A Flag Or A Fleet

Before We Solve The Hormuz Crisis

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Now, we give President Trump two ways of opening up the Strait of Hormuz. 

What Iran Thinks It Has Won

Five months of American and Israeli bombing have devastated Iran without forcing Tehran to surrender control of the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s leaders still believe they can decide who passes, on what terms, and at what price.

Their latest draft arrangement with Oman makes that confidence explicit. As ZeroHedge reported Thursday, commercial vessels would enter the Persian Gulf through an Iranian-controlled route and leave through an Omani-controlled one. Iran’s parliament is reviewing additional terms that would bar U.S.- and Israel-linked vessels and impose penalties on others. Meanwhile, the Houthis have attacked Saudi tankers in the Red Sea and threatened the main bypass to Hormuz.

The gap between military damage and political compulsion is now the core problem. Iran has absorbed enormous losses while preserving a public claim to sovereign control over the chokepoint. President Trump needs a threat—or a bargain—that changes that calculation. He needs a flag or a fleet.

The Missing Ingredient Is Legibility

On March 22nd, in our original Hormuz post, we argued that America’s ability to reopen the Strait would shape more than the price of oil. Failure would advertise the limits of U.S. military supremacy and accelerate the shift toward a multipolar order.

The war since then has clarified the challenge. Airpower can destroy fixed sites, aircraft, air defenses, command nodes, and known missile infrastructure. It can’t occupy terrain, search every bunker, seize senior officials, or replace the flag over a strategic position.

Israel has already acknowledged commando operations inside Iran for intelligence, target designation, and tactical deception. The United States and Israel have also discussed special-forces missions against underground nuclear sites. Those missions improve access and targeting. Their secrecy limits their coercive value.

Tehran can still tell its population that the regime survived, no enemy publicly holds Iranian territory, and Iran controls the Strait. That narrative supports its strategy of outlasting Trump. His aversion to American casualties is well known, Gulf governments want de-escalation, and the war has drawn down U.S. stocks of standoff weapons and interceptors.

A credible escalation now has to threaten something Iran’s leaders value more than another military installation. It also has to be visible enough that they can’t disguise the loss.

A Flag

The most literal answer is territorial. Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb are three strategic islands near the shipping lanes. Iran garrisons them, while the United Arab Emirates claims all three.

A coalition operating with Emirati consent, potentially built around Israeli special-operations units and regional forces, could seize one or more of the islands, destroy hardened military sites, and raise the Emirati flag. Air-backed ground forces could also capture IRGC officers and intelligence that airstrikes leave behind. The image would be unmistakable: the regime had lost Iranian-held territory and failed to protect its own forces.

The obstacles explain why it hasn’t happened. Taking a small island may be feasible; holding it against Iranian missiles and drones would be harder. A foreign seizure could also rally Iranian nationalism and make compromise politically dangerous for Tehran. And the UAE has declared its neutrality, withholding its territory and airspace from attacks on Iran. An Emirati flag can’t provide legitimacy without Emirati approval.

A tightly limited operation could reduce those risks. Removing an Iranian garrison and transferring administration to the UAE could be paired with an immediate ceasefire offer: free passage through Hormuz in exchange for an end to further ground operations. That would give Trump a credible escalation ladder without committing American troops to a march on Tehran.

A Fleet

The diplomatic alternative would make Iran’s concession legible while giving its leaders a face-saving explanation for it.

The Oman framework contains the beginnings of such an arrangement, but its reported terms would formalize Iran as the Strait’s gatekeeper. Iranian permission, selective bans, and tolls would convert a commercial shipping lane into an instrument of Iranian sovereignty.

A broader settlement could transfer navigation and enforcement to a multinational force that includes the countries with the largest stake in open passage: Oman and the Gulf states, India, China, Russia, the United States, and European allies. A United Nations or Omani mandate could guarantee transit without Iranian permission. Any service fees could go to a joint maritime authority rather than Tehran.

China and Russia have already conducted repeated naval exercises with Iran near the Gulf of Oman. Their participation would give Tehran a way to describe the settlement as internationalization rather than surrender. It would also give Washington something it currently lacks: guarantors with leverage over Iran and an interest in uninterrupted energy flows.

Their participation would probably carry a price. Russia might press for changes in U.S. support for Ukraine; China might seek movement on Taiwan. Those demands would reshape separate balances of power and provoke resistance from allies and Congress. They would have to be weighed against the economic and military cost of an indefinite blockade. Narrower currencies—sanctions relief, energy access, formal naval roles, or recognition as guarantors—may be enough.

The fleet would also need a Red Sea component. Renewed Houthi attacks show that reopening Hormuz alone won’t secure the alternative route around Arabia. A durable agreement must cover the Houthis as well as Iran.

The Order Behind The Outcome

The two paths would reopen the Strait on very different terms.

A flag would be an attempt to preserve the old American-led order through coercion: assemble a coalition, take a strategic position, and force Iran to concede. A fleet would reopen Hormuz by acknowledging the multipolar order our March post warned was emerging. China, Russia, India, and the Gulf states would become co-guarantors of a trade route the U.S. Navy once secured.

The next durable settlement will tell us whether the United States can still enforce passage on its own terms, or whether global trade now needs a concert of powers. Hormuz may reopen either way. The flag over its islands—or the flags in its escort fleet—will tell us what replaced the postwar order.