Three Levers China Is Pulling To Weather Gulf Energy Shock; How Long Can Beijing Hold Out?

The new troubling development is that maritime chokepoint chaos spread overnight from the Strait of Hormuz to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, where Iran-backed Houthis targeted two Saudi Arabian tankers. The attacks expose yet another maritime chokepoint and risk further physical market tightening, forcing traders to price a larger war-risk premium into Brent crude futures and pushing the benchmark above $100 a barrel Thursday morning.

Oil headed to Asia generally does not flow through both chokepoints. Persian Gulf exports pass through Hormuz and sail east, while Saudi crude loaded at Yanbu enters the Red Sea and passes south through Bab el-Mandeb.

Asia takes most of Hormuz crude, with China alone absorbing nearly two-fifths. On Saudi Arabia's Red Sea route through Bab el-Mandeb, China recently accounted for more than half of exports.

With both chokepoints disrupted, we want to check back in with China to understand what levers Beijing is pulling to absorb the energy shock - this builds on our three previous notes:

• China's Oil Imports Plummet To Eight-Year Low
• Visualizing China's Role In Stabilizing Oil Markets
• China's Refiners Slash Runs To Lowest Since 2017, As Asia Refiners Slow Purchases Of Mid-East Oil

On Wednesday, Goldman commodities strategist Hongcen Wei outlined three factors that have so far allowed Beijing to contain the economic fallout from the Gulf energy shock:

1. drawing down fuel inventories,
2. switching to coal and renewables,
3. and concentrating production cuts in oil- and gas-intensive industries.

China's real GDP growth slowed to an annualized 3.6% in the second quarter from 5.3% in the first, while total energy demand still rose .4% from a year earlier in April and May. Destocking of coal, oil and NatGas added 5.4 percentage points to energy-demand growth.

Fuel substitution also softened the impact. Lower oil and gas use subtracted 1.7 percentage points, while increased consumption of coal and renewables added 2.2 points. Gasoline demand sank 23%, but EV charging jumped 60%, allowing transportation activity to migrate toward electricity.

The remaining damage was concentrated in industries heavily dependent on oil and NatGas, while industries with greater flexibility shifted toward electricity and alternative fuels.

Wei provided the full rundown on how China is absorbing the energy shock:

Major Fall in Net Imports, but Total Energy Demand Growth Still Positive. Ordinarily the largest importer of energy products shipped through the Strait of Hormuz, China has drastically reduced its net imports of fossil fuels, effectively acting as a shock absorber for global energy prices through reduced demand. Net imports of crude oil cratered in China and the rest of Asia beginning in March, but recovered in the rest of Asia to 2025 levels by June while continuing to fall in China through the first half of July (Exhibit 3).

China's net imports of oil/natural gas/coal fell 24%/7%/24% YoY in April and May reflecting YoY price jumps of 59%/49%/38% (Exhibit 4). These reductions in fossil fuel net imports were the largest source of negative total energy demand growth, representing -3.7pp/-0.3pp/-1.2pp of China's total YoY energy demand growth of +0.4% (Exhibit 5).

Exhibit 3: China Crude Oil Net Imports Continue to Fall While the Rest of Asia Recovers to 2025 Levels

Chinese total energy consumption in April and May increased by an average of 0.4%, or 52 petajoules, year-over-year. To roughly estimate the impact of the supply shock on energy consumption, we estimate counterfactual consumption growth as the average +3.1% annual total energy demand growth rate from 2014-2023.[2] Applying this rate to China's average total monthly consumption in April and May 2025 would imply 375 PJ counterfactual YoY energy demand growth. This would suggest roughly 323 PJ of demand destruction for April and May, or 2.7pp reduction in the potential YoY growth rate. China's Q2 real GDP growth fell to 3.6% after 5.3% Q1 growth quarterly annualized, slightly exceeding our China team's nudged-down June forecast of 3.5% Q2 growth but missing market expectations. Lower GDP growth reflected mostly slower government spending, but also higher energy prices and unfavorable weather conditions.

Below, we highlight three factors that helped mitigate the total demand shock.

#1 Effective Destocking of Coal, Oil and Natural Gas Filled in for Fall in Fossil Fuel Imports and Production

Importing less of its energy needs from abroad, China has turned to its domestic inventories--rather than domestic production growth--to supplement the supply of fossil fuels.

Total domestic fossil fuel production actually fell slightly YoY in April and May, with lower coal production comprising a 0.5 percentage point reduction in total energy supply growth (Exhibit 5). Domestic crude oil production was unchanged compared to April and May of last year, likely constrained by high extraction costs in China's aging brownfields.

The bulk of the rise in total energy consumption has been driven by the effective destocking of fossil fuels.

