Spain: The Ultimate Doomsday Presentation

Tyler Durden's picture

Since we have grown tired of variations on the theme of "The Pain in ...." (having been guilty of encouraging it ourselves), we will spare readers this triteness, and instead summarize the attached must read slidedeck from Carmel Asset Management as the ultimate Spanish doomsday presentation. Naive and/or idealistic Spanish readers are advised to resume sticking their heads in the sand, and to stay as far away as possible from the attached 54 pages, which prove without any doubt why not only was Greece the appetizer (have your UK law:non-UK Law divergence trade on yet?) but why things in Europe are about to get far, far worse, as the Hurricane shifts to its next preferred location, somewhere above and just south of the Pyrenees.

In summary, here are Carmel's five reasons why Spain's problems are worse than the market anticipates:

1. Spain’s national debt is 50% greater than the headline numbers

Spain’s debt-to-GDP balloons from 60% to 90% of GDP with regional and other debts

2. Spain’s housing prices will fall by an additional 35%

Spain built one house for every additional person added to the population during the past two decades; the fall will decrease GDP by ~2% each of the next two years

3. Spain has “zombie” banks with massive loans to developers and to homeowners

Banks have not begun to realize losses and are vastly undercapitalized

4. Spain’s economy has not stabilized and will continue to deteriorate

Spain has the highest unemployment in the developed world, one of the highest overall debt loads, and the most uncompetitive labor market in Europe

5. The EU will not have the firepower or political will to bail out Spain

Rescue fund headline numbers are misleading and count capital that is not yet committed

And here are the problems that will manifest themselves over the next 12 months:

  • Spain’s true debt burden will pass the 90% “tipping point” identified by Rogoff and Reinhart
  • Housing prices will fall further and faster than anticipated (consensus is 15%; CAM estimate is 35%)
  • Banks underestimate the residential real estate loan defaults (consensus estimate is 2.8% vs. CAM estimate of 11%)
  • Expected housing price depreciation and loan defaults will deepen Spain’s recession (additional 2% contraction in 2012 and 2013)
  • Spain will need to refinance €186.1 Billion in 2012 alone

End result: surging CDS and/or plunging bond prices, if faith in the sovereign CDS market continues to be at rock bottom lows courtesy of ISDA nearly blowing its own head off.

Full presentation: