Newly-Declassified Documents Show Western Leaders Promised Gorbachev that NATO Would Not Move “One Inch Closer” to Russia

The U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union at the time it broke up and many other experts have said that the West promised Gorbachev that – if the USSR allowed German re-unification – NATO wouldn’t move “one inch closer” to Russia.

While Western leaders have long denied that such a promise was ever made, newly-declassified documents now prove this.

The National Security Archive at George Washington University reported Tuesday:

U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s famous “not one inch eastward” assurance about NATO expansion in his meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on February 9, 1990, was part of a cascade of assurances about Soviet security given by Western leaders to Gorbachev and other Soviet officials throughout the process of German unification in 1990 and on into 1991, according to declassified U.S., Soviet, German, British and French documents posted today by the National Security Archive at George Washington University (


The documents show that multiple national leaders were considering and rejecting Central and Eastern European membership in NATO as of early 1990 and through 1991, that discussions of NATO in the context of German unification negotiations in 1990 were not at all narrowly limited to the status of East German territory, and that subsequent Soviet and Russian complaints about being misled about NATO expansion were founded in written contemporaneous memcons and telcons at the highest levels.


The documents reinforce former CIA Director Robert Gates’s criticism of “pressing ahead with expansion of NATO eastward [in the 1990s], when Gorbachev and others were led to believe that wouldn’t happen.” The key phrase, buttressed by the documents, is “led to believe.”




The first concrete assurances by Western leaders on NATO began on January 31, 1990, when West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher opened the bidding with a major public speech at Tutzing, in Bavaria, on German unification. The U.S. Embassy in Bonn (see Document 1) informed Washington that Genscher made clear “that the changes in Eastern Europe and the German unification process must not lead to an ‘impairment of Soviet security interests.’ Therefore, NATO should rule out an ‘expansion of its territory towards the east, i.e. moving it closer to the Soviet borders.’” The Bonn cable also noted Genscher’s proposal to leave the East German territory out of NATO military structures even in a unified Germany in NATO.


This latter idea of special status for the GDR territory was codified in the final German unification treaty signed on September 12, 1990, by the Two-Plus-Four foreign ministers (see Document 25). The former idea about “closer to the Soviet borders” is written down not in treaties but in multiple memoranda of conversation between the Soviets and the highest-level Western interlocutors (Genscher, Kohl, Baker, Gates, Bush, Mitterrand, Thatcher, Major, Woerner, and others) offering assurances throughout 1990 and into 1991 about protecting Soviet security interests and including the USSR in new European security structures. The two issues were related but not the same. Subsequent analysis sometimes conflated the two and argued that the discussion did not involve all of Europe. The documents published below show clearly that it did.


The “Tutzing formula” immediately became the center of a flurry of important diplomatic discussions over the next 10 days in 1990, leading to the crucial February 10, 1990, meeting in Moscow between Kohl and Gorbachev when the West German leader achieved Soviet assent in principle to German unification in NATO, as long as NATO did not expand to the east.




The conversations before Kohl’s assurance involved explicit discussion of NATO expansion, the Central and East European countries, and how to convince the Soviets to accept unification. For example, on February 6, 1990, when Genscher met with British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd, the British record showed Genscher saying, “The Russians must have some assurance that if, for example, the Polish Government left the Warsaw Pact one day, they would not join NATO the next.” (See Document 2)

Having met with Genscher on his way into discussions with the Soviets, Baker repeated exactly the Genscher formulation in his meeting with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze on February 9, 1990, (see Document 4); and even more importantly, face to face with Gorbachev.


Not once, but three times, Baker tried out the “not one inch eastward” formula with Gorbachev in the February 9, 1990, meeting. He agreed with Gorbachev’s statement in response to the assurances that “NATO expansion is unacceptable.” Baker assured Gorbachev that “neither the President nor I intend to extract any unilateral advantages from the processes that are taking place,” and that the Americans understood that “not only for the Soviet Union but for other European countries as well it is important to have guarantees that if the United States keeps its presence in Germany within the framework of NATO, not an inch of NATO’s present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction.” (See Document 6).

Here are two relevant excerpts from Document 6:
Delete 1


The National Security Archive report continues:

Baker reported: “And then I put the following question to him [Gorbachev]. Would you prefer to see a united Germany outside of NATO, independent and with no U.S. forces or would you prefer a unified Germany to be tied to NATO, with assurances that NATO’s jurisdiction would not shift one inch eastward from its present position? He answered that the Soviet leadership was giving real thought to all such options [….] He then added, ‘Certainly any extension of the zone of NATO would be unacceptable.’” Baker added in parentheses, for Kohl’s benefit, “By implication, NATO in its current zone might be acceptable.” (See Document 8)


Well-briefed by the American secretary of state, the West German chancellor understood a key Soviet bottom line, and assured Gorbachev on February 10, 1990: “We believe that NATO should not expand the sphere of its activity.” (See Document 9).

