Voting irregularities managed by private companies

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by globalintelhub
Wednesday, Nov 04, 2020 - 14:48

Since the year 2000 when hanging chads confused blue haired voters in South Florida, there has been a rush to build the best electronic voting machine.  According to the US Election Assistance Commission, there are a number of registered voting manufacturing companies that are approved to make electronic voting machines.  One of them is Election Systems & Software  According to Wikipedia (which we know is biased.. ) it says:

ES&S is a subsidiary of McCarthy Group, LLC. In 2014, ES&S was the largest manufacturer of voting machines in the United States, claiming customers in 4,500 localities in 42 states and two U.S. territories.[citation needed] As of 2014, the company had more than 450 employees, more than 200 of whom are located in Omaha.

The company is not without controversy.  In fact, there is a long list of controversies you can read about on the Wiki page, but the most disturbing by far is this one:

In a letter sent to Senator Ron Wyden in April 2018, Election Systems & Software made the disclosure that in fact "some" of the election management systems that they sold for voting did have remote-access software installed. This disclosure was made public in July 2018.[39][40][41] The letter to Wyden had been in response to a question from the senator requesting clarification of the information on remote-access software in the New York Times article.[41][40]

While election-management systems are not the voting machines voters use to cast their ballots, they are used to program the voting machines used in a county and to count and tabulate the results from the voting machines. By installing remote access software allowing the machines to be accessed via the internet, the machines are vulnerable to being "hacked" remotely..

This is to be expected, but what is interesting is that "Election Source" is not listed on the approved certified website, nor are any of their voting machines approved for use (see the full list here).  Election Source is the company that manages the majority of voting in Michigan.

Michigan officials are looking into the data discrepancies:

A county in the battleground state of Michigan is reviewing the Election Day vote count after the clerk “became aware of apparently skewed results.” Antrim County Clerk Sheryl Guy learned of the skewed results in unofficial tabulations, the county said in a statement. Since then, her office has been reviewing the results “and the multiple redundancies to search out any possible discrepancies.”  Staff members are working with township officials and Election Source, the company that provides the voting software programs and hardware.

Even biased NBC News reported on the fact that voting machines were made with "Chinese Parts" and open for remote manipulation:

The nondescript name and building match the relative anonymity of the company, more commonly known as ES&S, which has operated in obscurity for years despite its central role in U.S. elections. Nearly half of all Americans who vote in the 2020 election will use one of its devices.  That has led to calls for ES&S and its competitors, Denver-based Dominion Voting Systems and Austin, Texas-based Hart Intercivic, to reveal details about their ownership and the origins of the parts, some of which come from China, that make up their machines.

If the actual vote count is done by private computer firms - how is anyone to know the real results?  How is a court battle going to change anything, if the results are tabulated and displayed via private computer systems, with no technical audit?

What we do know - after 4 years of being terrorized by the news media, the "Russia Hack" was not a hack at all, but a leak at the DNC.  We don't know who did the leaking or why, if Wikileaks was involved or not.  What we have confirmed in the technical community was the IP addresses listed in the Congressional report were TOR exit nodes.  Anyone can generate their origin from Russia by using TOR, this was confirmed by the preponderance of the repeating subnet, and cross referenced with TOR exit node data, available publicly:

All Tor nodes that make up the Tor network are completely public. You can visit this page to see a list of the current Tor exit node IP addresses. But since the Tor network is run by volunteers, the list of nodes constantly changes — people running old nodes decide to shut them down, and other people start up new nodes. So I used the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine to download each historical list of Tor exit nodes available, beginning in September 2014.

I found a total of 7,854 IPs that were, in recent years, Tor exit nodes, and I compared it to the list of 876 IPs that were published with the Grizzly Steppe report. I found 367 IP addresses in common — in other words, at least 367 of the suspicious IP addresses are, or were, Tor exit nodes. And after this story was posted, I was alerted to an even better data set, assembled by the Tor Project’s CollecTor, that showed more Tor nodes: it turns out that 426 of the IP addresses in the Grizzly Steppe report are historical Tor nodes, so it’s actually 49% rather than 42%.

So you see dear ZH readers - just as explained in our books, the world is not as it seems.

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