FOMC Minutes: Some Fed Officials Sought To Retain Option For QE3
It appears Operation Twist was not enough for all...
- SOME FED OFFICIALS SOUGHT TO RETAIN OPTION OF QE3, MINUTES SAY
- SOME FED OFFICIALS SAW QE3 AS 'MORE POTENT TOOL' TO SPUR GROWTH.
- TWO FOMC MEMBERS FAVORED `STRONGER POLICY ACTION' LAST MONTH
And remember Golidlocks:
- MANY FOMC MEMBERS SAID INFLATION RISKS `WERE ROUGHLY BALANCED'
- FOMC MEMBERS SAW `RELATIVELY LITTLE RISK OF DEFLATION'
- FOMC MINUTES SAY LABOUR MARKET COSTS REMAIN SUBDUED
Specifically on why QE3 is coming, only a matter of time:
Meeting participants expressed a range of views on the potential efficacy of policy tools tied to the size and composition of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet. Many judged that these policies could provide additional monetary policy accommodation by lowering longer-term interest rates and easing financial conditions at a time when further reductions in the federal funds rate are infeasible. However, a number saw the potential effects on real economic activity as limited or only transitory, particularly in the current environment of balance sheet deleveraging, credit constraints, and household and business uncertainty about the economic outlook. Participants noted that a SOMA maturity extension program would not expand the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet or the level of reserve balances, and that the scale of such a program was necessarily limited by the size of the Federal Reserve’s holdings of shorter-term securities so that it could not be repeated to provide further stimulus. A number of participants saw large-scale asset purchases as potentially a more potent tool that should be retained as an option in the event that further policy action to support a stronger economic recovery was warranted. Some judged that large-scale asset purchases and the resulting expansion of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet would be more likely to raise inflation and inflation expectations than to stimulate economic activity and argued that such tools should be reserved for circumstances in which the risk of deflation was elevated.
On why Goldman did not get the desired reduction in IOER:
Participants discussed whether to reduce the IOR rate, weighing potential benefits and costs. A number of participants judged that a reduction would result in at least marginally lower money market rates and could help stimulate bank lending. Several noted that reducing the IOR rate could help signal the Committee’s intention to keep the federal funds rate low. Some participants observed that keeping the IOR rate noticeably above the market rate on other safe, short-term instruments could be perceived as subsidizing some banking institutions. However, some others noted that a recent change in deposit insurance assessments had the effect of significantly reducing the net return that many banks receive from holding reserve balances. Moreover, many participants voiced concerns that reducing the IOR rate risked costly disruptions to money markets and to the intermediation of credit, and that the magnitude of such effects would be difficult to predict in advance. Participants generally agreed that they needed more information on the likely effects of a reduction in the IOR rate in order to judge its usefulness as a policy tool in the current environment.
On increased transparency:
Most participants also indicated that they saw advantages in being more transparent about the conditionality in the Committee’s forward guidance by providing more information about the economic conditions to which the guidance refers. They judged that such a step could make the Committee’s forward guidance more effective and increase the likelihood that financial markets would respond to incoming economic information in ways that would help monetary policy achieve its goals. However, several participants saw a risk that any explicit statement of economic conditions specified in the Committee’s forward guidance could be mistaken for a statement of its longer-run objectives. Others thought this risk of misinterpretation could be managed through careful communications. A number of participants suggested that the Committee’s periodic Summary of Economic Projections could be used to provide more information about their views on the longer-run objectives and the likely evolution of monetary policy.
The Fed on the USd and on stocks:
The foreign exchange value of the dollar increased over the intermeeting period, reflecting a flight to safety that also contributed to lower benchmark sovereign yields in Germany, the United Kingdom, and Canada. In contrast, the yield on two-year Greek sovereign bonds rose sharply as market participants became increasingly concerned that Greece might default on its sovereign debt. Equity prices in the euro area decreased over the intermeeting period, following sharp declines in early August. After falling steeply before the August FOMC meeting, emerging market equity prices were little changed, on net, over the period.
The Fed on other central planners around the world:
The European Central Bank continued to purchase, in the secondary market, sovereign debt of euro-area countries. Yields on Italian and Spanish debt, which declined following reported ECB purchases in early August, drifted higher during the intermeeting period. Prices of money market futures contracts indicated that monetary policy was expected to become more accommodative in both the euro area and the United Kingdom. The Swiss National Bank took several steps to ease monetary policy, including intervening in the foreign exchange market to counter further appreciation of its currency and eventually announcing that it is prepared to buy unlimited quantities of foreign currency to prevent the Swiss franc from trading in the foreign exchange market at a rate below 1.2 Swiss francs per euro. Citing concerns over the global economic outlook, the central bank of Brazil reduced its policy rate after having raised it several times earlier this year. In contrast, China continued to tighten its monetary policy, extending reserve requirements to a wider range of bank liabilities as it attempted to rein in off-balance sheet lending by its banks.
And why wages are never going up, at least not until money is falling from the skies:
Available measures of labor compensation indicated that wage increases continued to be restrained by the large margin of slack in the labor market. Average hourly earnings for all employees posted a small gain, on net, over July and August, and their rate of increase from 12 months earlier remained subdued.
Lastly, why the dissenters dissented:
Messrs. Fisher, Kocherlakota, and Plosser dissented because they did not support additional policy accommodation at this time. Mr. Fisher saw a maturity extension program as providing few, if any, benefits in support of job creation or economic growth, while it could potentially constrain or complicate the timely removal of policy accommodation. In his view, any reduction in long-term Treasury rates resulting from this policy action would likely lead to further hoarding by savers, with counterproductive results on business and consumer confidence and spending behaviors. He felt that policymakers should instead focus their attention on improving the monetary policy transmission mechanism, particularly with regard to the activity of community banks, which are vital to small business lending and job creation. Mr. Kocherlakota’s perspective on the policy decision was again shaped by his view that in November 2010, the Committee had chosen a level of accommodation that was well calibrated for the condition of the economy. Since November, inflation, and the one-year-ahead forecast for inflation, had risen, while unemployment, and the one-year-ahead forecast for unemployment, had fallen. He did not believe that providing more monetary accommodation was the appropriate response to those changes in the economy, given the current policy framework. Mr. Plosser felt that a maturity extension program would do little to improve near-term growth or employment, in light of the ongoing structural adjustments and fiscal challenges both in the United States and abroad. Moreover, in his view, with inflation continuing to run above earlier forecasts, such a program could risk adding unwanted inflationary pressures and complicate the eventual exit from the period of extraordinarily accommodative monetary policy.