Welcome To The World That Now Exists
By Michael Every of Rabobank
We ended last week with the Dutch thinktank acknowledgement that "The world as we knew it no longer exists.” We start this week knowing many are going to be profoundly uncomfortable with the new world that replaces it. Not the weekend op-ed in the Financial Times asking, ‘Is Keynesianism dead?’ adding “When debt is the disease, fiscal medicine may be as likely to harm as heal,” though that will shock many. Nor that the US just blew up three Iranian tankers, and Iran is firing at others, when such economic warfare is only going to drive inflation higher.
Rather, Germany’s state election in Saxony-Anhalt saw the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) emerge by far the largest party with 44%, over double what it got in the last election. It may be able to govern alone depending on what happens to smaller parties falling under the 5% threshold. If not, it will need a coalition partner. The mainstream --but no longer main-- parties like the Social Democrats (SDU), on 9%, and governing Christian Democrats (CDU), on 17%, refuse to work with it. However, the far left populist BSW party, which won 5%, might do so.
To say this upends post-war German electoral politics is an understatement: it would be the first time the "far right" would be in power since 1945. Moreover, the two extremes of the German political spectrum would be the majority, not “the sensible center combines to win – because markets.” Indeed, a ‘horseshoe effect’ of opposed anti-establishment parties could work together to dynamite that system. After all, the AfD and BSW have the same views on immigration and deportations; on Russia and Ukraine (pro-Russia, anti-the Ukraine war and Germany’s role in it – and in NATO); and on energy (favoring a return to Russian gas as soon as possible).
Yes, ‘This is only Saxony’, and the AfD is polling at 28% in west Germany vs. the 44% it just got in the east. However, add leftists Die Linke and BSW 17% and it’s again close to half of voters. That’s as VW fires another 50,000 workers, deindustrialisation accelerates, and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov just warned Germany is moving towards war with Russia, all of which might see further voting shifts. The “sensible center” doesn’t seem to have any answers to those huge problems regardless of whether one likes the AfD and BSW proposals. As such, could markets start considering a second German structural shift in the space of a few years? First, ‘Germany will never borrow’ became ‘Germany is borrowing hugely’; could ‘Germany is politically stable’ now become ‘Germany is politically unstable’? “Was gibt, Mr Market?”
That’s as French far-left presidential candidate Melenchon, who wants more public spending, declared: “The ECB holds an enormous amount of French state debt. I propose to all the states of the eurozone to cancel this debt held by the ECB.” He added, “We are all members of the euro system, so this is a debt we owe to ourselves. The media establishment has tried to manipulate this reasonable proposal. It took us a few days of explanation to untangle their lies. That is now done. From now on, a poll shows that the French who support this proposal to cancel the debt are more numerous than those who oppose it.“ That’s on top of, “We will establish a public banking hub. Our country has a lot of money.” Melenchon also wants "cooperative non-alignment" with Russia and blames US and NATO expansionism for provoking the crisis; he strongly opposes a new Cold War with China or any potential conflicts over Taiwan and sees closer ties with Beijing as part of a multipolar world order that undermines US hegemony.
However, nationalist Le Pen is the election favorite. She promises a "golden rule" to keep fiscal deficits under 3% of GDP and a cost-cutting package - which includes €125bn from migration, “useless” public agencies, and France’s EU contribution; plus, she wants to roll back Macron’s pension reform so workers can retire at 62. Le Pen also favors a strategic rapprochement with Moscow, once the war is over, opposes economic sanctions, and aims to limit aid to Kyiv.
In Italy, PM Meloni, now the longest serving post-WW2 leader, is heading into a 2027 election with a political rival to her far right; she is moving in that direction as a result. As Le Monde puts it, ‘Meloni's migration policy becomes lever for Italy's illiberal shift: Questioning the work of magistrates, bypassing parliament, putting the press under surveillance, marginalizing human rights: The Italian prime minister's ongoing escalation is undermining the rule of law.’
Spain has its own problems, and a recent immigration incident in Ceuta, as PM Sanchez is moving to the progressive left geopolitically, including towards China, leading to clashes with not just Trump but Meloni. There, the right-wing PP is polling at around 33%, the far-right Vox at around 18%, and the further right SALF, promising an “iron fist” on around 6%.
Germany, France, Italy, and Spain account for 60% of Eurozone GDP. Yes, there is a technocratic rules-based EU superstructure, and the ECB’s Transmission Protection Instrument that allows it to buy Eurozone government bonds during periods of market stress or disorderly conditions not justified by country-specific fundamentals. (Just imagine if the Fed under Warsh were to consider putting that kind of monetary policy in place in the current market environment: quelle horreur!) However, how comfortably could that trundle on if we were to see conflated trouble in the Big Four Eurozone political economies? But this isn’t a ‘European’ issue any more than it is a ‘US’ one.
In Australia, the One Nation Party is now supported by a quarter of all voters and breathing down the neck of the center-right Liberal-National coalition, pulling the center right to the right as center-left Labor is pulled to the left. The same trend is clear in the UK with Reform vs the Conservatives (and Restore vs Reform, as we just saw the first proto ‘Blackshirts’ rally in the UK since the 1930s) and Labour vs the Greens and sectarian parties. Canadian PM Carney meanwhile seems to have found “sensible centrist” political support by being the ‘anti-Trump’… while embracing his policies like defence spending, fiscal deficits, tariffs, and national security subsidies.
As with geopolitics, markets generally only react to ‘political issues’ once they are in their faces. However, the number of such political backdrops should be seen as a whole, not separate pieces: first, because this populism is a logical and predictable byproduct of the current system; second, because Trump aside, populists are non-linearly disruptive for “because markets” in direct correlation with their numbers in power.
One populist leader may be cowed by a “coalition of the willing centrists” around them; two may not be as much; three are less likely to be again, etc. And we are looking at a possible near future where populists are no longer the angry minority but the majority. Happy Monday, and welcome to the world that now exists.