On one hand there are hard-core Keynesians who will wave the flag of inflation as the only cure to a world drowning in debt, even after the mushroom cloud results of their policies going off around the globe "assure" GDP hits +? once every window in the world is shattered and has to be replaced...
... on the other, you have the BIS which with every passing day is becoming the citadel of Austrian thought, the latest example thanks to the BIS' most recent quarterly review [8]in which we read that not only is deflation not the "monster" the Bank of Japan and other Keynesian acolytes would like to make it appear...
The evidence from our long historical data set sheds new light on the costs of deflations. It raises questions about the prevailing view that goods and services price deflations, even if persistent, are always pernicious. It suggests that asset price deflations, and particularly house price deflations in the postwar era, have been more damaging. And it cautions against presuming that the interaction between debt and goods and services price deflation, as opposed to debt’s interaction with property price deflations, has played a significant role in past episodes of economic weakness.
... but more importantly and as Zero Hedge has said from day one, the BIS now says the solution to an asset bubble is not some incomprehensible jibberish of "macroprudential regulation" or a "bubble-busting" SWAT team at the Fed [9], not another asset bubble (especially not one which leads to house price deflation, the same that is slamming the Chinese economy at this moment), which by now has become clear to all is the only "tool" in a central banker's aresnal, and the remedy to debt is not even more debt.
How best to address financial cycles is a broader policy question that the specific analysis in this article obviously cannot answer. As discussed in detail elsewhere (see eg Borio (2014a,b)), there is a case that policy should first and foremost constrain the build-up of financial booms – especially in the form of strong joint credit and property price increases – as these are the main cause of the subsequent bust. And once the financial bust occurs, after the financial system is stabilised, the priority should be to address the nexus of debt and poor asset quality head-on, rather than relying on overly aggressive and prolonged macroeconomic accommodation through traditional policies. This would pave the way for a sustainable recovery. The idea would be to have macroeconomic policies that are more symmetrical across financial booms and busts so as to avoid a persistent bias that could, over time, entrench instability and chronic economic weakness as well as exhaust the policy room for manoeuvre.
The Fed's response: the S&P should hit new all time highs in the next few hours.