Here is a related excerpt from Document 9:


The National Security Archives report concludes:

All the Western foreign ministers were on board with Genscher, Kohl, and Baker. Next came the British foreign minister, Douglas Hurd, on April 11, 1990.




Hurd reinforced the Baker-Genscher-Kohl message in his meeting with Gorbachev in Moscow, April 11, 1990, saying that Britain clearly “recognized the importance of doing nothing to prejudice Soviet interests and dignity.” (See Document 15)


The Baker conversation with Shevardnadze on May 4, 1990, as Baker described it in his own report to President Bush, most eloquently described what Western leaders were telling Gorbachev exactly at the moment: “I used your speech and our recognition of the need to adapt NATO, politically and militarily, and to develop CSCE to reassure Shevardnadze that the process would not yield winners and losers. Instead, it would produce a new legitimate European structure – one that would be inclusive, not exclusive.” (See Document 17)


Baker said it again, directly to Gorbachev on May 18, 1990 in Moscow, giving Gorbachev his “nine points,” which included the transformation of NATO, strengthening European structures, keeping Germany non-nuclear, and taking Soviet security interests into account. Baker started off his remarks, “Before saying a few words about the German issue, I wanted to emphasize that our policies are not aimed at separating Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union. We had that policy before. But today we are interested in building a stable Europe, and doing it together with you.” (See Document 18)


The French leader Francois Mitterrand  … continued the cascade of assurances by saying the West must “create security conditions for you, as well as European security as a whole.” (See Document 19) Mitterrand immediately wrote Bush in a “cher George” letter about his conversation with the Soviet leader, that “we would certainly not refuse to detail the guarantees that he would have a right to expect for his country’s security.” (See Document 20)


At the Washington summit on May 31, 1990, Bush went out of his way to assure Gorbachev that Germany in NATO would never be directed at the USSR: “Believe me, we are not pushing Germany towards unification, and it is not us who determines the pace of this process. And of course, we have no intention, even in our thoughts, to harm the Soviet Union in any fashion. That is why we are speaking in favor of German unification in NATO without ignoring the wider context of the CSCE, taking the traditional economic ties between the two German states into consideration. Such a model, in our view, corresponds to the Soviet interests as well.” (See Document 21)


The “Iron Lady” also pitched in, after the Washington summit, in her meeting with Gorbachev in London on June 8, 1990. Thatcher anticipated the moves the Americans (with her support) would take in the early July NATO conference to support Gorbachev with descriptions of the transformation of NATO towards a more political, less militarily threatening, alliance. She said to Gorbachev: “We must find ways to give the Soviet Union confidence that its security would be assured…. CSCE could be an umbrella for all this, as well as being the forum which brought the Soviet Union fully into discussion about the future of Europe.” (See Document 22)


The NATO London Declaration on July 5, 1990 had quite a positive effect on deliberations in Moscow, according to most accounts, giving Gorbachev significant ammunition to counter his hardliners at the Party Congress which was taking place at that moment.




As Kohl said to Gorbachev in Moscow on July 15, 1990, as they worked out the final deal on German unification: “We know what awaits NATO in the future, and I think you are now in the know as well,” referring to the NATO London Declaration. (See Document 23)


In his phone call to Gorbachev on July 17, Bush meant to reinforce the success of the Kohl-Gorbachev talks and the message of the London Declaration. Bush explained: “So what we tried to do was to take account of your concerns expressed to me and others, and we did it in the following ways: by our joint declaration on non-aggression; in our invitation to you to come to NATO; in our agreement to open NATO to regular diplomatic contact with your government and those of the Eastern European countries; and our offer on assurances on the future size of the armed forces of a united Germany – an issue I know you discussed with Helmut Kohl. We also fundamentally changed our military approach on conventional and nuclear forces. We conveyed the idea of an expanded, stronger CSCE with new institutions in which the USSR can share and be part of the new Europe.” (See Document 24)


The documents show that Gorbachev agreed to German unification in NATO as the result of this cascade of assurances, and on the basis of his own analysis that the future of the Soviet Union depended on its integration into Europe, for which Germany would be the decisive actor. He and most of his allies believed that some version of the common European home was still possible and would develop alongside the transformation of NATO to lead to a more inclusive and integrated European space, that the post-Cold War settlement would take account of the Soviet security interests. The alliance with Germany would not only overcome the Cold War but also turn on its head the legacy of the Great Patriotic War.