• Thermal coal inventory levels increased by 1.6%/3.7% during April/May 2026, significantly lower than the 4.7%/5.8% MoM increase of April/May 2025. Though China's coal inventory level rose this April and May, we consider the reduction in MoM additions compared to last year's flows--in other words, how much less China added to its coal inventory this April/May compared to April/May 2025--as effective destocking. Defined this way, coal stock use contributed 3.0 percentage points to total YoY demand growth (Exhibit 5).
• We estimate that oil destocking also accelerated, contributing 2.2pp to total YoY demand growth (Exhibit 5). Moreover, changes in China's visible crude oil stocks also appear directionally consistent with our implied destocking estimates of around 1mb/d in May and June, suggesting a shift from restocking in Q2 2025 to greater inventory use this year (Exhibit 6).
• Effective natural gas destocking accounted for 0.2pp of total YoY energy demand growth (Exhibit 5).

#2 Fuel Substitution to Coal and Renewables Has Limited the Demand Destruction

To avoid wider demand destruction caused by lower fossil fuel imports and production, China has increased its reliance on coal and renewables in its wider energy mix. Lower oil/natural gas use in China's overall energy demand contributed -1.6/-0.1 percentage points to its total YoY energy demand growth in April and May, while greater reliance on coal/renewables contributed +1.4/+0.8pp (Exhibit 7).

As an example of this fuel switching in practice, we observe China substituting driving with gasoline for driving with electricity. Gasoline consumption fell 23%/23%/21% YoY in April/May/June, but EV charging growth rose to 62%/60%/57% YoY. Despite much lower gasoline consumption, traffic congestion remained relatively stable, falling only 1.2% YoY in April before growing by 0.2% and 2.1% YoY in May and June (Exhibit 8). These findings are consistent with our prior reporting on China's uptick in domestic EV sales since the start of the Iran war (despite seasonally-adjusted total passenger car sales remaining flat) and may reflect substitution both in car purchases (more EVs bought) and especially in choosing which kind of energy to drive on.[3]

#3 Energy-Related Reductions in Output Are Concentrated in Oil- and Natural Gas-Reliant Sectors

Several industries that are highly oil- or natural gas-intensive have slowed production. Physical output of processed crude oil fell by 10.9% YoY in Q2 reflecting lower crude oil inputs (Exhibit 9).[4] Sulfuric acid, produced as a byproduct during oil and natural gas refining, saw 4.6% lower Q2 physical output YoY. Chemical fibers, produced with either oil or natural gas feedstocks like ethane or naphtha as inputs, saw 3.7% lower Q2 physical output YoY.

The production of the industrial chemical ethylene increased in Q2 by 1.2% YoY, rebounding from a 4.1% YoY fall in April to +2.1% and +5.5% YoY growth in May and June. Though conventional ethylene production involves steam cracking of oil feedstocks like ethane or naphtha, the recent rebound in ethylene output growth may reflect China's significant acceleration in modern coal-to-chemicals pathways like Coal-to-Olefins (CTO) where coal is gasified into syngas, synthesized into methanol, and dehydrated to form ethylene. China's use of coal in chemical production rose by 11.5% in April YoY amid the energy supply shock according to DBX Commodities, with coal-to-chemicals facilities residing atop domestic coal reserves well-positioned to facilitate the transition.

Furthermore, energy-intensive products more reliant on power than oil or natural gas feedstocks saw more resilient output growth. The production of caustic soda, a major industrial chemical, is highly electricity-intensive but does not require oil or natural gas as unique inputs. Physical output of caustic soda grew by 2.4% YoY in Q2. EV production, more reliant on power than on materials made with oil and natural gas, also increased 17.0% YoY.

The key question is how long China's energy strategy to bridge Hormuz and Red Sea disruptions can last.

China recently had 1.3 billion to 1.4 billion barrels in crude inventories, including roughly 400 million barrels accumulated during 2025. At the current import shortfall of about 3.5 million barrels a day, that recent stock build is about four months of coverage. Of course, the substitution strategy also has its limits. Coal, renewables, and EVs can replace gas-fired power and some gasoline consumption, but they cannot entirely substitute for oil used in aviation, trucking, petrochemicals, or industrial processes.

The bigger risk comes when China stops drawing on its strategic stockpile and returns aggressively to the global crude market.

Earlier today, Helima Croft, head of global commodity strategy at RBC Capital Markets, warned in a note that "war enters a dangerous phase with the Red Sea and critical infrastructure at risk." Read it here.

Professional Subscribers can access our latest energy-market intelligence, including analysis of Hormuz and other critical maritime chokepoints, through the new Marketdesk.ai.