Canada Is Building The Wrong Army For The War That Is Coming
Authored by Andrew Latham via RealClearDefense,
The next major land war will not reward elegance, boutique modernization, or the comforting belief that advanced technology can replace mass and endurance. It will expose armies built on fragile assumptions. Concealment has largely disappeared. Attrition has returned as a central fact of combat. Sustainment shapes outcomes as decisively as firepower. Yet the Canadian Army remains organized, equipped, and intellectually anchored to a vision of warfare that belonged to yesterday’s world. The problem is not a simple modernization lag or a lack of new kit. It is a deeper conceptual failure—a refusal to absorb how radically and irreversibly the character of land warfare has changed.
That is the larger point. The key change is not this or that technology. The battlespace itself has changed. Artificial intelligence, proliferated drones, commercial satellites, autonomous strike systems, and persistent ISR have combined into a transparent, data-rich battlespace where everyone is on the move, movement is tracked instantly, concentrations are targeted rapidly, and supply lines are targeted as soon as they begin to form—an environment already documented in assessments of modern conflict. An army that cannot scatter, regenerate while under fire, and sustain itself while under persistent observation is not going to muddle through. It is going to break.
Transparency and the End of Concealment
Western armies have operated on the assumptions of concealment and intermittent detection for a generation. Those assumptions are no longer valid. The contemporary battlespace is full of aerial surveillance, open-source commercial satellite imagery, digital emissions that reveal every vehicle and headquarters location, and loitering munitions that make ground above those locations perpetually contested—patterns captured in recent operational analyses.
The issue is time: the time between being discovered and being targeted. The time between when a headquarters can command and when it becomes a targeting point. The time between declaring a movement and becoming a target.
Survival requires dispersion, deception, mobility, and an entire operating paradigm built on the idea that you are observed all the time. The Canadian Army knows about the emergence of drones, ISR, and digital exposure, but it has not yet internalized the ways that they change land warfare’s fundamentals.
Attrition Has Returned—and Canada Is Not Ready
Precision fires promised surgical, inexpensive war. In reality, they have intensified attrition: the ability to strike targets more often, more reliably, and more predictably. Ukraine has demonstrated the scale of this shift: modern war is industrial, not surgical. It consumes people, equipment, ammunition, drones, and spare parts at rates far beyond what most Western forces planned for in peacetime, as shown by studies of wartime industrial demand.
The Canadian Army is not designed for this reality. It is small and brittle. It is optimized for controlled, expeditionary contributions, not for open-ended, high-intensity conflict. Ammunition stocks are low. Maintenance capacity is thin. Replacement cycles are slow. Mobilization—across industry, reserve forces, and training pipelines—is largely theoretical, even as official modernization documents highlight the fragility of the current model.
You can have a small and lethal army if it is small and lethal through design and deliberate choice. You cannot have a small, hollow, and unprepared army if it has to fight for extended periods. In an attritional war, those features are decisive.
Sustainment as a Front-Line Fight
The rise of long-range strike, drones, and cyber means that the old rear area is no more. Supply lines are now a front-line fight from start to finish. Supply depots, railheads, ports, repair facilities, and fuel infrastructure are all high-priority targets. If an enemy cannot stop forward brigades, it will attempt to starve them. Analyses of modern logistics under fire emphasize that industrial capacity and resilient supply networks—not efficiency—determine strategic endurance.
An army for the future must be able to fight under conditions of intermittent resupply, contested and damaged infrastructure, disrupted and overloaded communications, and near-constant threats to supply lines. Planning and organization must prioritize resilience, redundancy, and regeneration rather than peacetime efficiency and timeliness.
The Canadian Army still plans as if reliable resupply were a given and rear areas could stay intact. The moment a capable adversary enters the fight, those assumptions are shattered.
Dispersion, Autonomy, and Command Under Fire
Land warfare favors armies that can fight dispersed but connected, decentralized but coordinated. Small units must be able to operate at will even when isolated or cut off. Junior leaders must be able to act without micromanagement. Commanders must know their communications will be lost and they must be able to exercise control while that loss is happening. Contemporary doctrinal analysis underscores exactly this requirement for decentralized command in contested environments.
This is a question of more than new radios or drones. It is also a cultural issue. The instinct for centralization, risk aversion, and procedural control stems from the experience of peacekeeping and counterinsurgency missions, not from the needs of a high-tech, fully contested battlespace.
The institutional habits and instincts of the Canadian Army are still oriented to a previous world. It is those habits that will be unprepared when the next world comes.
The Arctic and Continental Reality
Canada’s geography adds to the problem. The Arctic is no longer a distant, largely theoretical frontier. It is now a theatre of competition defined by opposing surveillance architectures, long-range strike systems, and critical infrastructure vulnerabilities—conditions mapped in recent assessments of Arctic security. Continental defense is no longer just about aerospace warning. It is also about protecting energy networks, ports, radar sites, satellite uplinks, and the digital infrastructure that underpins modern life, as reflected in NATO’s forward defense posture.
A land force built for small contributions overseas cannot do all that. Canada needs an army that is also oriented toward persistent continental defense, NATO high-intensity operations, and hybrid resiliency. Canada does not have that. Instead, it has something far smaller and far less capable—an assessment echoed in recent readiness evaluations.
Radical Redesign, Not Cautious Incrementalism
Add drones, experiment with AI tools, rewrite doctrine. It is the typical Ottawa response to a problem of this nature. It is also not remotely enough. This is a structural problem, not a superficial one. Canada faces a conceptual failure, not a cosmetic one. A conceptual failure cannot be solved by bolt-on solutions.
What is needed is redesign. Force structure, reserves, sustainment, mobilization, training, and even strategic purpose must be rethought. This means jettisoning some assumptions that have been bedrock in Canadian defence since the Kosovo and Afghanistan era. It also means facing political realities about cost, scale, and what it is to be a responsible nation in this new moment. Emerging analysis of “hiding vs. finding,” sensor-shooter compression, and mass-versus-quality dynamics illustrates how unforgiving the next battlespace will be.
Optimism that everything is fine is a costly illusion. The faster you are wrong, the greater the cost.
The Cost of Illusion
The transformation of land warfare is happening before our eyes, under real fire. Armies that adapt late lose deterrence, relevancy, and influence. Canada does not need the biggest army in NATO. It needs an army designed for the realities of transparent, attritional, technologically saturated land warfare where endurance—not elegance—is the definition of combat power, themes reinforced in the latest assessments of the future competitive security environment.
Steel will matter. Silicon will matter. But none of it will matter until Canada has rethought how it prepares for land war – and makes the necessary changes. Waiting until events force that remaking is asking for a much harder reckoning in far worse circumstances down the road.
Andrew Latham, Ph.D., a tenured professor at Macalester College in Saint Paul, Minnesota. He is also a Senior Washington Fellow with the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy in Ottawa and a non-resident fellow with Defense Priorities, a think tank in Washington, D.C.