But inside the U.S. government, a different discussion continued, a debate about relations between NATO and Eastern Europe. Opinions differed, but the suggestion from the Defense Department as of October 25, 1990 was to leave “the door ajar” for East European membership in NATO. (See Document 27)




As late as March 1991, according to the diary of the British ambassador to Moscow, British Prime Minister John Major personally assured Gorbachev, “We are not talking about the strengthening of NATO.” Subsequently, when Soviet defense minister Marshal Dmitri Yazov asked Major about East European leaders’ interest in NATO membership, the British leader responded, “Nothing of the sort will happen.” (See Document 28)


When Russian Supreme Soviet deputies came to Brussels to see NATO and meet with NATO secretary-general Manfred Woerner in July 1991, Woerner told the Russians that “We should not allow […] the isolation of the USSR from the European community.” According to the Russian memorandum of conversation, “Woerner stressed that the NATO Council and he are against the expansion of NATO (13 of 16 NATO members support this point of view).” (See Document 30)


Thus, Gorbachev went to the end of the Soviet Union assured that the West was not threatening his security and was not expanding NATO.


OutaTime43 Mtnoise255 Fri, 12/15/2017 - 01:10 Permalink

I don't see why anyone would trust us diplomatically. We've gone back on our agreements for years now. We interferred with Ukraine's political independence and carried out a coup there (full media blackout of course) thus violating the Budapest Memorandum. We stabbed Mohammar in the back in Libya after he did basically everything we asked of him.  We made an agreement with Iran that we are now foolishly trying to back out of. 

In reply to by Mtnoise255

Luc X. Ifer Mtnoise255 Fri, 12/15/2017 - 04:06 Permalink

So, your logic is this - at that time - of the Soviet, the land wasn't inhabited by Russians but Soviets, and suddenly, after the change in the state name, suddenly all Soviets become Russians. Is this what you learn at your social media manipulation classes - still the well known now Alinsky's tactics, I must confess you folk run out of tools ...

In reply to by Mtnoise255

OutaTime43 Not Too Important Fri, 12/15/2017 - 01:15 Permalink

Complete media blackout on that one too. They used the Julia Tymoshenko issue to spark the war . Well done I might add.  Yanukovych was ready to sign the EU cooperation agreement until the west insisted on the release of far right wing nut Tymoshenko from prison. The former president balked , setting off a near riot in parliament and in the street among her supporters. The west saw their opportunity and their provacateurs pounced. The rest is history. Not something you'll see in our media at all. Total blackout of our fully controlled media.

In reply to by Not Too Important

HenryHall Thu, 12/14/2017 - 19:18 Permalink

To suggest that Gorbachev believed American promises is absurd. Gorbachev was general secretary of the CPSU for goodness sake, not some naive child. He knew that promises from NATO were worthless, that those people, including especially American government officials, have no honesty or decency. It is ridiclous to propose otherwise.

TexasDave Thu, 12/14/2017 - 19:46 Permalink

Comfirmation finality. I have seen the enemy and it is us. Galts Gulch and resistance to Washington is basically obedience to God at this point. -Dave

Son of Captain Nemo Thu, 12/14/2017 - 21:53 Permalink

Already a known quantity GW well before these docs "officially" hit the street...

But thank you for reminding U.S. AGAIN at just how fucking evil our government is after this ( and every other piece of history you've catalogued for us over the last 5 years!

Lot of good it will do given how many Americans read it and yawn!... Especially with child molesting nut cases like this one (…) that are holding North Korea' as a hostage for the "sound money" Nation(s) that are on it's border(s)!

PrometeyBezkrilov Thu, 12/14/2017 - 21:56 Permalink

These so called "western leaders" keep lying and lying for years and years. Bunch of satanists doing there dirty job. But the "Empire of Evil" was for some reason the Soviet Union, even though the "Empire of Evil" was building schools in Afghanistan and not growing opium as the "Greatest democracy of all times".

BetterRalph Thu, 12/14/2017 - 22:45 Permalink

Come on get the nazis out of ukrane already, it was retarded when the ol lady got hit on those steps it was retarded when they took up all the cobble stones of the city and it's retarded as it persists today-- why because of deep state snipers?~!

Truthseeker20 Thu, 12/14/2017 - 23:40 Permalink

Gorbachev is no victim. He is a globalist. He is a cfr member, club of rome member and for UN green agenda. There is a theory that globalists wanted the ussr to fall so the west would accept russia. Russia and china are going to be leading the NWO via brics.Supposedly communism never was rid of in the ussr. Many of the communist leaders are still in power. It was a charade.

Victor999 Truthseeker20 Fri, 12/15/2017 - 02:01 Permalink

Incredible!  And they have hidden it so well. Completely different political system.  Completely different economic system.  Completely different monetary system.  Completely different social system.  These folks are artists!  And look how they have in spite of all this tomfoolery managed to influence both the US elections and the Brexit decision at minimal cost ($100K for the US elections and £1 for Brexit).  These commies are indeed masters of deceit!

In reply to by Truthseeker20