
SheepDog-One's picture

As the clouds of Hopium waft away, the hangovers seem to be getting worse. 

Wed, 11/02/2011 - 13:29 | 1837570 agent default
agent default's picture

Financial Innovation? What a deal! Where do I sign up?

Wed, 11/02/2011 - 13:32 | 1837580 delacroix
delacroix's picture

we who have done so much, with so little, for so long, now attempt to do the impossible, with absolutely nothing

Wed, 11/02/2011 - 13:50 | 1837642 AldoHux_IV
AldoHux_IV's picture

All these short-term technical gimmicks to not trigger an event, but neglecting the whole time the model is inherently flawed as you can not solve the insolvable with more debt (even if it comes with guarantees).

In the meantime, the technical talk is good reading for those not so familiar with the CDS-esque market (like myself).

So if Greece leaves the euro zone the threat debate comes down to potentially being shunned as a pariah in Europe or being a slave to debt and giving up your sovereignty.  Doesn't seem so tough a choice, but then again I hear Stockholm syndrome is real.

Wed, 11/02/2011 - 13:53 | 1837654 kaiserhoff
kaiserhoff's picture

If I were a bond buyer, words I would never want to hear are "unique instrument" and Greece.

There will be no market for this crap.  If it proceeds at all, it will have to be forced on the banks.   Valuation?  It is to laugh.

Wed, 11/02/2011 - 14:12 | 1837722 SDRII
SDRII's picture

This entire post - imaginative/informative as it is  - misses the fundamental point that it is (was) the opaqueness that makes (made) the engine run. All the between the legs dribbling about stripping guarantees, waterfall structures etc. don't dazzle anywhere near what they did pre 2007. 

Wed, 11/02/2011 - 14:52 | 1838013 Whizbang
Whizbang's picture

I get it! All they are doing is offering to back the questionable debt with a synthetic vehicle which is composed of a combination of interest rate and default swaps from the remaining european countries. The risk is ultimately spread to france and germany, but with the support of smaller european states backing them, the odds of default theoretically diminish substantially. At the same time, it gives the appearance of of being funded by all of europe, not a bilateral action between germany and france. The problem is that you are backing a dubious promise to pay with another AAA RATED OVERLEVERAGED SYNTHETIC INSTRUMENT WHICH IS BACKED BY NO REAL CAPITAL. It's just the sovereign countries doing the same thing that Paulson, Indymac and Wachovia were doing back in 2007-2008.

 

It's probably all garbage, but it'll be interesting to see how people respond to the idea.

Wed, 11/02/2011 - 14:53 | 1838016 Whizbang
Whizbang's picture

I get it! All they are doing is offering to back the questionable debt with a synthetic vehicle which is composed of a combination of interest rate and default swaps from the remaining European countries. The risk is ultimately spread to France and Germany, but with the support of smaller European states backing them, the odds of default theoretically diminish substantially. At the same time, it gives the appearance of of being funded by all of Europe, not a bilateral action between Germany and France. The problem is that you are backing a dubious promise to pay with another AAA RATED OVERLEVERAGED SYNTHETIC INSTRUMENT WHICH IS BACKED BY NO REAL CAPITAL. It's just the sovereign countries doing the same thing that Paulson, Indymac and Wachovia were doing back in 2007-2008.

 

It's probably all garbage, but it'll be interesting to see how people respond to the idea.

Wed, 11/02/2011 - 14:53 | 1838018 Whizbang
Whizbang's picture

I get it! All they are doing is offering to back the questionable debt with a synthetic vehicle which is composed of a combination of interest rate and default swaps from the remaining European countries. The risk is ultimately spread to France and Germany, but with the support of smaller European states backing them, the odds of default theoretically diminish substantially. At the same time, it gives the appearance of of being funded by all of Europe, not a bilateral action between Germany and France. The problem is that you are backing a dubious promise to pay with another AAA RATED OVERLEVERAGED SYNTHETIC INSTRUMENT WHICH IS BACKED BY NO REAL CAPITAL. It's just the sovereign countries doing the same thing that Paulson, Indymac and Wachovia were doing back in 2007-2008.

 

It's probably all garbage, but it'll be interesting to see how people respond to the idea.

Wed, 11/02/2011 - 15:47 | 1838301 Withdrawn Sanction
Withdrawn Sanction's picture

The two big countries that the EFSF is trying to protect are both too big, default likelihood is too high, and the deep pockets just aren’t deep enough, and the fact that every country involved is highly correlated, makes any wrap or CDO solution marginal at best because it unravels at the first default.

I like the way Tchir thinks through the various permutations of these impossible dilemmas, and ultimately comes to the conclusion that...well, the quotation above sums it up.  A snowball's chance in hell.  Not quite zero, but you can smell zero from there.

Wed, 11/02/2011 - 19:39 | 1839187 Schmuck Raker
Schmuck Raker's picture

Thank you PT, for enlightening me on the nuances in understandable language.

 

Do NOT follow this link or you will be banned from the site!