SEC Sues Former Fannie, Freddie CEOs For Misleading Investors On Subprime Risk
So with just a 3 years delay, the SEC has finally put down the porn channel remote, and decided to do what it should have done back in 2008, which is to sue the former heads of Fannie and Freddie for "misleading investors about risky mortgages" in the case below, former Fannie CEO Daniel Mudd, who was paid $13.4 million in 2007. With MF Global telling everyone it had no European exposure as recently as September 30, this appears to be a recurrent theme. So at this pace, Corzine should expect the SEC to sue him... about 8 years after he passes away? Per Reuters: "The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission sued three former executives at Fannie Mae and three at Freddie Mac, including former chief executives of both companies. The civil charges were filed in two separate lawsuits. The SEC said both firms have agreed to cooperate with the agency and have entered into non-prosecution agreements." Yes, your honor, we don't admit or deny that we got paid tens of millions to blow up the companies at the backbone of the American mortgage industry by lying what we were investing in, but we will cooperate... We promise. In the meantime, we won't hold our breath for the SEC to clawback even one cent from Mudd in this purely theatrical spectacle, of which we will see many more as the US enters election year. Incidentally, any and all LPs of Fortress Group may want to ask themselves what else (if anyhting) the current CEO of the company, who just happens to be Dan Mudd, is misrepresenting these days.
From the lawsuit:
This action arises out of a series of materially false and misleading public disclosures by the Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae" or the "Company") and certain of its former senior executives concerning the Company's exposure to subprime mortgage and reduced documentation Alt-A loans. Eager to promote the impression that Fannie Mae had limited exposure to- subprime and Alt-A loans during a period of heightened investor interest in the credit risks associated with these loans, Fannie Mae and its executives misled investors into believing that the Company had far less exposure to these riskier mortgages than in fact existed.
Between December 6, 2006, and August 8, 2008, (the "Relevant Period"), Daniel H. Mudd ("Mudd"), Enrico Dallavecchia ("Dallavecchia") and Thomas A. Lund ("Lund") (collectively, "Defendants"), made or substantially assisted others in making materially false and misleading statements regarding Fannie Mae's exposure to subprime and Alt-A loans.
For example, in a February 2007 public filing, Fannie Mae described subprime loans as loans "made to borrowers with weaker credit histories" and reported that 0.2%, or approximately $4.8 billion, of its Single Family credit book of business as of December 31, 2006, consisted of subprime mortgage loans or structured Fannie Mae Mortgage Backed Securities ("MBS") backed by subprime mortgage loans.
Fannie Mae did not disclose to investors that in calculating the Company's reported exposure to subprime loans, Fannie Mae did not include loan products specifically targeted by the Company towards borrowers with weaker credit histories, including Expanded Approval ("EA") loans. As ofDecember 31, 2006, the amount ofEA loans owned or securitized in the Company's single-family credit business was approximately $43.3 billion, yet none of these loans were included in the Company's disclosed subprime exposure.
Fannie Mae's exclusion of loans such as EA from its subprime disclosures was particularly misleading because EA loans were exactly the type of loans that investors would reasonably believe Fannie Mae included when calculating its exposure to subprime loans. In fact, the Company identified EA as its "most significant initiative to serve credit impaired borrowers" in response to regulatory requests for information on its subprime loans. In addition, all of the Defendants knew that EA loans had higher average serious delinquency rates, higher credit losses, and lower average credit scores than the loans Fannie Mae included when calculating its disclosed subprime loan exposure.
In a November 2007 public filing, Fannie Mae described subprime loans as a loan to a borrower with a "weaker credit profile than that of a prime borrower," classified mortgage loans as "subprime" if the mortgage loans were originated by a "specialty" subprime lender or a "subprime division of a large lender," and again represented that only 0.2%, or approximately $4.8 billion, of its Single Family credit book of business consisted of subprime mortgage loans or structured Fannie Mae MBS backed by subprime mortgage loans as of both March 31, 2007, and June 30, 2007.
Fannie Mae did not tell investors that in calculating the Company's exposure to subprime loans reported in this filing, Fannie Mae again did not include at least $43 billion of EA loans, included loans from only fifteen loan originators of the approximately 210 lenders listed on the HUD Subprime Lender list, and did not even have the capacity to track whether loans were originated by a subprime division of a large lender.
Fannie Mae made similarly misleading disclosures concerning its exposure to subprime loans in public filings throughout the Relevant Period. The result of these disclosures was to mislead investors into seriously underestimating Fannie Mae's exposure to subprime loans.
Similarly, Fannie Mae misled investors concerning its exposure to Alt-A loans with reduced or alternative documentation requirements. Fannie Mae did not disclose the total percentage of its Single Family mortgage guarantee business consisting of reduced documentation loans as reflected in its own internal reporting, which Defendants routinely received throughout the Relevant Period.
The result of these disclosures was to mislead investors into materially underestimating Fannie Mae's exposure to reduced documentation loans. Fannie Mae made similarly misleading disclosures concerning its exposure to reduced documentation loans in public filings throughout the Relevant Period.
By engaging in the misconduct described herein, Mudd violated and aided and abetted the violation of the antifraud and reporting provisions of the federal securities laws; Dallavecchia violated the antifraud provisions and aided and abetted the violation of the antifraud and reporting provisions of the federal securities laws; and Lund aided and abetted violations of the antifraud and reporting provisions of the federal securities laws. The Commission seeks injunctive relief, disgorgement of profits, prejudgment interest, civil penalties and other appropriate and necessary equitable relief from both defendants.